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EXECUTE SUMMARY 
Although it is widely accepted that risk preferences and women’s empowerment influence how 
decisions are made and have tangible outcomes, such as on livelihood strategies, food security, 
and poverty traps, there is no consensus on their measurement or determinants. Improved 
methods to elicit risk preferences and decision-making power as well as a better understanding of 
their determinants can allow development policy to better match smallholders’ risk preferences 
and to increase women’s empowerment. This thesis has two main objectives: 1) To identify 
influencing factors of risk preferences and intra-household decision-making power using a 
conceptual framework; 2) To improve methods to measure risk preferences and intra-household 
decision-making by comparing widely used methods to more innovative ones. This thesis is 
based on data collected in 2011 from both household heads and spouses in a random sample of 
300 households, representative of Yen Chau district, Son La Province in northwestern Vietnam. 
On average, respondents are poor, have a low level of education, worry about food security, 
produce maize for cash income and rice for home consumption, and rely heavily on social 
networks to obtain credit. Households in Yen Chau face significant risks from idiosyncratic and 
covariate shocks, such as illness, drought, animal death, and yield losses from pests and diseases.  
The thesis contains five chapters: the introductory chapter explains the conceptual framework 
and research objectives, outlining the importance of a better understanding of determinants of 
risk preferences and decision-making power for poverty traps, income, and food security; the 
second chapter examines determinants of risk preferences, including several proxies of social 
capital and other individual-level and household-level variables; the third chapter examines 
determinants of changes in risk preferences across the lean season and the harvest season, 
focusing on whether shocks cause individuals to become more risk averse; the fourth chapter 
analyzes influencing factors of husbands' and wives' intra-household financial decision-making 
power; and the final chapter concludes and offers recommendations for research and policy.  
After establishing the importance of risk preferences and women's decision-making power 
within a conceptual framework in the first chapter, the second chapter examines determinants of 
risk preferences using a cross-section dataset. Five widely applied methods to elicit risk 
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preferences (a non-hypothetical lottery game, financial risk tolerance question, self-assessment 
scale, and hypothetical income and inheritance gambles) and four innovative methods (maize 
and rice gambles of yields and prices) are compared. We find that respondents are, on average, 
very risk averse. Moreover, correlations between most risk preference measures are statistically 
highly significant, although most are weak. This suggests that risk preference measures related to 
various decision domains should be compared with caution. Using a conceptual framework, we 
outline the hypothesized determinants of risk preferences: the decision domain, prior 
experiences, and the asset base including human, financial, and social capital. Given the 
importance of social capital in Yen Chau, we use several proxies of to capture its various 
dimensions: norms of helping and of sharing with others (cognitive social capital), the ability to 
rely upon various social networks in times of need (structural and cognitive social capital), 
membership in organizations (structural social capital), connections to local authorities (linking 
social capital), and the village population and its square (to capture low vs. high closure). The 
results show that significant determinants of risk preferences across most elicitation methods are 
gender, age, idiosyncratic shocks, education, social norms, network-reliance with extended 
family, and connections to local authorities. The significance of several social capital proxies 
suggests that people's risk preferences are embedded in social institutions. Moreover, we find 
that greater network-reliance with first-degree relatives has an increasing effect on risk aversion, 
providing evidence that strong familial attachments may discourage individuals from taking 
risks. Given the high degree of risk aversion, we recommend ex-ante and ex-post mitigation and 
coping policies such as agricultural insurance and other safety nets which could target the most 
risk averse individuals. In addition, we recommend opportunities for smallholders to participate 
in the hands-on operations of local field trials to help overcome risk aversion to new production 
systems and technologies.  
Despite the emphasis in the literature that shocks cause households to fall into poverty traps 
and that risk averse individuals can remain trapped in poverty, there has been no attempt yet to 
discern whether shocks influence risk aversion. Moreover, there is no consensus on whether risk 
preferences are stable over time. Thus, the third chapter examines whether risk preferences 
remain stable from the lean season to the harvest season and then analyzes whether shocks 
change individual risk preferences. Risk preferences were assessed from the same respondents 
seven months apart using three widely applied elicitation methods (a lottery game, financial risk 
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tolerance question, and self-assessment scale) and four innovative methods (maize and rice 
gambles of yields and prices). To obtain a better understanding of how shocks may affect risk 
preferences, we examine both the time component of a shock – i.e., how soon the shock had 
occurred before risk preferences were elicited – and the specific characteristic of shock – i.e., if 
the shock were a drought, livestock death, another covariate shock, or idiosyncratic. The results 
indicate that for all but one assessment method – the financial risk tolerance question – risk 
preferences are not stable across seasons. Correlations between risk preferences across seasons in 
the lottery game and self-assessment scale are rather weak, while those in the maize and rice 
gambles are stronger. Respondents became less risk averse according to the lottery game and 
self-assessment scale, yet they became more risk averse according to the rice and maize gambles. 
The regression analyses find that characteristics which are unlikely to change between seasons, 
such as gender, education and social capital proxies, and characteristics which do change across 
seasons, such as idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, are significant determinants of changes in 
risk preferences between seasons, although determining factors differ by elicitation method. 
Factors determining risk preference changes across seasons based on the two self-assessment 
methods (the financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale) tend to have the 
opposite effect compared to the methods involving gambles. This provides further evidence of 
the importance of the decision domain when analyzing risk preferences. Examining the influence 
of shocks by type and by time in separate analyses highlights the importance of separating 
various shocks to examine their impact on risk preference stability. Contrary to expectations, 
more recent shocks did not have a greater effect on risk preferences. In regressions which 
analyzed impacts of specific types of shocks, losses from livestock deaths had no significant 
effect on changes in risk preferences across seasons, although losses from other covariate shocks 
and idiosyncratic shocks did. Nevertheless, in all analyses the relative impact on changes in risk 
preferences across seasons as a result of shocks is quite small. The chapter concludes with 
recommendations to help prevent households from falling into poverty and remaining trapped in 
poverty based on findings that shocks change individual risk preferences. 
Women's empowerment can also influence important outcomes for livelihood strategies. 
Previous research has demonstrated positive impacts of women's empowerment on food security, 
child nutritional status, and education. Several studies have explored the impact of exposure to 
financial programs on women's empowerment. Missing from the literature, however, is 
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examining influencing factors of women's intra-household decision-making power for a variety 
of financial decisions. Thus, the fourth chapter examines influencing factors of wives' and 
husbands' decision-making power in taking out and repaying four different sized loans, as well as 
in saving and family budgeting to obtain a better overview of household financial decision-
making dynamics. Rather than aggregating all decisions together in an index as most studies do, 
the chapter focuses on examining each decision separately. The identification of sources of 
decision-making power in specific decisions can help direct policies to improve women’s 
decision-making power in distinct financial domains. Based on theories and previous research, 
we hypothesize that individual-, household-, and institutional-level factors may influence 
women’s decision-making power for financial decisions. The results show that determinants of 
decision-making power vary by decision and demonstrate that important findings are lost 
altogether in aggregated indices composed of several decisions. We find that being able to speak 
Vietnamese, completing more education, living in a relatively poor household, and having more 
network-reliance with extended family increases wives' odds of being empowered in most 
financial decisions, whereas being married longer, living in a household with a relatively high 
child dependency ratio, and living in a household with greater women-controlled income 
decreases wives' odds of being empowered. Although this latter result may seem counterintuitive 
based on the theory that the more women control, the greater their intra-household power, 
previous studies and follow-up interviews suggest that the more successful the woman's domain 
becomes, the greater the chance men take it over. Based on the results, we provide the following 
policy recommendations to increase wives' empowerment in financial decisions: ensuring 
fluency by women in Vietnamese, increasing education, supporting at-home employment 
opportunities for women, lengthening the school day, and requiring that children eat lunch at 
school. Recommendations specific to the formal financial sector are to target financial services to 
both husbands and wives, offer mobile banking, and reduce red tape for conducting financial 
transactions. Because sources of empowerment from the individual-, household-, and 
institutional-levels may mutually reinforcing, a multi-level approach is needed to improve wives’ 
empowerment. 
There are two main contributions that this thesis makes. The first is that we develop more 
suitable and informative methods for measuring risk preferences and decision-making power as 
well as provide suggestions for future research. Because risk preferences were elicited from such 
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a wide range of techniques – one non-hypothetical lottery, two self-assessment techniques, and 
six hypothetical gambles – we are able to offer specific suggestions for improving the 
measurement of risk preferences, particularly for smallholder farmers in a developing country. 
We find that the self-assessment scale and hypothetical maize and rice gambles are the most 
suitable methods, yet they should be improved. For example, the easily identifiable middle 
category should be removed from the self-assessment scale and more refined choices should be 
provided in the maize and rice gambles. The fourth chapter demonstrated the drawbacks of the 
status quo which relies on analyzing intra-household decision-making power based on an index 
composed of several decisions. Moreover, the advantages of asking about specific types of loans 
rather than about loans in general were evident: We found stark and important differences 
between decision-making power in small loans as opposed to loans of greater value. In addition, 
the three main chapters revealed that social capital can have varying affects on risk preferences 
and decision-making power depending on its proxy. Thus, we recommend that several proxies of 
social capital should be used rather than one only. To aid future research, an appendix contains 
the questionnaires used to elicit risk preferences, decision-making power, and social capital.  
The second contribution is that the results can be used to target safety nets, encourage 
investments, and improve women's financial decision-making power. The recommendations may 
help prevent households from falling into poverty and remaining trapped in poverty. Given the 
finding that most respondents are very risk averse and that the current livelihood strategy – 
maize production on steep slopes which highly degrades the soil – is perceived by farmers in Yen 
Chau to be a low-risk activity, respondents should be supported in adopting new production 
systems which do not entail as much environmental degradation, yet which they view as risky. 
Support for adopting new production systems could be in the form of credit, subsidized inputs, 
and local field trails. Based on the finding that shocks can cause individuals to become even 
more risk averse, effective cash or food transfer programs, more expansive health insurance, and 
agricultural insurance may help reduce the increasing effect of shocks on risk aversion by 
helping households mitigate the effect of adverse shocks. The above recommendations for 
increasing women's power in financial decisions may also have tangible outcomes important for 
food security. In summary, support should be provided to encourage the adoption of new 
production systems, to help households better cope with shocks, and to increase women's clout in 
financial decisions, thereby opening the door to new livelihood strategies.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Obwohl es weithin anerkannt ist, dass Risikopräferenzen und die Stärkung der Rolle der Frau 
Einfluss darauf haben wie Entscheidungen gefällt werden und sich auch konkret auf 
beispielsweise Lebensunterhalt, Nahrungssicherheit und Armutsfallen auswirken, gibt es in der 
Wissenschaft keinen Konsens über deren ausschlaggebende Faktoren oder ihre Erhebung. Durch 
verbesserte Methoden zur Ermittlung von Risikopräferenzen und der Entscheidungsmacht als 
auch ein besseres Verständnis über deren ausschlaggebende Faktoren kann Entwicklungspolitik 
besser auf kleinbäuerliche Risikopräferenzen ausgerichtet werden und zur Stärkung der Rolle der 
Frau beitragen. Diese Dissertation hat folgende zwei Hauptziele: 1) Identifizierung der 
Einflussfaktoren von Risikopräferenzen und der Entscheidungsmacht innerhalb eines Haushaltes 
anhand eines konzeptuellen Rahmen und 2) Verbesserung der Messungen von Risikopräferenzen 
und der Entscheidungsprozesse innerhalb eines Haushaltes durch den Vergleich weithin 
verbreiteter Methoden mit innovativen Ansätzen. Diese Dissertation basiert auf Daten, die im 
Rahmen einer repräsentativen Zufallsstichprobe von 300 Haushalten des Yen Chau Distrikts, Son 
La Provinz im nordwestlichen Vietnam, im Jahre 2011 durch Befragung sowohl der 
Haushaltsvorstände als auch der Ehegatten erhoben wurden. Die Befragten sind im Durchschnitt 
arm,  besitzen ein niedriges Bildungsniveau, sind in Sorge um Nahrungssicherheit, produzieren 
Mais als Quelle für Geldeinkommen und Reis für den Eigenbedarf und sind bei der Versorgung 
mit Krediten auf soziale Netzwerke angewiesen. Haushalte in Yen Chau sind mit erheblichen 
Risiken aus idiosynkratischen und kovarianten Schocks wie Krankheit, Dürre, Tiersterben und 
Ernteverlust durch Schädlinge und Pflanzenkrankheiten konfrontiert. 
Die Dissertation umfasst fünf Kapitel: Das Einführungskapitel erklärt den konzeptuellen 
Rahmen und die Forschungsziele, welche die Bedeutung eines besseren Verständnisses der 
Determinanten von Risikopräferenzen und der Entscheidungsmacht  in Bezug auf Armutsfallen, 
Einkommen und Nahrungssicherheit zusammenfassen; das zweite Kapitel untersucht die 
ausschlaggebenden Faktoren von Risikopräferenzen, darunter mehrere Stellvertretervariablen 
(proxies) für Sozialkapital sowie andere Variablen auf Individual- und Haushaltsebene; im dritten 
Kapitel werden die Determinanten von Veränderungen in Risikopräferenzen über die magere 
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Jahreszeit bis über die Erntezeit hinweg untersucht, wobei ein besonderer Fokus auf 
Wetterschocks gelegt wird, welche dazu führen dass Individuen risikoscheuer werden; das vierte 
Kapitel analysiert Einflussfaktoren der finanziellen Entscheidungsmacht von Ehemann und 
Ehefrau innerhalb eines Haushaltes; das letzte Kapitel zieht Schlussfolgerungen und gibt 
Empfehlungen für Politik und Forschung.        
Nachdem im ersten Kapitel die Bedeutung von Risikopräferenzen und der Entscheidungs-
macht von Frauen innerhalb eines konzeptuellen Rahmens verdeutlicht wurde, untersucht das 
zweite Kapitel auf Basis von Querschnittsdaten die Determinanten von Risikopräferenzen. Es 
werden fünf weit verbreitete Methoden zur Bestimmung von Risikopräferenzen (nicht-
hypothtisches Lotteriespiel, finanzielle Risikotoleranz-Frage, Self-Assessment-Skala, und 
hypothetische Szenarien zu Einkommen und Erbschaft)  mit vier innovativen Methoden 
(Szenarien zu Erträgen und Preisen bei Mais und Reis) verglichen. Wir stellen fest, dass die 
Befragten im Durchschnitt sehr risikoscheu sind. Darüber hinaus sind die Korrelationen 
zwischen den meisten Risikopräferenzen statistisch höchst signifikant, obwohl die meisten 
schwach ausfallen. Dies weist darauf hin, dass Risikopräferenzmessungen, welche sich auf 
verschiedene Entscheidungsdomänen beziehen, nur mit Vorsicht verglichen werden sollten. Auf 
Grundlage eines konzeptuellen Rahmens, fassen wir im Folgenden die vermuteten 
Determinanten von Risikopräferenzen zusammen: die Entscheidungsdomäne, vorangegangene 
Erfahrungen, und der Vermögensbestand welcher Human-, Finanz- und Sozialkapital umfasst. 
Angesichts der Bedeutung von Sozialkapital in Yen Chau, verwendeten wir eine Reihe von 
Stellvertretervariablen (proxies) für Sozialkapital um dessen verschiedene Dimensionen zu 
erfassen: Normen des Helfen und Teilens mit andern (kognitives Sozialkapital), die Fähigkeit 
sich in Zeiten der Not auf verschiedene soziale Netzwerke zu verlassen (strukturelles und 
kognitives Sozialkapital), Mitgliedschaft in Organisationen (strukturelles Sozialkapital), 
Beziehungen zu lokalen Behörden („linking“ (vertikal verbindendes) Sozialkapital), und die 
Dorfbevölkerung und ihr Quadrat (zur Erfassung von starker und schwacher 
Zusammengehörigkeit). Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass über die meisten Erhebungsmethoden 
hinweg Aspekte wie Geschlecht, Alter, idiosynkratische Schocks, Bildungstand, soziale Normen, 
das Verlassen auf das Netzwerk Großfamilie und die Beziehungen zu lokalen Behörden 
signifikante Determinanten von Risikopräferenzen sind. Die Signifikanz der verschiedenen 
Stellvertretervariablen (proxies) für Sozialkapital deutet darauf hin, dass Risikopräferenzen in 
xv 
 
soziale Institutionen eingebettet sind. Außerdem stellen wir fest, dass das größeres Verlassen auf 
das Netzwerk mit der Verwandtschaft ersten Grades einen erhöhten Effekt auf die Risikoaversion 
hat, was darauf hindeutet, dass starke  familiäre Verbundenheit Individuen davon abhalten kann, 
Risiken einzugehen. In Anbetracht des hohen Grades an Riskoaversion, raten wir zu 
risikominimierenden politischen Maßnahmen, wie etwa Landwirtschaftsversicherungen oder 
andere Sicherheitsnetze, welche die risikoscheusten Individuen gezielt ansprechen könnten. Des 
Weiteren empfehlen wir Möglichkeiten für Kleinbauern zur Teilnahme an den praktischen 
Tätigkeiten der lokalen Feldversuche zu schaffen, um die Risikoaversion gegenüber neuen 
Produktionssystemen und –technologien abzubauen.  
Obwohl in der Literatur oft betont wird, dass Schocks dazu führen, dass Haushalte in die 
Armutsfalle geraten und risikoscheue Personen in der Armut gefangen bleiben, wurde bis jetzt 
noch kein Versuch unternommen um festzustellen, ob  Schocks die Risikoaversion beeinflussen. 
Außerdem gibt es keinen Konsens darüber, ob Risikopräferenzen über die Zeit unveränderlich 
bleiben. Deshalb untersucht das dritte Kapitel ob Risikopräferenzen von der mageren Zeit des 
Jahres zur Erntesaison hin unveränderlich bleiben und ob Schocks individuelle 
Risikopräferenzen verändern. Dazu wurden im Abstand von sieben Monaten, die 
Risikopräferenzen der selben Befragten durch drei weit verbreitete (Lotteriespiel, finanzielle 
Risikotoleranz-Frage, und Self-Assessment-Skala) und vier innovative Methoden (Szenarien zu 
Erträgen und Preisen bei Mais und Reis) erhoben. Um ein besseres Verständnis darüber zu 
erlangen, wie Schocks Risikopräferenzen beinflussen können, untersuchten wir sowohl die 
zeitliche Komponente des Schocks, dass heisst in welchem zeitlichen Abstand zur Erhebung der 
Risikopräferenzen ereignete sich der Schock – als auch die spezifische Art/Ausprägung des 
Schocks, dass heisst handelte es sich bei dem Schock um Dürre, Viehsterben, einen anderen 
kovarianten Schock oder um einen idiosynkratischen Schock. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass bei 
allen außer einem Messverfahren– der finanziellen Risikotoleranz-Frage – Risikopräferenzen 
über die Saisons nicht stabil bleiben. In der Lotteriespiel- und der Self-Assessment-Skala 
Methode sind Korrelationen zwischen Risikopräferenzen über die Saisons hinweg eher schwach 
ausgeprägt, während Korrelationen bei den Szenarien zu Erträgen und Preisen bei Mais und Reis 
stärker ausfallen. Nach der Lotteriespiel- und der Self-Assessment-Skala Methode wurden die 
Befragten weniger riskioscheu, nach der Methode der Reis und Mais Szenarien jedoch 
risikoscheuer. Die Regressionsanalyse zeigt, dass Merkmale, welche sich zwischen den Saisons 
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eher nicht verändern, wie etwa Geschlecht, Bildung, und den Stellvertretervariablen für 
Sozialkapital, und Merkmale, welche sich über die Saisons hinweg verändern, wie 
idiosynkratische und kovariante Schocks, signifikante Determinanten von Veränderungen in 
Risikopräferenzen zwischen den Saisons sind, obwohl sich die bestimmenden Faktoren je nach 
Erhebungsmethode unterscheiden. Faktoren, die Veränderungen in den Risikopräferenzen über 
die Saisons hinweg verursachen und mittels der beiden Self-Assessment Methoden (finanzielle 
Risikotoleranz-Frage, und Self-Assessment-Skala) ermittelt wurden, haben tendenziell den 
gegenteligen Effekt im Vergleich zu den Methoden, die Szenarien beinhalten. Dies unterstreicht 
einmal mehr die Wichtigkeit der Entscheidungsdomäne und der Erhebungsmethoden bei der 
Analyse von Risikopräferenzen. Untersucht man in getrennten Analysen den Einfluss von 
Schocks, differenziert nach Typ und Zeit, wird deutlich, dass es wichtig ist die verschiedenen 
Schocks zu trennen, um deren Einfluss auf die Stabilität von Risikopräferenzen zu bestimmen. 
Entgegen den Erwartungen haben jüngere Schocks keinen größeren Einfluss auf 
Risikopräferenzen. In den Regressionen, welche die Einflüsse von bestimmten Typen von 
Schocks untersuchten, hatten durch Viehsterben verursachte Verluste keine signifikante Wirkung 
auf Veränderungen in Risikopräferenzen über Saisons hinweg, obwohl Verluste durch andere 
kovariante und idiosynkratische Schocks einen solchen aufwiesen. In allen Analysen ist der 
relative Einfluss auf Veränderungen in Risikopräferenzen über die Saisons hinweg als Folge von 
Schocks recht klein. Aufeinanderfolgende Schocks können im Laufe der Zeit jedoch einen 
signifikanten Einfluss auf Risikoaversion haben.  Basierend auf den Forschungsergebnissen, dass 
Schocks individuelle Risikopräferenzen verändern, schließt das Kapitel mit entsprechenden 
Maßnahmenempfehlungen, um zu verhindern, dass Haushalte in Armut geraten und in der Armut 
gefangen bleiben.  
Die Stärkung der Rolle der Frau kann ebenfalls wichtige Auswirkungen auf Lebensunterhalts-
strategien haben. Vorangegangene Forschungen zeigten, dass die Stärkung der Rolle der Frau 
einen positiven Einfluss auf die Bereiche Nahrungssicherheit, Ernährungszustand von Kindern, 
und Bildung hat.  Darüberhinaus untersuchten mehrere Studien, welchen Einfluss die Teilnahme 
von Frauen an finanziellen Programmen auf deren Stärkung hat. In der Literatur fehlt es jedoch 
an Untersuchungen zu den Faktoren, die die Entscheidungsmacht von Frauen innerhalb des 
Haushaltes in Bezug auf eine Vielzahl von finanziellen Entscheidungen beeinflussen. Deshalb 
werden im vierten Kapitel die Einflussfaktoren der Entscheidungsmacht von Ehemann und 
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Ehefrau bei der Aufnahme und Rückzahlung von vier verschieden großer Kredite als auch beim 
Sparen und bei der Familienbudgetplanung untersucht. Anstatt alle Entscheidungen in einem 
Index zu bündeln, so wie es in den meisten Studien gemacht wird, fokussiert sich dieses Kapitel 
auf die getrennte Untersuchung jeder Entscheidung. Die Bestimmung der  Determinanten der 
Entscheidungsmacht bei konkreten Entscheidungen kann helfen politische Maßnahmen  auf die 
Stärkung der Entscheidungsmacht der Frau in bestimmten finanziellen Bereichen auszurichten.  
Ausgehend von Theorien und vorangegangener Forschung stellen wir die Hypothese auf, dass 
Faktoren auf individueller, Haushalts- und institutioneller Ebene Frauens Entscheidungsmacht in 
finanziellen Entscheidungen beeinflussen können. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die 
Determinanten der Entscheidungsmacht abhängig von der Art der Entscheidung variieren und 
dass wichtige Erkenntnisse verloren gehen, wenn aggregierte Indices, basierend auf mehreren 
Entscheidungen, gebildet werden. Wir stellen fest, dass das Beherrschen der Vietnamesischen 
Sprache, ein höherer Bildungsabschluss, das Leben in einem relativ armen Haushalt und ein 
größeres Verlassen auf das Netzwerk Großfamilie, die Chancen der Frauen erhöhrt in den 
meisten Entscheidungen gestärkt aufzutreten, während eine langjährige Ehe, das Leben in einem 
Haushalt mit einem relativ hohen Kinderquotient, und das Leben in einem Haushalt in dem das 
Einkommen stärker von Frauen kontrolliert wird dagegen die Chancen der Frauen gestärkt zu 
sein, mindert. Obwohl das letztere Ergebnis ausgehend von der Theorie, dass je mehr von Frauen 
gesteuert wird, umso größer ist ihre Macht innerhalt des Haushaltes, nicht eingängig erscheint, 
deuten vorangegangene Studien und Folgeinterviews darauf hin, dass je erfolgreicher die 
Domäne der Frau wird, umso größer ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass diese von den Männern 
übernommen wird. Ausgehend von den Ergebnissen geben wir folgende Empfehlungen zur 
Stärkung der Rolle der Frau in finanziellen Entscheidungen: Es sollte sichergestellt werden, dass 
Frauen Vietnamesisch sprechen; man sollte Bildung und heimische Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten 
für Frauen fördern; eine Verlängerung des Schultages sollte angestrebt werden; man sollte 
gewährleisten, dass Kinder die Möglichleit haben in der Schule Mittag zu essen. Empfehlungen 
speziell für den formellen Finanzsektor sind: Finanzidienstleistungen sollten sowohl auf Männer 
als auch auf Frauen ausgerichtet sein; Mobile Banking sollte angeboten und Bürokratie in der 
Durchführung von Finanztransaktionen sollte abgebaut werden. Da sich die Determinanten der 
Stärkung der Rolle der Frau auf individueller, Haushalts- und institutioneller Ebene gegenseitig 
verstärken können, ist ein Multi-Level-Ansatz zur Stärkung der Rolle der Frau erforderlich.  
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Diese Dissertation liefert zwei Hauptbeiträge: Der erste ist, dass wir sowohl geeignetere und 
aussagekräftigere Methoden zur Messung von Risikopräferenzen und der Entscheidungsmacht 
innerhalb eines Haushaltes entwickeln als auch Anregungen für zukünftige Forschung liefern. 
Dadurch, dass wir Risikopräferenzen mittels einer Reihe von Techniken – einem nicht-
hypothetischen Lotteriespiel, zwei Self-Assessment-Techniken und sechs hypothetischen 
Szenarien – herausarbeiten, sind wir in der Lage gezielte Vorschläge zur Verbesserung der 
Messung von Risikopräferenzen, besonders für Kleinbauern in einem Entwicklungsland, zu 
erbringen. Wir sind der Meinung, dass die Self-Assessment-Skala und die hypothetischen Mais 
und Reis Szenarien die geeignetsten Methoden sind, jedoch sollten diese noch verbessert werden. 
So sollte man zum Beispiel aus der Self-Assessment-Skala die einfach zu identifizierende 
mittlere Kategorie herausnehmen und in den Mais und Reis Szenarien differenziertere 
Auswahlmöglichkeiten bieten. Im vierten Kapitel wurden die Nachteile des Status Quo, welcher 
auf der Analyse der Entscheidungsmacht innerhalb eines Haushaltes mittels eines Indexes, 
zusammengesetzt aus mehreren Entscheidungen, basiert, dargelegt. Zudem sind die Vorteile, die 
sich aus der Befragung nach spezifischen Arten von Krediten anstatt nach Krediten im 
Allgemeinen ergeben, offensichtlich: Wir fanden markante und wichtige Unterschiede zwischen 
der Entscheidungsmacht bei Kleinkrediten im Gegensatz zu Krediten größeren Umfangs. 
Darüberhinaus zeigten die drei Hauptkapitel, dass Sozialkapital, abhängig von der 
Stellvertretervariablen, unterschiedliche Wirkung auf Risikopräferenzen und 
Entscheidungsmacht haben kann. Deshalb schlagen wir anstelle nur einer Stellvertretervariablen 
die Verwendung mehrerer solcher Variablen vor. Um zukünftige Forschung zu unterstützen, sind 
die Fragebögen, welche zur Bestimmung von Risikopräferenzen, der Entscheidungsmacht und 
des Sozialkapitals verwendet wurden, im Annex aufgeführt. 
Der zweite Beitrag dieser Arbeit ist, dass die Ergebnisse dazu verwendet werden können, um 
Sicherheitsnetze zielgenauer auszurichten, Investitionen zu fördern und die finanzielle 
Entscheidungsmacht von Frauen zu verbessern. Diese Empfehlungen können Haushalten helfen 
nicht in Armut zu geraten und in der Armut zu bleiben. Anhand der Forschungsergebnisse hat 
man herausgefunden, dass die meisten Befragten sehr risikoscheu sind und die gegenwärtige 
Existenzgrundlage  - Maisproduktion an steilen Hängen und auf stark degradierten Böden – von 
den Bauern in Yen Chau als eine Aktivität mit niedrigem Risiko wahrgenommen wird. Die 
Befragten sollten angesichts dieser Erkenntnisse in der Übernahme neuer Produktionssysteme, 
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welche weniger Umweltbeeinträchtigung mit sich bringen aber von ihnen als risikoreicher 
eingestuft werden, unterstützt werden. Die Unterstützung bei der Übernahme von neuen 
Produktionsmaßnahmen könnte in Form von Krediten, subventionierten Produktionsmitteln, und 
lokalen Feldversuchen erfolgen. Angesichts der Forschungsergebnisse, dass Schocks dazu führen 
können, dass Individuen sogar risikoscheuer werden, können wirksame Transferprogramme für 
Nahrungsmittel und Geld, umfangreichere Krankenversicherungen, und 
Landwirtschaftsversicherungen dazu beitragen, die zunehmende Wirkung von Schocks auf 
Risikoaversion zu reduzieren, indem sie Haushalten bei der Linderung der Auswirkungen 
negativer Schocks helfen. Die obengenannten Vorschläge zur Steigerung des Einflusses von 
Frauen bei finanziellen Entscheidungen können zu greifbaren Ergebnissen, die wichtig für die 
Nahrungssicherheit sind, führen. Zusammenfassend soll gesagt werden, dass Unterstützung 
notwendig ist, um die Übernahme neuer Produktionssysteme zu fördern, um zu helfen mit 
Schocks besser fertig zu werden, und um den Einfluss von Frauen bei finanziellen 
Entscheidungen zu erhöhen, wodurch sich die Tür zu neuen Lebensunterhaltsstrategien eröffnet.                        
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1 INTRODUCTION  
This introduction presents general information on Vietnam and the study area before 
explaining the conceptual framework which puts forth the importance of understanding 
determinants of risk preferences and women’s empowerment for poverty traps, income, and food 
security. Following the conceptual framework, we present the main research objectives, 
questions, and hypotheses. At the end of the introduction, an outline of the thesis is provided.  
1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Vietnam is a country rich in biodiversity and culture, yet its people suffer from poverty and 
food insecurity. Nearly half of Vietnam's 86 million people depend on an inherently risky 
livelihood – agriculture (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2012; General Statistics Office, 
2010). Despite recent economic growth and significant declines in poverty, poverty rates remain 
high. In 2008, 43% of Vietnamese were living on less than $2 per day (The World Bank, 2012). 
Poverty is concentrated in rural areas, particularly in the Northern Uplands and among ethnic 
minorities (FAO, 2009). Although Vietnam's 53 ethnic groups comprise 13% of the total 
population, they account for nearly 30% of poor people (International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, n.d.). Given that poverty and food insecurity are intricately linked, food insecurity 
figures prominently in Vietnam's rural areas and remote communes as well as among ethnic 
minorities (Baulch and Masset, 2003). Food insecurity is both an adult and child phenomenon: 
11% of Vietnam’s population were undernourished in 2006-2008 (International Food Policy 
Research Institute, 2012); 20% of its children under five years of age were underweight in 2005-
2010 (International Food Policy Research Institute, 2012); and 27% of mothers of young 
children suffer from chronic energy deficiency (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2012). 
Moreover, girls are three times more likely to be chronically stunted than boys, indicating gender 
inequality (Baulch and Masset, 2003).  
This research takes place in Yen Chau district, Son La province, in northwestern Vietnam 
(please see Appendix 6.18 for a map of the study area). Yen Chau is mountainous and inhabited 
primarily by ethnic minorities. The largest ethnic minorities are Black Thai and H’mong, 
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accounting for 55% and 20% of the district’s population, respectively. Kinh (“ethnic 
Vietnamese”) constitute another 13%. Thai and H’mong ethnic minorities lag behind the Kinh 
majority in a number of important indicators. For example, the H’mong people have the highest 
fertility rate, infant mortality rate, and under-five morality rate, as well as the lowest life 
expectancy, literacy rate, and age of first marriage of any other ethnic group in Vietnam (United 
Nations Population Fund, 2012). Thai people also have poorer living standards than the Kinh. 
Poverty and food insecurity are widespread in Yen Chau: the average daily per capita 
expenditures are just $2.34 purchasing power parity (PPP)
1
 and 70% of household heads in the 
previous year worried that food supplies would run out before the next harvest or before their 
household had enough money to purchase food. 
Agriculture is the keystone for people’s livelihoods in Yen Chau. Households grow rice on 
paddy fields in the lowlands mainly for home consumption, although nearly half do not produce 
enough rice to meet their consumption needs. Maize is grown in the uplands as a cash crop with 
the vast majority of households selling almost all harvested maize. Nearly all households are 
engaged in maize production on steep slopes resulting in high levels of soil erosion. Degraded 
soils combined with an increasing population density portend future problems compounding 
already existing ones (Lippe et al., 2011; Saint-Macary et al., 2010). People in Yen Chau 
confront significant risks, such as illness, drought, flooding, pests, plant diseases, and livestock 
deaths from harsh winters and disease outbreaks. Households have inadequate mechanisms to 
cope with shocks. Agricultural insurance is unavailable and government-provided health 
insurance covers only general administrative fees and low-cost treatments. Households must pay 
70% of the costs for more serious treatments. Very few households deposit into savings accounts 
and just half save in other forms. Therefore, if a shock occurs, households have difficult choices 
between consumption smoothing (by selling assets or seeking other income) or asset smoothing 
(by reducing consumption). Given their low-level of income, households in Yen Chau are thus 
susceptible to falling into and remaining in poverty traps.  
Worldwide, it is estimated that 320-443 million people are trapped in poverty (Chronic Poverty 
Research Centre, 2009). Its causes are multi-dimensional, dynamic, and can reinforce and 
                                                 
1
 The average daily per capita expenditures in 2010 were 19,740 Vietnamese dong (VND). These expenditures were 
updated for inflation and then converted to their purchasing power parity (PPP) equivalent: 10,178.57 VND/$1 PPP 
(General Statistics Office, 2012; The World Bank, 2012).  
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interact with one another (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). This 
perpetuates a cycle of low consumption, income, savings, and assets, resulting from insurance 
and credit market failures (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005; Barnett et al., 2008; Carter and 
Barrett, 2006), remoteness (Bird et al., 2002), and other institutional failures (Azariadis and 
Stachurski, 2005). Moreover, poverty traps have been found to exist in remote and marginal 
areas, rather than more developed areas (Barrett et al., 2006). Given that Yen Chau is a remote 
area with marginal lands, has an increasing population density, and has poor availability and 
accessibility of formal credit, savings, and insurance, it is important to better understand 
dynamics within poverty traps so that recommendations can be made for keeping households out 
of poverty traps and helping households escape from them.   
1.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In this subsection, we first define risk and empowerment and then explain how they can be 
measured before discussing their importance in general and then specifically for poverty traps.  
1.2.1 DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENTS OF RISK AND EMPOWERMENT  
Risk is a situation where alternative outcomes exist with known probabilities and is distinct 
from uncertainty since the former entails unknown probabilities (Knight, 1921).
2
 Some people 
prefer taking risks and are thus risk lovers, others avoid taking risks and are thus risk averse, and 
others have no preference for or against risk and are thus risk neutral. There are many methods to 
assess risk preferences including pairwise choice (e.g., Hey et al., 2009), willingness to pay or 
accept (e.g., Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992), the Becker DeGroot Marschak mechanism (e.g., 
James, 2007), lottery choice task decisions (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002), self-assessment 
questions (e.g., Cesarini et al., 2009), and hypothetical scenarios (e.g., Anderson and Mellor, 
2009). In addition, risk preferences can be inferred from real life choices such as the ratio of 
risky assets to less risky assets (e.g., Gilliam et al., 2010) or insurance deductibles (e.g., Cohen 
and Einav, 2007). Although lottery choice task decisions are considered to be the gold standard, 
other methods continue to be applied.  
                                                 
2
 According to Knight (1921, p. 46), "while a single situation involving a known risk may be regarded as 'uncertain,' 
this uncertainty is easily converted into effective certainty; for in a considerable number of such cases the results 
become predictable in accordance with the laws of chance, and the error in such prediction approaches zero as the 
number of cases is increased."  
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A research gap persists in the comparison of different elicitation methods – particularly for 
data collected from resource-poor farmers in a developing country – since only a handful of 
studies have elicited risk preferences from more than one elicitation method (e.g., Anderson and 
Mellor, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011). For this reason, we compare a variety of elicitation 
techniques: a lottery game with actual or non-hypothetical monetary payoffs; hypothetical 
gambles relating to inheritance, income, and prices and yields of maize and rice; and the 
financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale which allow respondents to self-assess 
their risk preferences. Moreover, there is no consensus in the literature on how risk preferences 
are influenced by socio-economic characteristics. Some studies have found that risk preferences 
differ significantly based on gender (e.g., Gilliam et al., 2010), education (e.g., Harrison et al., 
2007), age (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2010), number of dependents (e.g., Hallahan et al., 2004), shocks 
(e.g., Guiso et al., 2011) and/or income (e.g., Cohen and Einav, 2007), while other studies have 
found no significant relationship (cf. Harrison et al. (2007) for gender; Anderson and Mellor 
(2009) for education; Holt and Laury (2002) for age; Picazo-Tadeo and Wall (2011) for number 
of dependents; Chiappori and Paiella (2011) for shocks; and Tanaka et al. (2010) for income). 
The relation between risk preferences and social capital is particularly neglected. Given the 
importance of social capital in the study area, we use several proxies to capture its various 
dimensions: norms of helping others, norms of sharing gains with others, the ability to rely upon 
various social networks in times of need, membership in organizations, connections to local 
authorities, and the village population. Moreover, we explore whether other socio-economic 
characteristics, including age, gender, education, and income, influence risk preferences.  
In addition to the lack of agreement on how risk preferences are influenced by socio-economic 
characteristics, there is no consensus on whether risk preferences are stable over time and what 
causes for its instability are. There are only a handful of studies which have analyzed the 
consistency of risk preferences over time (Andersen et al., 2008; Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008; 
Chiappori and Paiella, 2011; Cohen and Einav, 2007; Doss et al., 2008; Guiso et al., 2011; 
Harrison et al., 2005; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Sahm, 2008; Vlaev et al., 2009) with just a 
few eliciting risk preferences using more than one technique (Guiso et al., 2011; Malmendier and 
Nagel, 2011; Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Vlaev et al., 2009). Findings from previous studies on 
the stability of risk preferences over time greatly vary. In some, risk preferences are stable (e.g., 
Andersen et al., 2008; Chiappori and Paiella, 2011; Harrison et al., 2005) and in others they are 
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unstable (e.g., Doss et al, 2008; Guiso et al., 2011; Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Sahm, 2008). A 
few studies have analyzed whether shocks are significant in changing risk preferences. Most 
have found that national- or community-level shocks are significant (Doss et al., 2008; Guiso et 
al., 2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Sahm, 2008), while household- or individual-level 
shocks are not (Doss et al., 2008; Sahm, 2008). Adverse shocks can have detrimental outcomes 
for poor and non-poor households, such as through a reduction in savings and future investment 
capabilities. In this thesis we explore whether risk preferences are stable from the lean season to 
the harvest season as well as examine determinants of changes in risk preferences over time.   
Despite the wide use of the term "empowerment" in development policy and in the literature, it 
is an amorphous concept since it is rarely precisely defined (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; G. Sen and 
Batliwala, 2000), a universal definition is lacking (Haque et al., 2011; Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 
2011), and it represents a complex phenomenon (Kabeer, 2001) operating at multiple levels 
(Mabsout and Staveren, 2010). We adopt the most widely accepted definition (Haque et al., 
2011) from Kabeer (2001, p. 81): empowerment is "an expansion in the range of potential 
choices available to women so that actual outcomes reflect the particular set of choices which the 
women in question value.” Similar to determinants of risk aversion, determinants of women's 
empowerment are not well-understood, despite findings that it has tangible outcomes on a variety 
of development goals including food security, health, and education. Although several studies 
have explored the impact of exposure to credit or savings programs on empowerment (Ashraf et 
al., 2010; Hashemi et al., 1996; Holvoet, 2005; Swain and Wallentin, 2007), none have examined 
influencing factors of empowerment in a variety of intra-household financial decisions. Other 
studies, for example, have examined influencing factors of empowerment in decisions about 
credit in general, household expenditures, and/or mobility, often combining various decision 
domains together (Allendorf, 2007; Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Garikipati, 2008; Kantor, 
2003; Pitt et al., 2006; Rahman and Rao, 2004; Yusof and Duasa, 2010). We, instead, focus on 
women’s role in financial decisions only because such decisions may impact strategic life 
choices (Kabeer, 1999) as well as reflect and create a particularly transformative power in 
women’s improved status within the household (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Kabeer, 2001). 
Moreover, identifying sources of empowerment in specific financial decisions can help direct 
policies to improve women’s decision-making power in distinct financial domains. In this thesis, 
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we examine determinants of wives' and husbands' intra-household decision-making power for 
keeping track of family finances, saving, and taking out and repaying four types of loans. 
1.2.2 THE GENERAL IMPORTANCE OF RISK AND EMPOWERMENT  
Risk is central to many aspects of economic life including decisions about insurance, 
consumption, income, savings, and portfolio choice (Barry and Robison, 1975; Pratt, 1964; 
Sandmo, 1969, 1970, 1971).  For example, risk aversion may affect tax evasion (Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972), pension plans (Vlaev et al., 2009), and the portfolio share invested in stocks 
(Gilliam et al., 2010). In addition, high levels of risk aversion are cited as a major cause of 
poverty traps since risk averse individuals pursue low-risk, low-return livelihood strategies 
(Dercon, 1996; Lybbert and McPeak, 2012; Morduch, 1994; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 
1993). For example, Barnett et al. (2008, p. 1766) write, "Due to high uninsured risk exposure, 
households may adopt low-risk, low-return strategies for using productive assets, reducing the 
likelihood that they can accumulate the assets needed to escape poverty through autarchic 
savings and investment". However, both the poor and non-poor face complex risks, such as from 
credit availability, weather, the general economy, and contractual arrangements (Barry and 
Robison, 2001). Thus, decisions by the poor and non-poor are affected by risk preferences.  
Similar to risk preferences, empowerment is also important for a variety of outcomes. Women's 
empowerment has been found to influence tangible outcomes including child nutrition, food 
security, education, and contraceptive use (Allendorf, 2007; Doss, 2006; Hashemi et al., 1996; 
Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Schuler et al., 1997; B. Sen and Hulme, 2004; Smith and Haddad, 
2000; Thomas, 1990; Quisimbing and Maluccio, 2000). In addition, it has intrinsic value 
(Kabeer, 1999; G. Sen and Batliwala, 2000; The World Bank, 2011) and is regarded as critical 
for achieving poverty reduction and human rights (Malhotra and Schuler, 2005). Examples of 
international commitments to enhance women's empowerment include the Beijing Platform for 
Action at the United Nation's Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 and the Millennium 
Development Goals. National commitments to improve women's empowerment include quotas, 
such as political quotas, which have been adopted in a number of developed and developing 
countries (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005).  
In what follows, we focus on the relevance of risk preferences and empowerment for poverty 
traps to provide an overarching conceptual framework in light of the average poor living 
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standard in Yen Chau. Nevertheless, as shown above, risk preferences and empowerment are also 
paramount outside of poverty traps.  
1.2.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF RISK AND EMPOWERMENT FOR POVERTY TRAPS 
Risk preferences and empowerment are intricately linked to poverty traps. The “classic” 
poverty trap involves low savings, low economic growth, and deepening poverty (United Nations 
Millennium Project, 2005). Poverty traps occur when households are trapped in chronic poverty 
from pursuing a perpetual cycle of low-risk, low-return livelihood strategies experienced by 
households below a particular income or asset threshold (Barrett et al., 2006; Carter and Barrett, 
2006; Carter et al., 2007; Dercon, 1996; Lybbert and McPeak, 2012; Morduch, 1994; 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; von Braun, 1995), which can be measured by the number of 
livestock owned by a household, for example. The threshold determines whether a household is 
in a dynamic system in which asset accumulation or asset decumulation prevails and has been 
identified in a number of countries (Adato et al., 2006; Barrett and Swallow, 2006; Barnett et al., 
2008; Carter and Barrett, 2006; Carter et al., 2007; United Nations Millennium Project, 2005). 
Below the threshold, households are trapped in poverty and are unable to advance economically. 
Above the threshold, households are able to invest, accumulate, and advance economically 
(Carter et al., 2007).  
Determinants of poverty traps include spatial remoteness, poor environmental conditions, local 
externalities, the general economic environment, financial market failures, low education, low 
income, intergenerational transfers, large household size, low asset endowment, poor 
employment access, and preferences such as for financial bequest (Benabou, 1994; Bird et al., 
2001; Carter and Barrett, 2006; Carter and Lybbert, 2012; P. Dasgupta, 1997; S. Dasgupta et al., 
2005; Durlauf, 1994; Hulme et al., 2001; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003; Ravallion, 2002; Woolard 
and Klasen, 2005). This thesis explores determinants of two factors within poverty traps – risk 
preferences and women's empowerment. Linkages of risk aversion and women's low 
empowerment within other aspects of poverty traps are explained in more detail below and 
summarized in Figure 1.1, which provides the conceptual framework for this thesis and indicates 
the chapters in which specific relationships are tested. This conceptual framework allows for a 
more in-depth analysis of causes of poverty traps by examining linkages among its various 
facets. Two overarching causes of poverty traps which are not explicitly included in Figure 1.1 
are spatial remoteness and intergenerational transfers. Spatial remoteness contributes toward 
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many factors shown in Figure 1.1, such as poor credit market access, health, education, social 
capital access, and high child dependency ratios (Bird et al., 2001; Hulme et al., 2001). 
Intergenerational transfers are environmental, human, health, and financial capital transfers 
which can occur through various means such as socialization, transfers, and genetic inheritance 
(Durlauf, 1994; Emerson and Souza, 2003; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003).  Because numerous 
studies have found that genetics and socialization influence a range of outcomes, such as 
political attitudes and ideologies (Alford et al., 2005) as well as social attitudes (Martin et al., 
1986), we decided not to include intergenerational transmission in Figure 1.1. Moreover, there 
are even linkages between spatial remoteness and intergenerational transmission of poverty traps 
(Baulch and Masset, 2003).  
Risk is central for decision-making and therefore affects several dimensions within poverty 
traps. Based on previous research and an extensive literature review, we hypothesize that risk 
aversion may increase from low education, particular forms of social capital, more household 
dependents, lower income, and adverse shocks. These hypothesized determinants of risk 
preferences are intricately linked within poverty traps. For example, low income and low 
education can lead to greater soil erosion since it has been found that low income and low 
education decrease the likelihood of adopting soil conservation techniques in Yen Chau (Saint-
Macary et al., 2010). High risk aversion can also lead to environmental degradation through a 
dependence on maize production on highly degraded soils on steep slopes – a production system 
which smallholder farmers in Yen Chau perceive as a low risk income earning activity.
3
 Soil 
erosion can reduce income over time since the land yields less with the same inputs. In fact, soil 
erosion in Vietnam has been identified as an environmental cause of poverty traps (S. Dasgupta 
et al., 2005). In Chapter 2, we examine determinants of risk aversion, including income, 
education, and various types of social capital.  
Adverse shocks can cause households to fall into poverty traps, while positive shocks can help 
households escape them. When a negative shock (hereafter, "shock") occurs and a minimum 
consumption and/or asset level is threatened, households must reduce physical capital, financial 
capital, savings, consumption, social capital, and/or human capital (Hoddinott, 2006; Hulme et 
al., 2001). Households already below the poverty trap threshold have been found to smooth 
assets by reducing consumption rather than to smooth consumption by reducing assets (Barrett et 
                                                 
3
 This was identified by smallholders via a picture ranking of risks (shown in Appendix 6.16).  
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al., 2006; Carter et al., 2007, 2012; Kazianga and Udry, 2006; Lybbert and McPeak, 2012; 
Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). Reducing already low levels of consumption can further reduce 
the productive capacity of poor households through malnutrition's reducing effect on future 
income earning potential. For example, reductions in food consumption can have long-term and 
even permanent consequences on the physical and cognitive development of children (Alderman 
et al., 2003; Hoddinott, 2006; Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001), further perpetuating poverty traps 
through reduced productivity and earnings (Behrman et al., 2004; Hoddinott, 2006).  
Unfortunately, positive shocks, such as a significant inheritance or lottery winnings, are rare, 
while negative shocks are a recurring feature of poverty (Barnett et al., 2008; Wood, 2003). 
Household heads in Yen Chau confirmed this: when asked what the most common way allowing 
households to escape poverty, just 2.4% said receiving an inheritance or windfall gain (see Table 
1.1) and when asked what the number one reason causing households to fall into poverty, nearly 
half stated drought or the illness or death of a working family member (see Table 1.2). Despite 
the sentiment among the majority of household heads that hard work is the number one way to 
escape poverty (see Table 1.1), previous studies have come to these inescapable conclusions: 
"the currently poor are likely to remain poor" (Naschold, 2012, p. 2033) and it is "extremely 
difficult for the poor to emerge from poverty by their own efforts" (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003, 
p. 407). Although the literature emphasizes connections between shocks and risk aversion with 
poverty traps, there has been no attempt to date to discern whether shocks influence risk 
aversion. If shocks cause individuals to become even more risk averse, this could increase the 
likelihood that households remain trapped in poverty because of pursuing even more extreme 
low-risk, low-return livelihood strategies. In Chapter 3, we explore whether shocks and other 
factors affect risk preferences to change over time. 
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Table 1.1: Most important ways for escaping poverty, in percent (N = 291) 
 Most 
important 
Second most 
important 
Third most 
important 
Hard work 57.7 19.9 9.6 
Government support 17.5 6.5 7.9 
Taking a risk that pays off 7.6 11.7 14.8 
Support by local social network 6.2 5.8 10.3 
Thriftiness 5.2 47.8 16.8 
Receiving an inheritance or windfall gain 2.4 1.4 3.4 
Support by remote social networks/remittances 2.4 0.7 2.4 
Notes: These were identified by household heads. Other possible answers were windfall monetary gains such as an 
inheritance, non-government organization support, and other. Numbers do not sum to 100 because of excluding 
responses with a low percentage. Appendix 6.1 shows the exact wording of this question. Source: Own 
computations using data of the F2 project of SFB 564.
4
  
Table 1.2: Most important causes of falling into poverty, in percent (N = 291) 
 Most 
important 
Second most 
important 
Third most 
important 
Bad habits (gambling, wasteful lifestyle) 29.9 16.2 12.7 
Drought 28.5 15.1 16.5 
Death/illness of a working household member 19.9 18.2 8.6 
Taking a risk that fails 15.1 11.7 10.0 
Alcoholism 2.1 12.0 5.8 
Flooding or landslide 1 8.2 7.6 
Notes: These were identified by household heads. Other possible answers were output price decrease, input price 
increases, expenses for ceremonies like funerals or weddings, declining soil fertility, and other. Numbers do not sum 
to 100 because of excluding responses with a low percentage. Appendix 6.1 shows the exact wording of this 
question. 
Another perpetuating cause of poverty is low levels of women's empowerment. Linkages 
between women’s empowerment and poverty traps have been less explicit than that between risk 
aversion or adverse shocks and poverty traps. An exception is B. Sen (2004), who writes of 
connections between women's empowerment and households getting out of poverty through 
better family planning, which leads to reduced family size, fewer resources spent on household 
consumption, and thus more capital accumulation. Indeed Hashemi et al. (1996) and Schuler et 
al. (1997) found that women’s empowerment determines contraceptive use. Decreased 
contraceptive use allows high fertility rates which can exacerbate environmental degradation (S. 
Dasgupta et al., 2005; Sachs et al., 2004). Moreover, Vietnamese children from large households 
                                                 
4
 Throughout this thesis, if not indicated otherwise, the source of all tables and figures showing descriptive or 
econometric statistics are derived from own computations using F2 project data of SFB 564. For brevity, the source 
is not mentioned in the following tables and figures throughout the thesis.  
 11  
are less likely to ever attend primary school (Baulch and Masset, 2003). Thus, household size 
may also determine educational attainment. One reason why children may not attend school is 
that they may need to work. Working as a child has been found to reduce lifetime earnings 
(Emerson and Souza, 2011). Moreover, low education decreases future income earning potential, 
which can persist over time (Benabou, 1994). Women’s empowerment has been found to 
increase expenditure shares on children's education in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and South Africa 
(Quisimbing and Maluccio, 2000). Thus, these studies highlight connections among women's 
empowerment, household size, education, and income.  
In addition to the importance of women’s empowerment for family planning and education, 
women’s empowerment is imperative for food security. Previous studies have found that 
women’s empowerment increases expenditure shares on food in Ghana (Doss, 2006), Côte 
d'Ivoire (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995), and Ethiopia
5
 (Quisimbing and Maluccio, 2000) as well 
as increases child food security in Nepal (Allendorf, 2007), Bangladesh (B. Sen and Hulme, 
2004), and Brazil (Thomas, 1990). Moreover, women's education is important for child nutrition: 
in a study of 63 developing countries by Smith and Haddad (2000), women's gross secondary 
school enrollment rates were responsible for about 43% of the total reduction in child 
malnutrition between 1970 and 1995. Food security is intricately linked to poverty traps: poor 
health is both a cause and effect of falling into poverty, a so-called nutritional poverty trap (P. 
Dasgupta, 1997). As shown in Figure 1.1, we hypothesize that education, social capital, 
household dependents, income, and risk aversion may influence women's empowerment for 
financial decisions. As explained above, these hypothesized influencing factors are intricately 
connected to other aspects within poverty traps. For example, certain social norms may decrease 
women's empowerment which may lead to poorer health and nutrition of children, which in turn 
may decrease future income earning potential.  
Causes, consequences, linkages, and reinforcements in poverty traps are complex. This thesis 
focuses on identifying influencing factors of risk preferences and decision-making power and on 
                                                 
5
 In contrast, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) found that the higher the assets the husband had at marriage, the 
greater the expenditure share on food in Bangladesh. The authors write that this is likely because of the important 
role of men's assets in food production. They also found that greater assets brought into marriage by the wife in 
relation to the husband decrease the share of income spent on food. The authors explain that this may be because 
women who are more empowered may prefer lower cost food.    
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improving methods for their measurement. Although risk preferences and empowerment form 
just a part of the complex interactions in poverty traps, it is important that their determinants and 
elicitation methods are better understood since their relevance extends beyond poverty traps as 
well.  
Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework of poverty traps encompassing risk aversion, negative shocks, 
and women’s low empowerment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own depiction. 
 
Notes: This figure combines findings from the literature as well as hypothesized influencing factors of risk aversion 
and empowerment which are tested in Chapters 2-4. Hypothesized influencing factors which are tested in this thesis 
are indicated within the link by the number of the chapter in which the link is examined. Some of these links show 
two-way relationships – the chapters, however, test influencing factors of risk aversion and empowerment only and 
do not test consequences of risk aversion or empowerment.  
a 
Social capital includes social norms and social networks. Some social norms may increase risk aversion; others 
may decrease it. Chapters 2-3 and Chapter 4 provide more information on the influence of various facets of social 
capital on risk preferences and women's empowerment, respectively. 
b
 The link between lower income/assets and low empowerment refers to women-controlled income/assets. 
Household theory suggests that the higher the income of the household, the less empowerment women are because 
of a likely lower relative contribution of women to total household income.  
c 
In Yen Chau, people perceive maize production as a low-risk income earning activity. Maize is produced on steep 
slopes highly susceptible to soil erosion, which can make households more vulnerable to negative shocks (this link 
is not shown).  
d 
The linkage between low education and environmental degradation (Saint-Macary et al., 2010) is now shown. 
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1.3 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Despite high risk aversion and low empowerment forming critical components in poverty traps 
as well as having tangible outcomes for income, investments, health, food security, and 
livelihood strategies for both the poor and non-poor, little is known about their influencing 
factors and their measurement. The main objective of this thesis is twofold: to identify 
influencing factors of risk preferences and women’s decision-making power so that policy 
recommendations can help households and individuals avoid poverty traps or escape them as 
well as help both poor and non-poor households improve their livelihoods and make better 
investment and consumption decisions; and to compare and improve measurements of risk 
preferences and intra-household decision-making power, so that future research can use 
improved elicitation methods. Below, we list the three major research topics which correspond to 
the following three chapters, as well as their research questions and hypotheses.  
Research topic 1: Risk preferences – their determinants and measurement 
This topic is dealt with in Chapter 2 of the thesis and includes the following research questions 
and hypotheses: 
1. How do widely applied methods of eliciting risk preferences compare to more locally-adapted 
methods? 
We hypothesize that the decision domain will influence the degree of risk aversion elicited 
from respondents. The decision domain refers to the sphere the assessment method pertains to, 
such as whether the method refers to lottery winnings or windfall gains, food security, income, 
investments, prices, yields, inheritance, or a general willingness to take risks. The decision 
domain has been found to be an important factor to consider in the measurement of risk 
preferences (e.g., MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Soane and Chmiel, 2005). In this thesis, 
we examine whether the decision domain affects elicited risk preferences by comparing 
different assessment methods related to non-hypothetical windfall gains (via a lottery game), 
hypothetical windfall gains (via inheritance gambles), income-generating activities (via 
income gambles and maize gambles), household food security (via rice gambles), financial 
investments (via a financial risk tolerance question), and an overall willingness to take risks 
(via a self-assessment scale). We hypothesize that the two self-assessment methods will be 
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more highly correlated compared to the other methods and that the gambles involving maize 
and rice will also be highly correlated. On the other hand, the lottery game may not be as 
highly correlated with the other methods since it is the only non-hypothetical method applied.  
2. What are determinants of risk preferences?  
Using the above conceptual framework, we hypothesize that low levels of education and 
income, as well as high child dependency ratios, will increase risk aversion. Based on previous 
research, we hypothesize that female gender and older age may increase risk aversion.  
3. How do various facets of social capital influence risk preferences? 
We hypothesize that different forms of social capital will have varying impacts on risk 
preferences. For example, institutional factors – namely, social norms – may influence risk 
preferences given the reliance on social networks to obtain credit in the study area. 
Organizational membership may influence risk preferences less than the other forms of social 
capital given the bureaucratic nature of organizations in Vietnam. Moreover, network-reliance 
with different social networks may have varying impacts on risk preferences, with those 
among family being stronger than those among friends. 
4. How applicable are widely applied methods to elicit risk preferences? Can the elicitation 
methods be improved to be more suitable, in general, and improved to be more suitable for 
smallholders in a developing country, in particular? 
Because respondents, on average, have a low level of education, methods which are easier to 
comprehend may be better suited for eliciting risk preferences from smallholders in a 
developing country. Thus, we hypothesize that the lottery game may not be as appropriate to 
measure risk preferences compared to the other methods since it is more complex. Moreover, 
methods which relate more to livelihood strategies, namely, maize and rice production, may 
be better suited than methods based on windfall gains.  
Research topic 2: The impact of shocks and other factors on changes in risk preferences 
from the lean season to the harvest season 
This topic is dealt with in Chapter 3 of the thesis and includes the following research questions 
and hypotheses: 
1. Do elicited risk preferences change across the lean season and hungry season? 
 15  
We are unsure if and how risk preferences will change in the harvest season compared to the 
lean season. On the one hand, respondents could become less risk averse if elicited risk 
preferences reflect more current situations since risk preferences were reassessed during the 
harvest season when cash is more plentiful and the household is better able to buy food and 
other essentials. On the other hand, respondents could become more risk averse if risk 
preferences reflect the future more, which includes the possibility of another harsh winter.   
2. Do shocks experienced just before risk preferences were elicited and covariate shocks have 
greater impacts on risk preferences than shocks experienced at a later date and idiosyncratic 
shocks, respectively?  
Given the low level of income, assets, and savings in the study area, we hypothesize that 
shocks will increase risk aversion. In addition, we hypothesize that: shocks experienced closer 
to the survey date will have a greater impact on risk preferences compared to shocks 
experienced at a later date; and covariate shocks will have a greater impact on risk preferences 
than idiosyncratic shocks because support through social networks may break down if a shock 
affects most people in the area and covariate shocks could have a greater affect through peer 
reinforcement. 
3. Do other characteristics which do not change between seasons, such as gender, education, and 
social capital, cause risk preferences to change from the lean season to the harvest season?  
Based on the stark contrast in respondents' conditions in the lean and harvest seasons, we 
hypothesize that characteristics which do not change between seasons may also influence risk 
preference changes. For example, women may become more risk averse in the harvest season 
in light of the upcoming winter months and social norms may influence risk preference 
changes since gift giving through weddings is more common in the harvest season. 
Research topic 3: Determinants of wives’ and husbands' intra-household financial decision-
making power 
This topic is dealt with in Chapter 4 of the thesis and includes the following research questions 
and hypotheses: 
1. How do wives' intra-household financial decision-making power compare to that of their 
husbands for saving, family budgeting, and borrowing and repaying four types of loans?  
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Given the gender context of the study area as well as wives' higher work load and lower 
education, we hypothesize that wives will have less intra-household financial decision-making 
power than husbands. Moreover, we hypothesize that wives’ decision-making power will be 
lower for taking out and repaying loans of greater value compared to that for taking out and 
repaying smaller-sized loans, saving, and family budgeting.   
2. What are influencing factors of wives’ decision-making power? 
Individual-, household-, and institutional-level factors may influence wives' intra-household 
financial decision-making power. Wives who cannot speak Vietnamese, who have a low level 
of education and income, who do not work off-farm, who are more risk averse, who have less 
social capital, who live in households with high child dependency ratios, and who live in 
households with more women household members, are hypothesized to have lower intra-
household financial decision-making power.  
3. How do measurements of decision-making power compare when based on an index composed 
of several decisions versus based on each decision separately?  
Based on the majority of previous research which measures women’s empowerment by 
relying on an index composed of several decisions rather than analyzing each decision 
separately, we hypothesize that indices will be able to adequately capture influencing factors 
of wives’ decision-making power, but that they may obscure some important findings.  
1.4 OUTLINE OF THESIS 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 examines determinants of risk preferences, including 
several proxies of social capital and other individual- and household-level socio-eocnomic 
characteristics, and compares the measurement of risk preferences using four widely applied 
hypothetical methods, four locally-adapted methods, and a non-hypothetical lottery game; 
Chapter 3 examines whether risk preferences are stable between the lean season and harvest 
season as well as causes for its instability, focusing on whether shocks and various facets of 
social capital cause individuals to become more risk averse; Chapter 4 analyzes influencing 
factors of wives' and husbands' intra-household financial decision-making power for taking out 
and repaying four types of loans, savings, and family budgeting; and Chapter 5 provides a 
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discussion of  the results in light of the conceptual framework, discusses data limitations, and 
offers final conclusions for future research and policy.   
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Abstract 
We examine the consistency of risk preference measures based on eight hypothetical elicitation 
methods and a lottery game applied to smallholder farmers in a marginal upland environment in 
Vietnam. Using these measures, we identify influencing factors of risk aversion via regression 
analysis, whereby unlike previous studies, we include several proxies for social capital such as 
social networks and norms. Data were collected from household heads and spouses separately in 
a random sample of 300 households. While correlations between most of the various risk 
preference measures are statistically highly significant, most are weak. On average, respondents 
have a high degree of risk aversion and specific characteristics – gender, age, idiosyncratic 
shocks, education, social norms, network-reliance with extended family, and connections to local 
authorities – are significant determinants of risk preferences across most elicitation methods, 
while others – the household's dependency ratio, wealth, and covariate shocks – are significant in 
a few methods only. The explanatory power of the models is limited, indicating that other factors 
are likely to be of greater importance in determining risk preferences. The results can help target 
safety nets, encourage investments, and lead to the development of more applicable methods for 
assessing risk preferences of smallholders in developing countries. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Risk is an integral part of decision-making, particularly for smallholder farmers in developing 
countries. Accordingly, it is important that risk preferences, their influencing factors, and the 
methods to empirically elicit them are better understood, allowing policy recommendations to 
better match smallholders’ risk preferences. While classical theory suggests that all risky 
decisions take into account the same utility function, Rabin (2000) argues that decisions are 
made in different contexts and therefore may be subject to different parameters in the utility 
function, which is similar to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) demonstration of framing effects. 
This suggests that the use of different elicitation techniques may lead to diverging measures of 
risk preferences.  
Although there are many methods to elicit risk preferences, a research gap persists in the 
comparison of different elicitation methods – particularly for data collected from resource-poor 
farmers in developing countries. The methods encompass pairwise choice (e.g., Hey et al., 2009), 
willingness to pay or accept (e.g., Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992), the Becker DeGroot 
Marschak mechanism (e.g., James, 2007), lottery choice task decisions (e.g., Holt and Laury, 
2002), self-assessment questions (e.g., Cesarini et al., 2009), and hypothetical scenarios (e.g., 
Anderson and Mellor, 2009) as well as inferring risk preferences from real life choices such as 
the ratio of risky assets to less risky assets (e.g., Gilliam et al., 2010) or insurance deductibles 
(e.g., Cohen and Einav, 2007). Weighing three types of bidding tasks against pairwise choice 
lotteries, Hey et al. (2009) find that the latter led to significantly lower noise. A variation of 
pairwise choice lotteries, the multiple price list technique, has become the gold standard to assess 
risk preferences. This method was popularized by Holt and Laury (2002) and has subsequently 
been used in a number of studies (e.g., Anderson and Mellor, 2009; Harrison et al., 2007; Tanaka 
et al., 2010). Nevertheless, researchers continue to rely on other methods to elicit risk 
preferences, few of which are adapted to smallholders in developing countries (an exception is 
Hill (2009) which is explained in Section 2.3.2). Naturally, the question arises how risk 
preferences assessed by different techniques compare to each other in a within-sample 
experiment. This question, however, has been largely neglected in the literature to date since 
only a handful of studies have elicited risk preferences from more than one elicitation method 
(e.g., Anderson and Mellor, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011).  
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Furthermore, there is no consensus on how risk preferences are influenced by socio-economic 
characteristics. While some studies find that risk preferences differ significantly based on gender 
(e.g., Gilliam et al., 2010), education (e.g., Harrison et al., 2007), age (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2010), 
number of dependents (e.g., Hallahan et al., 2004), shocks (e.g., Guiso et al., 2011) and/or 
income (e.g., Cohen and Einav, 2007), others find no significant relationship (cf. Harrison et al. 
(2007) for gender; Anderson and Mellor (2009) for education; Holt and Laury (2002) for age; 
Picazo-Tadeo and Wall (2011) for number of dependents; Chiappori and Paiella (2011) for 
shocks; and Tanaka et al. (2010) for income). The relation between risk preferences and social 
capital is particularly neglected. Previous studies have focused on how social networks function 
as an informal insurance mechanism against potential downfalls in consumption (Platteau and 
Abraham, 1987; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), how social capital 
influences the formation of risk pooling groups (Murgai et al., 2002; Attanasio et al., 2012; Barr 
et al., 2012), or how social capital encourages firms to take risks (Steer and Sen, 2010). These 
studies suggest that households with more extensive networks and hence greater access to 
consumption credit, assistance in-kind, and capital markets are better able to cope with risks. 
Thus, social capital may be particularly important in environments where government or private 
sector substitutes for risk coping mechanisms are not available or accessible (Collier, 2002; 
Murgai et al., 2002).  
Our study contributes to closing the above-mentioned knowledge gaps by: (1) comparing risk 
preferences elicited from a lottery choice task decision and eight hypothetical methods (the 
financial risk tolerance question, self-assessment scale, hypothetical scenarios involving income 
and inheritance gambles, and four locally-adapted scenarios involving hypothetical maize and 
rice gambles) in a within-sample experiment; and (2) identifying and comparing influencing 
factors of risk preferences, including several dimensions of social capital, across the elicitation 
techniques. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to compare risk preference 
measures from such a wide range of elicitation methods in a within-sample experiment in a 
developing country as well as to explore whether various facets of social capital influence an 
individual's risk preferences.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 briefly describes the study area; 
Section 2.3 explains the risk assessment methods; Section 2.4 presents the conceptual framework 
developed to investigate determinants of risk preferences; Section 2.5 describes the regression 
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models and the data used; Section 2.6 presents descriptive results and correlations of the risk 
preference assessment methods, regression results on influencing factors of risk preferences, and 
robustness checks; Section 2.7 discusses the results and limitations of the methods used; and 
Section 8 concludes and offers policy implications. 
2.2 STUDY AREA 
This study was conducted in Yen Chau district, a marginal upland area located in northwestern 
Vietnam. Yen Chau is inhabited primarily by ethnic minorities of which the largest are Black 
Thai and H’mong, accounting for 55% and 20% of the district’s population, respectively. Kinh 
(“ethnic Vietnamese”) constitute another 13%. Rice and maize are the two main crops: in 2010, 
83% of households grew rice and 94% grew maize. Rice is grown in paddy fields in the lowlands 
mainly for home consumption, whereby nearly half of the households do not produce enough 
rice to meet their consumption needs. Maize, on the other hand, is grown in the uplands as a cash 
crop with the vast majority of households selling almost all harvested maize. The average daily 
per capita expenditures are equivalent to $2.34 purchasing power parity (PPP).
6
 The most 
common shocks households experienced in the past year are drought, followed by animal death, 
yield losses from pests and diseases, and illness of a household member. 
2.3 METHODS TO ELICIT RISK PREFERENCES 
In this section we describe the risk preference elicitation methods. In all methods, larger 
numbers indicate a higher degree of risk aversion.   
2.3.1 NON-HYPOTHETICAL ELICITATION METHOD 
The only non-hypothetical elicitation method applied is the multiple price list technique 
(hereafter, MPL) based on Holt and Laury (2002). In the MPL, subjects were given a set of ten 
choices between two options – a relatively safer option (Option A) and a relatively riskier option 
(Option B). Each option had two possible payouts with different probabilities of each payout 
being realized (see Table 2.1). The payouts in the safer option had a lower variance than those in 
                                                 
6
 The average daily per capita expenditures in 2010 were 19,740 Vietnamese dong (VND). These expenditures were 
updated for inflation and then converted to purchasing power parity (PPP): 10,178.57 VND/$1 PPP (General 
Statistics Office, 2012; The World Bank, 2012).  
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the riskier option. In the first four choices, the expected value (not shown to subjects) of the safer 
option was greater than that of the riskier option, whereas in the last six choices the opposite was 
the case because the probability of the higher payout being realized increased by 10 percentage 
points in both options with each subsequent choice. Risk preferences are based on the point at 
which subjects switched from the safer Option A to the riskier Option B. According to expected 
payouts, approximately risk neutral people will switch to the riskier option in the fifth choice, 
while risk preferring and risk averse people will switch to the riskier option before and after the 
fifth choice, respectively.  
The highest payout amount in our scenario is equivalent to about 3.3 times the average daily 
per capita expenditures in our sample, 23,862 VND or $2.34 PPP. Therefore, the potential 
payouts can be considered substantial for respondents. To help subjects understand the ten 
choices, each choice was explained one at a time along with pie charts and explanations of 
probabilities via a ten-sided die (see Appendix 6.7 for the instructions and the choices in the 
lottery game). After all ten choices had been completed, subjects were shown their selections and 
given an opportunity to change any responses before one of the ten choices was randomly 
selected for an actual payout. 
Table 2.1: Choices in the multiple price list 
C
h
o
ic
e 
(r
o
w
) Probability of 
high and low 
payouts 
Payouts in the safer option 
(Option A) in ‘000 VND 
Payouts in the riskier option 
(Option B) in ‘000 VND 
 
Low High Low High E(A) Low High E(B) 
E(A)-
E(B) 
1 0.90 0.10 33.0 41.0 33.8 2.0 79.0 9.7 24.1 
2 0.80 0.20 33.0 41.0 34.6 2.0 79.0 17.4 17.2 
3 0.70 0.30 33.0 41.0 35.4 2.0 79.0 25.1 10.3 
4 0.60 0.40 33.0 41.0 36.2 2.0 79.0 32.8 3.4 
5 0.50 0.50 33.0 41.0 37.0 2.0 79.0 40.5 -3.5 
6 0.40 0.60 33.0 41.0 37.8 2.0 79.0 48.2 -10.4 
7 0.30 0.70 33.0 41.0 38.6 2.0 79.0 55.9 -17.3 
8 0.20 0.80 33.0 41.0 39.4 2.0 79.0 63.6 -24.2 
9 0.10 0.90 33.0 41.0 40.2 2.0 79.0 71.3 -31.1 
10 0 1.0 33.0 41.0 41 .0 2.0 79.0 79 .0 -38.0 
Notes: Each choice was explained one at a time along with pie charts and explanations of probabilities via a ten-
sided die (see Appendix 6.7 for the instructions and the choices). Expected values were not shown to respondents. 
The PPP in 2011 is 10,179 VND/1 USD (The World Bank, 2012). 
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There are several approaches which can be used to analyze responses in the MPL. Similar to 
other studies using the MPL (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002), we base risk preference labels on the 
total number of safer options chosen (see Table 2.2). Moreover, we calculate the constant relative 
risk aversion (CRRA) interval based on the following CRRA utility function: 
U(Y) = Y^(1 - r)/(1 – r) for r ≠ 1                                                 (1) 
where r is the CRRA and Y is the payout amount in the lottery.
7
 The CRRA is less than 0 for 
subjects who are risk lovers, equal to 0 for subjects who are risk neutral, and greater than 0 for 
subjects who are risk averse. The CRRA is preferable to other risk aversion parameters since it 
has a scale invariance property. Using this utility function, we can calculate the lower and upper 
bounds of a subject’s CRRA. For subjects who did not switch back to the safer option after 
having already chosen the riskier option, the calculation of the CRRA interval is based on the 
total number of safer options chosen (as shown in Table 2.2).  
Table 2.2: Risk preferences based on the multiple price list (N = 545) 
Choice where a 
subject switched 
to the riskier 
option 
Total number 
of safer 
options 
chosen 
Risk preference label
a
  Constant relative 
risk aversion  
interval 
Percent of 
subjects 
1 0 Extremely risk loving r < -1.73 1.8 
2 1 Highly risk loving -1.73 >  r < -0.96 0.9 
3 2 Very risk loving -0.96 > r < -0.49 0.7 
4 3 Risk loving -0.49 > r < -0.15 2.6 
5 4 Approximately risk neutral -0.15 > r < 0.15 10.1 
6 5 Slightly risk averse 0.15 > r < 0.41 11.7 
7 6 Risk averse 0.41 > r < 0.67 20.0 
8 7 Very risk averse 0.67 > r < 0.97 17.4 
9 8 Highly risk averse 0.97 > r < 1.36 20.0 
10 9 Extremely risk averse r > 1.36 14.7 
Notes: The total in the last column equals 99.9% because of rounding.  
a 
Labels are similar to those in previous studies; however, we exclude one respondent who never chose the safer 
option and label respondents who chose the safer option four times as being “approximately risk neutral” rather than 
“risk neutral”. 
 
                                                 
7 
We adopt the terminology of CRRA based on other studies using the MPL technique. The correct terminology for 
the above described CRRA, however, is a partial risk aversion coefficient since the utility function is defined in 
terms of gains and losses rather than wealth (Hardaker et al., 2004).  
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For evaluating subjects who switched back to the safer option after having already chosen the 
riskier option, one can calculate the CRRA interval based on either the total number of safe 
options chosen (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002) or on the first and last row in which the subject 
switched to the riskier option (e.g., Harrison et al., 2005). Risk preferences are determined by the 
midpoint of the CRRA interval, although subjects who chose the safer option nine (zero) times 
are assigned a CRRA equal to the lower (upper) bound of the CRRA interval since the upper 
(lower) bound equals infinity (negative infinity). For the hypothetical methods explained below 
which elicit a CRRA interval, we also determine risk preferences based on the midpoint of the 
CRRA interval; however, unlike the MPL, these methods have no explicit risk neutral or risk 
preferring options.  
2.3.2 HYPOTHETICAL ELICITATION METHODS 
The eight hypothetical methods to assess risk preferences are the financial risk tolerance 
question, a self-assessment scale, hypothetical scenarios involving income gambles (hereafter, 
the income series), hypothetical scenarios involving inheritance gambles (hereafter, the 
inheritances series), and four hypothetical questions involving price and yield gambles for rice 
and maize (hereafter, the rice and maize series).  
Unlike the other methods, the financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale allow 
subjects to identify their own willingness to take risks.  The financial risk tolerance question 
originates from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances and has been 
widely used in the U.S. to gauge risk preferences (e.g., Gilliam et al., 2010). Subjects were asked 
about the amount of financial risk they are willing to take: (1) substantial financial risks, 
expecting to earn substantial returns; (2) above average financial risks, expecting to earn above 
average returns; (3) average financial risks, expecting to earn average returns; or (4) not willing 
to take any financial risks (shown in Appendix 6.8). The self-assessment scale is based on the 
German Socio-Economic Panel Study conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research 
(DIW Berlin) and has also been widely used to analyze risk preferences. Dohmen et al. (2012) 
have confirmed the behavioral validity of this measurement. In the self-assessment, subjects 
were shown a scale with integers ranging from 0 (= fully avoiding risks) to 10 (= fully prepared 
to take risks) and asked to point to the integer best matching their willingness to take risks. 
Afterwards, responses were rescaled so that 0 represents the most risk preferring and 10 the most 
risk averse (shown in Appendix 6.9). 
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In the income gambles and inheritance gambles, subjects were asked how they would respond 
to hypothetical scenarios involving income and inheritance gambles (see Appendix 6.10 and 6.11 
for the income and inheritance gambles, respectively). These two methods originate from the 
Health and Retirement Study conducted by the University of Michigan and have been examined 
by Anderson and Mellor (2009). In the income series, subjects were told to imagine that they 
were the sole income earner in the household and must change their income earning activity. 
They could choose either an activity that would generate certain income equal to their current 
income or an activity with a 50/50 chance of doubling or decreasing their current income by 
75%, 50%, 33%, 20%, or 10%. The inheritance series has a similar approach. Subjects were 
asked to imagine that they had inherited a gas station which they could either sell outright for 
336 million VND (equivalent to $33,010 PPP) or wait one month to sell with a 50/50 chance of 
the inheritance doubling or decreasing in value by 75%, 50%, 33%, 20%, or 10%. To facilitate 
comprehension of the income and inheritance gambles, enumerators read each question aloud 
and showed and explained graphs representing the scenarios (see Appendices 6.10 and 6.11). 
Questions within the income and inheritance series were not presented in ascending or 
descending order of riskiness. Similar to Anderson and Mellor (2009), inconsistent responses 
were removed from the analysis; "inconsistent" means that a subject preferred the riskier (safer) 
choice in one question and the certain (riskier) choice in another question which entails a lower 
(higher) level of risk. For example, responses are inconsistent if the riskier outcome is preferred 
when the loss potential is 50% and the safer option is preferred when the loss potential is 33%, 
20%, or 10%. Based on the riskiest scenario chosen, a CRRA interval can be calculated.  
The last set of hypothetical methods to assess risk preferences are hypothetical gambles with 
varying yields and prices of maize and rice. The maize and rice gambles are adapted to local 
conditions and more familiar to respondents because they relate to the main cash crop and food 
crop, respectively. The gambles are based on Hill (2009); however, we use prices and yields 
which are within the minimum and maximum ranges in the study area. Respondents were asked 
which of four options of prices and yields for maize and rice they would prefer every year, 
assuming that yields and prices remain constant, respectively. Each gamble includes four 
options: The first option has a 100% chance of the median price or yield from Yen Chau in 2009 
(prices were adjusted for inflation), while each subsequent option has a 50/50 chance of a price 
or yield which is 15% lower or higher than the median. Enumerators read the question aloud and 
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pie charts were used as visuals to further aid comprehension (see Appendix 6.12-6.15 for maize 
and rice gambles). Based on the option chosen, a CRRA interval can be calculated.  
2.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO IDENTIFY DETERMINANTS OF RISK 
PREFERENCES 
Although there is no consensus on how risk preferences are influenced by respondent 
characteristics, based on theoretical and empirical justifications from the studies discussed in the 
introduction, we have developed the following conceptual framework:  
RP = f (decision domain, gender, prior experiences, asset base)                                           (2) 
where RP is the elicited risk preference which is a categorical classification in the financial risk 
tolerance question and self-assessment scale or the midpoint of the CRRA interval derived from 
the other elicitation techniques. The factor "decision domain" is captured in our analysis by using 
and comparing elicitation methods related to non-hypothetical windfall gains (the MPL), 
hypothetical windfall gains (the inheritance series), income-generating activities (the income 
series and maize gambles), household food security (the rice gambles), financial investments (the 
financial risk tolerance question), and an overall willingness to take risks (the self-assessment 
scale). The decision domain has been found to be an important factor to consider in the 
measurement of risk preferences (e.g., MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Soane and Chmiel, 
2005). Table 2.3 explains the measurement and presents descriptive statistics of the explanatory 
variables included in the regression analyses on the basis of the above functional equation. 
Descriptions of the variables and justification for their inclusion in the models are provided in 
the following paragraphs. 
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Table 2.3: Description and summary statistics of respondent characteristics (N = 545)  
Variable Description Mean Standard 
deviation 
Individual-level variables   
Gender Dummy = 1 if female, 0 otherwise  0.52 0.50 
Age Age in years 44.60 11.98 
Education Years of formal schooling completed 5.74 3.97 
Helping others 
norm 
Dummy = 1 if agrees that others in the village are 
expected to help a household who takes a risk and loses, 
0 otherwise 
0.46 0.50 
Sharing with 
others norm 
Dummy = 1 if agrees that a household who takes a risk 
and gains is expected to share its gain with others in the 
village, 0 otherwise 
0.66 0.47 
Organization 
membership 
Number of organizations the respondent is  a member of 1.35 0.76 
Household-level variables
a
    
Dependency 
ratio 
Ratio of dependent (less than 15 years of age or greater 
than 64) to non-dependent household members 
0.29 0.22 
Idiosyncratic 
shock impacts 
Monetary losses the household suffered due to 
idiosyncratic shocks in the preceding 12 months divided 
by annual per capita expenditures in 2010 
0.40 1.29 
Covariate shock 
impacts 
Monetary losses the household suffered due to covariate 
shocks in the preceding 12 months divided by annual 
per capita expenditures in 2010 
1.66 2.76 
Network-
reliance  
The sum of “easy” responses from: “If you or another 
household member asked, would it be easy or not easy 
to borrow money for education (or for health expenses, 
a positive social event, a negative social event, or to 
borrow a water buffalo, or to ask for labor) from (see 
social networks below)" 
  
First-degree 
relatives 
 5.77 0.86 
Extended family  4.48 1.96 
Friends  4.81 1.83 
Village head  3.92 2.69 
Connections to 
authorities  
The number of authorities at the commune, district, or 
provincial level that members of the household know 
personally (a two-way relationship in which people talk 
to each other and know at least basic information about 
one another) in the Communist Party, People’s 
Committee, Women’s Union, or Fatherland’s Front 
Union 
3.27 4.71 
Village 
population 
Number of residents in the village where the respondent 
lives 
546.17 271.60 
Notes: 
a
 An additional household level variable included in the regression analyses is the wealth tercile of the 
household based on a wealth index which includes a range of indicators capturing multiple dimensions of poverty. 
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Prior experiences are proxied by impacts from idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Although 
not explicitly tested before, the literature suggests that greater shock impacts – particularly 
covariate shocks – may increase risk aversion or risk averse behavior (Doss et al., 2008; Eswaran 
and Kotwal, 1990; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). The factor "asset base" can be further 
differentiated into natural, physical, financial, human, and social capital (Scoones, 1998). A 
wealth index, which includes a range of indicators capturing multiple dimensions of poverty, 
proxies physical and financial capital. Households are classified into wealth terciles based on a 
linear composite index which measures the relative wealth status of a household within our 
sample relying on data from 2006 and 2007. The index is constructed by principal component 
analysis (Dunteman, 1994) and represents the households’ scores on the first principal 
component extracted, which follows a standard normal distribution. The regression analyses 
include dummy variables representing if the respondent lives in a household classified as being 
in the poorest or wealthiest wealth tercile. Compared to respondents in the middle wealth tercile, 
we hypothesize that those in the poorest (wealthiest) tercile will be more (less) risk averse 
because of a lower (greater) capacity to cope with shocks (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). 
Human capital is proxied by the years of formal schooling completed and the respondent's age as 
well as the household's dependency ratio. Respondents with more education may be less risk 
averse since they may be better able to assess risks and more knowledgeable about risky 
opportunities. The influence of age on risk aversion is unclear given varying findings in previous 
studies (Tanaka et al. (2010) find a positive relationship with risk aversion whereas Picazo-Tadeo 
and Wall (2011) find a quadratic one). Higher dependency ratios are hypothesized to have a 
positive impact on risk aversion.   
Although social capital has many definitions, the most widely accepted one is by Putnam who 
defines social capital as "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust 
that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). Social 
networks are important in Yen Chau for households to obtain credit. Informal lenders dominate 
the credit market with most being neighbors, acquaintances, or relatives who live within the 
village or district. Relying upon family and acquaintances promotes information flows, 
trustworthy behavior, cooperation, and sanctions (Attanasio et al., 2012; Coleman, 1988; Karlan 
et al., 2009). Nearly all loans from informal sources do not require collateral and the majority of 
small- and medium-sized loans have no interest rate. Thus, most credit transactions rely upon 
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social collateral rather than physical collateral (Karlan et al., 2009) and can be considered a form 
of quasi-credit (Fafchamps, 1999; Platteau and Abraham, 1987). We analyze whether social 
capital influences risk preferences since social capital is likely to be effective in risk-sharing 
(Attanasio et al., 2009; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990; Platteau and Abraham, 1987).  
To capture distinct concepts of social capital, we use several proxies. Although this is 
recommended in the literature, most studies rely on one proxy only.
8
 The distinct concepts of 
social capital are the following: low and high closure which means having loose networks and 
sharing many common friends, respectively (Burt, 1995; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973); 
structural social capital which includes more observable social structures such as networks 
(Grootaert, 2002); cognitive social capital which includes less tangible elements such as norms 
and reciprocity (Grootaert, 2002); and linking social capital which involves relationships 
between people who interact across formal or institutionalized power in society (Szreter and 
Woolcock, 2004). The proxies we use to measure social capital are norms of helping others 
(cognitive social capital), norms of sharing gains with others (cognitive social capital), 
membership in organizations (structural social capital), the ease to rely upon various social 
networks (structural and cognitive social capital), connections to local authorities (linking social 
capital), and the village population and its square (to capture low vs. high closure). Below, we 
explain why these variables are included in the conceptual framework and hypothesize their 
impact on risk aversion.  
Norms  
Norms of helping others and norms of sharing gains with others capture reciprocity which is 
important in helping households cope with risks (Lyon, 2000; Murgai et al., 2002; Platteau and 
Abraham, 1987). Norms of reciprocity may be particularly important in Vietnam given the 
country's emphasis on equality through its political system and previous organization of farms in 
agricultural cooperatives. We hypothesize that respondents who agree with the helping others 
norm (i.e., that others in the village are expected to help households who take risks and lose) will 
be more willing to take risks since they may feel that others in the village would help them in 
case of a failed risky investment, while respondents who agree with the sharing gains with others 
norm (i.e., that a household who takes a risk and gains is expected to share its gain with others in 
                                                 
8 
We recommend Grootaert (2002) for a review on various definitions and measurements of social capital. Please 
refer to Appendix 6.3-6.6 for the elicitation methods for proxies of social capital described in this section.  
 37  
the village) will be less willing to take risks since they may feel obligated to share potential 
benefits with others and therefore may not benefit as much individually from taking risks.  
Membership in organizations 
This proxy underscores Putnam’s concept that civic engagement gives rise to social capital and 
has been used in a number of studies as an indicator of social capital (e.g., Narayan and Pritchett, 
1999). The most frequent organizations respondents belong to are the Farmer Union (29% of 
respondents), Women Union (27%), Elderly Union (11%), Veteran Union (9%), and Communist 
Party (5%). These highly bureaucratic organizations have strong ties to the government and help 
implement policies (Gray, 1999; Kerkvliet et al., 2003). Based on these links between the 
Communist Party and mass organizations, we are uncertain whether members of these 
organizations will be more willing to take risks. On the one hand, if members have a more 
internalized sense of equality, then they may be less willing to take risks. On the other hand, if 
they have better access to information and receive more support from officials for risky 
investments, they may be more inclined to take risks.  
Network-reliance 
The network-reliance variables capture the degree to which respondents can rely on first-
degree relatives, extended family, friends, and the village head and are included based on the 
concept that “networks create trust when agents use connections as social collateral to facilitate 
informal borrowing” (Karlan et al., 2009, p. 1308). Our measurement of network-reliance is also 
consistent with Fafchamps’ (1999) notion of risk-sharing via consumption credit and assistance 
in-kind as well as Simmel’s concept of reciprocity transactions. Reciprocity transactions are 
"giving and returning the equivalence", such as favors between neighbors, without which social 
cohesion could not exist (Simmel, 1950, p. 387). Instead of a borrowing limit (Karlan et al., 
2009) or the number of ties the household can rely on for help or who depends on the household 
for help (De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), our measurement of 
network-reliance captures the ability to rely on various networks to borrow not only money, but 
also a water buffalo or labor given their importance for agricultural households. Moreover, we 
analyze the impact of network-reliance with distinct social networks; namely, first-degree 
relatives, extended family, friends, and the village head. We hypothesize that network-reliance 
with relatives will have the largest influence on risk preferences based on the importance of 
family in the traditional Vietnamese society (Hoang et al., 2006) as well as previous studies 
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which find family ties to be important in risk sharing (Attanasio, et al., 2012; Murgai et al., 2002; 
Rosenzweig, 1988). Table 2.3 shows that network-reliance is highest with first-degree relatives, 
followed by that among friends, extended family, and the village head. 
Connections to local authorities 
Connections to local authorities may decrease risk aversion if individuals receive support from 
officials for risky investments or it may increase risk aversion if individuals are influenced by 
authorities' emphasis on equality or feel that they may have to share gains from a risky 
investment with authorities. 
Village population 
There are opposing theories whether larger communities are beneficial (Granovetter, 1973; 
Burt, 1995) or not (Coleman, 1990; Karlan et al., 2009) for an individual's social capital or 
ability to share risks. In large communities, gathering information about households, monitoring 
and enforcing contracts, coordinating activities, and thus insuring risks may be more time-
consuming and difficult (Rosenzweig, 1988; Murgai et al., 2002; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006). 
This implies that risk aversion may increase with village size. On the other hand, Granovetter’s 
emphasis that weak ties are "indispensible to individuals’ opportunities and to their integration 
into communities" (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1378) indicates that risk aversion may decrease with 
community size. Moreover, there may be a limit beyond which an exchange cannot take place 
(Bourdieu, 1986). Based on these theories, we examine whether village population and its 
squared term influence risk preferences. 
To confirm that the above proxies of social capital measure distinct concepts, we analyze their 
correlation coefficients. All but three correlation coefficients are lower than 0.3.
9
 Moreover, the 
statistical significance and regression coefficients of the social capital proxies (cf. Table 2.7 in 
Section 2.6.2) confirm that the proxies indeed measure distinct concepts of social capital. 
Another concern is that social capital may be endogenous: one could imagine that someone who 
is less risk averse may be less willing, for example, to join an organization. Unfortunately, there 
is a lack of good instrumental variables to test for the endogeneity of social capital (Grootaert, 
                                                 
9 
The highest correlation is between the helping others norm and sharing with others norm (Spearman correlation 
coefficient = 0.567, P = 0.000); the second highest is between network-reliance with friends and network-reliance 
with the village head (correlation coefficient = 0.481, P = 0.000); and the third highest is between network-reliance 
with first-degree relatives and network-reliance with extended family (correlation coefficient = 0.354, P = 0.000). 
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2002). However, Barr et al. (2012) find that risk aversion does not affect group formation for 
pooling risks, indicating that social capital may not be endogenous. 
 Other factors which may influence risk preferences include height, cognitive ability, 
personality, and parental education (Dohmen et al., 2010, 2011; Harrison et al., 2005; Mishra and 
Lalumière, 2011); however, because of data limitations we are not able to include these factors in 
our analysis. There may also be intergenerational transmission of risk preferences as a result of 
genetic inheritance (Cesaraini et al., 2009) and/or upbringing (Dohmen et al., 2012; Levin and 
Hart, 2003). This is briefly explored in Section 2.6.3. 
2.5 REGRESSIONS MODELS AND DATA USED 
Influencing factors of risk preferences elicited by the nine assessment methods are analyzed 
using ordinary least squares (OLS), two-limit tobit, and logistic regression models. The financial 
risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale are analyzed via OLS regression models 
because of the categorical nature of the dependent variable, while the other methods are analyzed 
via two-limit tobit models (Tobin, 1958) because of left- and right-censoring of the dependent 
variable which would yield biased estimates when using the OLS estimator. Left- (right-) 
censoring is caused by some respondents being even more risk preferring (averse) than the most 
risk preferring (averse) category could accommodate. Both lower and upper limits are observed 
in each model and therefore the dependent variable is censored at its minimum and maximum 
values. The tobit model accounts for the qualitative difference between limit and non-limit 
observations and uses the maximum likelihood method for parameter estimation (e.g., 
Wooldridge, 2006). Cluster effects need to be accounted for at the household-level because 
household-level variables are the same for both a household head and spouse. Not accounting for 
cluster effects would lead to underestimation of the population variance because the variation of 
the error term would be the same for two respondents residing in the same household. Therefore, 
all data are analyzed using models which adjust for clustering effects within households. 
Data were collected in a random sample of 300 households, representative of Yen Chau 
district, Son La Province in northwestern Vietnam. A cluster sampling procedure was followed in 
which first, a village-level sampling frame was constructed. All villages in Yen Chau district 
were included except for those in four sub-districts bordering Laos because of difficulties in 
obtaining research permits there. Twenty villages were randomly selected using the Probability 
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Proportionate to Size (PPS) method (Carletto, 1999) based on the number of households in each 
village. Within each selected village, 15 households were then randomly selected using updated, 
village-level household lists as the sampling frames. This sampling procedure results in a self-
weighting sample since the PPS method accounts for the difference in the number of households 
between villages (Carletto, 1999). In April and May of 2011, risk preferences were elicited from 
549 household heads and spouses residing in 291 households. Some households had members 
with severe health problems and could not be interviewed. The number of respondents was 
reduced to 545 because of incomplete information in two cases and irrational responses in the 
MPL in two cases.   
2.6 RESULTS 
2.6.1 COMPARING RISK PREFERENCES ELICITED BY THE DIFFERENT METHODS 
Although all assessment methods provide evidence that respondents are, on average, risk 
averse, there are marked differences in the degrees of risk aversion identified. In the MPL, the 
mean CRRA is 0.66 (s.d. = 0.61), indicating that respondents are risk averse to very risk averse 
based on the risk preference labels in Table 2.2.
10
 Based on the distribution of responses shown 
in Table 2.2, we can state that 6% are risk preferring, 10% are approximately risk neutral, and 
84% are risk averse. The number of respondents whose risk preferences we can assess based on 
the income and inheritance series (528 and 532, respectively) is lower than that in the other 
elicitation methods because of respondents who responded “do not know” or inconsistently. The 
mean midpoint of the CRRA interval in the income series, 3.63 (s.d. = 2.40), is slightly greater 
than and statistically different from that in the inheritance series, 3.36 (s.d. = 2.36). The two-way 
tabulation of consistent responses in both series is shown in Table 2.4. Respondents with the 
same CRRA in both series, 43.8%, are in bold. About 7% of respondents in each method have a 
CRRA less than 0.31, indicating that these respondents are slightly risk averse, risk neutral, or 
risk preferring. On the other hand, about one-sixth are in the most risk averse category. 
Responses in both income and inheritance series are quite similar with the plurality having a 
                                                 
10
 Some 5.7% of respondents reverted to the safer option after having previously chosen the riskier option; however, 
the mean midpoint of the CRRA interval based on the first and last switch points to the risky option is not 
statistically different from the mean midpoint based on the total number of safer options chosen. We therefore report 
the mean CRRA midpoint based on the total number of safer options chosen, as done by Holt and Laury (2002). 
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CRRA equal to 2.88. Discrepancies, however, are evident. For example, 25.6% of respondents in 
the most risk averse category in the income series are in the least risk averse category in the 
inheritance series.  
The distribution of responses and mean CRRA based on the maize and rice series is shown in 
Table 2.5. The mean difference of the CRRA is statistically significant between all series except 
for between the maize price series and maize yield series. Respondents are most risk averse in 
the rice price series: 54% chose the most risk averse option in this series. Few respondents have a 
CRRA less than 0.58 in any of the maize and rice series. If we rank the average CRRA midpoints 
elicited from the various methods, respondents are, on average, most risk averse in the income 
series, which is followed by the inheritance series, rice price series, rice yield series, maize price 
and maize yield series, and MPL.  
Responses from the self-assessment scale and financial risk tolerance question are shown in 
the left and right panels of Figure 2.1. The mean response in the self-assessment question is 5.58 
(s.d. = 2.36) on a scale from 0 to 10. The plurality selected “5”, although this should not be 
interpreted as indicating risk neutrality given the qualitative nature of this question (Gloede et al., 
2011). The mean response in the financial risk tolerance question is 2.87 (s.d. = 0.80) on a scale 
of 1 to 4, with the majority selecting the option indicating a willingness to take an average level 
of financial risk. Since the self-assessment scale and financial risk tolerance question do not 
elicit a CRRA and respondents may assume different reference points along the self-assessment 
scale, we cannot strictly compare these methods with the others. Nevertheless, the distributions 
in Figure 2.1 imply that the self-assessment scale and financial risk tolerance question elicit 
lower levels of risk aversion than the other methods since 28% are on the risk-preferring side of 
the self-assessment scale (i.e., they selected a number less than 5) and 26% are willing to take 
substantial or above average financial risk in the financial risk tolerance question. Nevertheless, 
given the different reference points along the self-assessment scale, this statement should be 
interpreted with caution.  
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Table 2.4: Comparison of consistent responses in the income and inheritance series (N = 520) 
Midpoint of the Constant relative 
risk aversion 
interval in the income series 
Midpoint of the Constant relative risk aversion interval in the 
inheritance series 
< 0.31 
 
0.65 1.50 2.88 5.65 > 7.53 
 
Total 
< 0.31  Frequency 14 5 6 2 3 5 35 
Percent in income series 40.0 14.3 17.1 5.7 8.6 14.3  
Percent  in inheritance 
series 
35.9 10.0 6.5 1.1 3.5 6.7 6.7 
0.65 Frequency 3 9 13 9 7 3 44 
Percent in income series 6.8 20.5 29.5 20.5 15.9 6.8  
Percent in inheritance 
series 
7.7 18.0 14.1 5.0 8.2 4.0 8.5 
1.50 Frequency 0 14 27 24 5 5 75 
Percent in income series 0 18.7 36.0 32.0 6.7 6.7  
Percent in inheritance 
series 
0 28.0 29.3 13.4 5.9 6.7 14.4 
2.88 Frequency 9 16 31 97 23 7 183 
Percent in income series 4.9 8.7 16.9 53.0 12.6 3.8  
Percent in inheritance 
series 
23.1 32.0 33.7 54.2 27.1 9.3 35.2 
5.65 Frequency 3 2 12 33 33 7 90 
Percent in income series 3.3 2.2 13.3 36.7 36.7 7.8  
Percent in inheritance 
series 
7.7 4.0 13.0 18.4 38.8 9.3 17.3 
 > 7.53  Frequency 10 4 3 14 14 48 93 
Percent in income series 10.8 4.3 3.2 15.1 15.1 51.6  
Percent in inheritance 
series 
25.6 8.0 3.3 7.8 16.5 64.0 17.9 
Total Frequency 39 50 92 179 85 75 520 
Percent in income series 7.5 9.6 17.7 34.4 16.3 14.4  
Notes: Each cell shows the frequency of each combination of response and the percentage within that row and 
column except for the last row and column which indicate totals for the income series and inheritance series, 
respectively. Responses signifying that the same selection was made in both series are shown in bold.  
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Table 2.5: Respondent choices in the maize and rice gambles (N = 545) 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4  
CRRA
a
 
interval 
r > 3.36 1.20 > r < 
3.36 
0.58 > r < 
1.20 
r < 0.58  
Scenario 100% chance 
of median
b
  
yield or price 
50/50 chance 
of a 15% 
higher/ lower 
yield or price 
from median 
50/50 chance 
of a 30% 
higher/ lower 
yield or price 
from median 
50/50 chance 
of a 45% 
higher/ lower 
yield or price 
from median 
Mean 
(standard 
deviation) of 
the CRRA
c
   
Maize yield 
gamble 
31.9% 44.2% 12.1% 11.7% 2.26 
(0.97) 
Maize price 
gamble 
33.6% 42.4% 11.6% 12.5% 2.27 
(0.99) 
Rice
d
  yield 
gamble 
36.1% 43.3% 11.7% 8.8% 2.36 
(0.95) 
Rice price 
gamble 
53.9% 31.6% 9.5% 5.0% 2.65 
(0.91) 
Notes:  
a
 Constant relative risk aversion.  
b
 The median maize yield is 6.8 tons/hectare, the median maize price is 3,900 VND/kg, the median rice yield is 5 
tons/hectare, and the median rice price is 6,550 VND/kg.  
c
 The mean difference between the maize yield series and maize price series is not statistically significant: all other 
mean differences are statistically significant (P < 0.01). 
d 
The rice series refer to unhusked rice in the summer season.   
Figure 2.1: Distribution of responses to the self-assessment scale (left panel: N = 545) and 
financial risk tolerance question (right panel: N = 544) 
 
Notes: In the left panel, 0 represent “fully prepared to take risks” and 10 represents “not willing to take any risks”. In 
the right panel, 1 represents a willingness to take “substantial financial risks, expecting to earn substantial returns”, 2 
“above average financial risks, expecting to earn above average returns”, 3 “average financial risks, expecting to 
earn average returns”, and 4 “not willing to take any financial risks”. 
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Correlations between the various assessment methods are used to further examine how they 
compare to one another (shown in Table 2.6). Correlations above 0.25 are in bold, which 
highlights two groups of elicitation methods with higher correlations. The first group contains 
correlations between the financial risk tolerance question, self-assessment scale, income series, 
and inheritance series. The second group contains correlations between the rice and maize 
gambles. Correlations between the maize and rice gambles with the other methods, however, are 
weak and several are not statistically significant. Moreover, correlations are even negative 
between the MPL and the maize price, maize yield, and rice yield gambles. 
Thus far, we have presented evidence that respondents are, on average, risk averse with many 
being very risk averse. We have also shown that elicited risk preferences differ depending on the 
method. For example, the mean CRRA ranges from 0.66 in the MPL to 3.63 in the income series. 
We will now examine whether socio-economic characteristics of respondents influence their risk 
preferences via regression analyses.  
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Table 2.6: Correlations between the risk assessment methods 
 Multiple 
price list 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
question 
Self-
assessment 
scale 
Income 
series 
Inheritance 
series 
Maize 
yield 
gambles 
Maize 
price 
gambles 
Rice  
yield 
gambles 
Rice  
price 
gambles 
Multiple price list  .220
*** 
(N = 544) 
.193
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.191
*** 
(N = 528)
 
.199
*** 
(N = 532)
 
-.099
** 
(N = 545)
 
-.075
* 
(N = 545)
 
-.016
 
(N = 545)
 
.112
*** 
(N = 545)
 
Financial risk 
tolerance question 
.220
*** 
(N = 544)
 
 .728
** 
(N = 544)*
 
.301
** 
(N = 527)*
 
.287
*** 
(N = 531)
 
.035
 
(N = 545)
 
.059
 
(N = 545)
 
.097
** 
(N = 545)
 
.107
** 
(N = 545)
 
Self-assessment 
scale 
.193
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.728
*** 
(N = 544)
 
 .290
*** 
(N = 528)
 
.265
*** 
(N = 532)
 
.080
* 
(N = 545)
 
.098
** 
(N = 545)
 
.110
** 
(N = 545)
 
.181
*** 
(N = 545)
 
Income series .191
*** 
(N = 528)
 
.301
*** 
(N = 527)
 
.290
*** 
(N = 528)
 
 .400
*** 
(N = 520)
 
.170
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.194
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.198
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.144
*** 
(N = 545)
 
Inheritance series .199
*** 
(N = 532)
 
.287
*** 
(N = 531)
 
.262
*** 
(N = 532)
 
.400
*** 
(N = 520)
 
 .079
* 
(N = 545)
 
.147
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.102
** 
(N = 545)
 
.035
 
(N = 545)
 
Maize yield series -.099
** 
(N = 545)
 
.035
 
(N = 544)
 
.080
* 
(N = 545)
 
.170
*** 
(N = 528)
 
.079
* 
(N = 532)
 
 .528
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.672
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.321
*** 
(N = 545)
 
Maize price series -.075
* 
(N = 545)
 
.059
 
(N = 544)
 
.098
** 
(N = 545)
 
.194
*** 
(N = 528)
 
.147
*** 
(N = 532)
 
.528
*** 
(N = 545)
 
 .478
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.333
*** 
(N = 545)
 
Rice yield series -.016
 
(N = 545)
 
.097
** 
(N = 544)
 
.110
** 
(N = 545)
 
.198
*** 
(N = 528)
 
.102
** 
(N = 532)
 
.672
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.478
*** 
(N = 545)
 
 .383
*** 
(N = 545)
 
Rice price series .112
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.107
** 
(N = 544)
 
.181
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.144
*** 
(N = 528)
 
.035
 
(N = 532)
 
.321
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.333
*** 
(N = 545)
 
.383
*** 
(N = 545)
 
 
Notes: The sample size, N, varies by correlation because one respondent answered “do not know” in the financial risk tolerance question and because we exclude 
inconsistent and “do not know” responses in the income series and inheritance series. Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported due to the non-
continuous nature of the variables. Correlations above 0.25 are in bold. 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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2.6.2 FACTORS INFLUENCING RISK PREFERENCES 
Separate regression models are estimated with the different risk preference measures as 
dependent variables to identify influencing factors of risk preferences. Examining determinants 
of risk preferences across various elicitation techniques allows us to check the robustness of 
explanatory factors and examine whether explanatory factors of risk preferences vary by decision 
domain. Regression results are shown in Table 2.7. All models are adjusted for clustering effects 
within households and thus the reported standard errors are linearized and robust. F-tests indicate 
that the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients are jointly zero can be strongly rejected in 
all models (P < 0.001) except for the maize yield and rice yield gambles; hence, the regression 
results of the latter two models are not shown. The variance inflation factor for each explanatory 
variable in the OLS regression models is smaller than 1.79 (with the exception of village 
population and its square) and the mean VIF is 4.16, indicating that multicollinearity does not 
pose a problem (Myers, 1990). 
The regression results show that, first, the directional impact of almost all statistically 
significant explanatory variables on risk aversion is consistent across the models. The two 
exceptions are the sharing gains with others norm in the rice price gamble and idiosyncratic 
shock impacts in the maize price gamble. Second, the majority of the independent variables are 
statistically significant in determining risk preferences across most, if not all, models. For 
example, education has a statistically significant negative effect on risk aversion in all but one 
method – the maize price gamble. Third, the results offer intriguing insights into characteristics 
significant in increasing or decreasing risk aversion as well as their relative impact. For example, 
while the coefficients of gender indicate that females are substantially more risk averse than 
males, the effect of age is quite small with each additional decade increasing the CRRA between 
0.06 and 0.50 points depending on the elicitation method. In separate regressions (results not 
shown) age-squared was also included, although we failed to find a nonlinear effect of age with 
the exception of the inheritance series (P < 0.10 for the added age-squared variable). 
Surprisingly, wealth is significant in two models only: Respondents in the poorest wealth tercile 
are significantly more risk averse than those in the middle wealth tercile in the self-assessment 
scale and inheritance series.  
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Table 2.7: Regression models with risk preferences as the dependent variable 
 Multiple 
price list 
 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
question 
Self-
assessment 
scale 
Income 
series 
Inheritance 
series 
Maize 
price 
gamble 
Rice price 
gamble 
Type of 
regression 
Tobit OLS OLS Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit 
Dependent 
variable 
CRRA
a
 Categorical Categorical CRRA CRRA CRRA CRRA 
Risk 
preference 
scale  
-1.73 to 
1.36 
1 to 4 0 to 10 0.31 to 
7.53 
0.31 to 
7.53 
0.58 to 
3.36 
0.58 to 
3.36 
Observations 545 544 545 528 532 545 545 
At lower limit 1.8%   6.6% 7.3% 12.5% 5.0% 
At upper limit 14.7%   17.6% 15% 33.6% 53.9% 
        
Constant 1.368*** 
(0.324) 
2.088*** 
(0.354) 
3.828*** 
(1.048) 
-0.071 
(1.836) 
-1.381 
(1.370) 
1.616* 
(0.940) 
4.469*** 
(1.070) 
Gender 0.114** 
(0.058) 
0.406*** 
(0.060) 
1.026*** 
(0.165) 
1.141*** 
(0.258) 
1.191*** 
(0.244) 
0.437*** 
(0.153) 
0.285 
(0.182) 
Age 0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.024** 
(0.011) 
0.050*** 
(0.014) 
0.048*** 
(0.013) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Education -0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.036*** 
(0.009) 
-0.064** 
(0.027) 
-0.058* 
(0.035) 
-0.142*** 
(0.034) 
-0.026 
(0.023) 
-0.093*** 
(0.026) 
Helping others 
norm 
-0.222*** 
(0.081) 
-0.477*** 
(0.092) 
-1.259*** 
(0.249) 
-0.102 
(0.256) 
-0.670** 
(0.324) 
0.190 
(0.207) 
0.257 
(0.232) 
Sharing gains 
with others 
norm 
0.076 
(0.076) 
0.351*** 
(0.076) 
0.666*** 
(0.234) 
0.339 
(0.341) 
0.946*** 
(0.326) 
0.145 
(0.184) 
-0.722*** 
(0.211) 
Organization 
membership 
-0.040 
(0.042) 
0.083* 
(0.042) 
0.253* 
(0.131) 
-0.020 
(0.184) 
0.061 
(0.181) 
-0.122 
(0.111) 
-0.102 
(0.136) 
Dependency 
ratio 
-0.212 
(0.142) 
-0.051 
(0.167) 
0.122 
(0.528) 
2.219*** 
(0.718) 
0.955 
(0.627) 
0.370 
(0.387) 
-0.486 
(0.486) 
Poorest tercile -0.056 
(0.087) 
0.097 
(0.089) 
0.700** 
(0.281) 
0.277 
(0.421) 
1.019*** 
(0.366) 
0.369 
(0.232) 
-0.255 
(0.278) 
Wealthiest 
tercile 
0.090 
(0.083) 
0.065 
(0.083) 
0.332 
(0.272) 
-0.099 
(0.321) 
0.376 
(0.295) 
0.077 
(0.198) 
0.336 
(0.233) 
Idiosyncratic 
shock impacts 
0.034** 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.016) 
0.115** 
(0.055) 
0.152* 
(0.088) 
-0.046 
(0.067) 
-0.098* 
(0.054) 
0.020 
(0.065) 
Covariate 
shock impacts 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.043 
(0.032) 
0.050 
(0.060) 
0.029 
(0.040) 
-0.020 
(0.036) 
-0.042 
(0.032) 
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(continued from previous page) 
 Multiple 
price list 
 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
question 
Self-
assessment 
scale 
Income 
series 
Inheritance 
series 
Maize 
price 
gamble 
Rice price 
gamble 
Network-
reliance 
       
First-degree 
relatives 
-0.013 
(0.040) 
0.132*** 
(0.045) 
0.261** 
(0.123) 
0.212 
(0.226) 
0.586*** 
(0.137) 
0.004 
(0.112) 
-0.011 
(0.127) 
Extended 
family 
-0.042** 
(0.018) 
-0.056*** 
(0.020) 
-0.082 
(0.058) 
-0.208** 
(0.084) 
-0.161** 
(0.071) 
-0.009 
(0.044) 
-0.024 
(0.054) 
Friends 0.009 
(0.018) 
-0.020 
(0.022) 
0.015 
(0.068) 
0.003 
(0.086) 
-0.172** 
(0.081) 
-0.006 
(0.048) 
-0.027 
(0.060) 
Village head 0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
-0.142*** 
(0.039) 
-0.027 
(0.051) 
-0.046 
(0.045) 
-0.021 
(0.029) 
0.047 
(0.033) 
Connections 
to authorities 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.085*** 
(0.022) 
-0.059 
(0.037) 
0.016 
(0.034) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.027* 
(0.015) 
Village 
population 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Village 
population 
squared 
1.19e-06** 
(4.55e-07) 
-3.51e-07 
(4.70e-07) 
3.14e-07 
(1.52e-06) 
-2.00e-06 
(2.20e-06) 
-1.32e-06 
(1.85e-06) 
-1.53e-07 
(1.14e-06) 
-5.01e-07 
(1.38e-06) 
F-statistic 
(18, 272) 
3.88*** 
 
8.76*** 9.40*** 4.08*** b 6.99*** 1.49* 2.39*** 
R-squared  0.222 0.203     
Pseudo R-
squared
c
  
0.063   0.032 0.047 0.018 0.031 
Notes: Coefficients are in bold with their robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are clustered at the 
household level. The maize yield and rice yield gambles are not shown because in each model the null hypothesis 
that all slope parameters are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected at the 10% level. 
a
 CRRA is the Constant relative risk aversion. 
b
 F(18, 271) for the income series. 
c 
Pseudo R-squared values reported are from the unclustered tobit regression models. Pseudo R-squared values 
cannot be reported for the clustered models because they rely on likelihood ratios which are inapplicable to survey 
data since maximum likelihood estimation assumes that observations are independently and identically distributed. 
Despite the close similarity in results from the unclustered and clustered models, these reported Pseudo R-squared 
values should be interpreted with caution. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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The different dimensions of social capital have varying impacts on risk preferences. 
Respondents who agree with the helping others norm are significantly less risk averse in most 
elicitation methods. On the other hand, respondents who agree with the sharing gains with others 
norm are significantly more risk averse according to the financial risk tolerance question, self-
assessment scale, and inheritance series, while they are less risk averse according to the rice 
price gambles. Memberships in organizations have a positive impact on risk aversion in the 
financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale, while more connections to local 
authorities have a negative impact on risk aversion in several elicitation methods. The network-
reliance variables exhibit varying impacts on risk preferences. For example, increased network-
reliance with first-degree relatives has a positive impact on risk aversion, while that with 
extended family, friends, and the village head has a negative impact. In the MPL, village 
population exhibits a quadratic relationship with risk aversion: increasing population reduces risk 
aversion at a decreasing rate until the population reaches 1,303 people (about 286 households), 
beyond which larger populations have an increasing effect on risk aversion.  
To investigate which characteristics are most influential in determining whether an individual 
is extremely risk averse, we use logistic regression models in which the dependent variable 
equals one if the respondent is classified as extremely risk averse. Table 2.8 shows results in 
terms of odds ratios. The models have been adjusted for clustering effects within households and 
thus the reported standard errors are linearized and robust. F-tests indicate that most models have 
statistically highly significant explanatory power overall: again, the two exceptions are the maize 
yield and rice yield gambles (results are not shown because P > 0.10). Sensitivity and specificity 
tests report the share of cases correctly predicted by the models for the extremely risk averse and 
non-extremely risk averse sub-groups, respectively.  
In general, the results from the logistic models confirm those from the OLS and two-limit tobit 
models, although there are some variables which are no longer significant or which become 
significant in the logistic models. For example, idiosyncratic shock impacts are no longer 
significant in the MPL and self-assessment scale. Contrary expectations, respondents in the 
wealthiest tercile in the MPL have a higher probability of being classified as extremely risk 
averse compared to respondents in the middle wealth tercile. The social capital variables again 
highlight the importance of social norms. Increased network-reliance with first-degree relatives 
has a positive impact on the probability of being extremely risk averse while that with extended 
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family has a negative impact. Network-reliance with the village head has an unexpected positive 
impact on being extremely risk averse in the rice price gamble. The specificity and sensitivity 
tests indicate that for most models, while the share of correctly predicted non-extremely risk 
averse individuals is quite high, the share of correctly predicted extremely risk averse individuals 
is quite low. This indicates that none of the models are capable of differentiating between the two 
groups at a satisfactory level of precision and that there must exist important, unidentified 
determinants of risk preferences apart from the factors included in this analysis.  
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Table 2.8: Logistic models with extreme risk aversion as the dependent variable 
 Multiple 
price list 
 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
question 
Income 
series 
Inheritance 
series 
Maize price 
gamble 
Rice price 
gamble 
Definition of 
extreme risk 
aversion 
Chose 8 or 9 
safe options 
 Chose “Not 
willing to 
take any 
financial 
risks” 
Always 
chose the 
safe option 
 
 
Always 
chose the 
safe option 
Chose the 
constant 
price 
Chose the 
constant 
price 
Observations 545 544 528 532 545 545 
Number (%) 
classified as 
extremely risk 
averse 
189 
(34.7) 
 
107 
(19.7) 
 
93 
(17.6) 
 
80 
(15.0) 
 
68 
(33.6) 
 
79 
(53.9) 
 
Constant 3.467 
(3.927) 
0.021** 
(0.032) 
0.012*** 
(0.016) 
0.008*** 
(0.011) 
0.217 
(0.218) 
1.858 
(1.875) 
Gender 1.532** 
(0.296) 
2.591*** 
(0.669) 
2.194*** 
(0.583) 
1.733* 
(0.520) 
1.530** 
(0.293) 
1.269 
(0.222) 
Age 1.017* 
(0.010) 
1.038*** 
(0.014) 
1.044*** 
(0.011) 
1.042*** 
(0.011) 
1.023*** 
(0.009) 
0.999 
(0.009) 
Education 0.870*** 
(0.026) 
0.837*** 
(0.034) 
0.988 
(0.036) 
0.889*** 
(0.033) 
0.967 
(0.027) 
0.919*** 
(0.024) 
Help norm 0.433*** 
(0.116) 
0.175*** 
(0.064) 
1.207 
(0.461) 
0.725 
(0.297) 
0.977 
(0.268) 
1.206 
(0.282) 
Share norm 1.148 
(0.298) 
2.728*** 
(0.981) 
1.868** 
(0.586) 
2.997*** 
(1.247) 
1.729** 
(0.414) 
0.585** 
(0.124) 
Organization 
membership 
0.963 
(0.143) 
1.306 
(0.265) 
1.077 
(0.202) 
0.909 
(0.219) 
0.861 
(0.124) 
0.920 
(0.123) 
Dependency ratio 0.465 
(0.250) 
0.875 
(0.625) 
5.703*** 
(3.446) 
2.182 
(1.375) 
1.605 
(0.688) 
0.724 
(0.328) 
Poorest tercile 0.794 
(0.254) 
1.421 
(0.516) 
1.263 
(0.415) 
2.074** 
(0.699) 
1.354 
(0.367) 
0.739 
(0.327) 
Wealthiest tercile 1.741** 
(0.445) 
1.402 
(0.467) 
0.729 
(0.222) 
1.441 
(0.498) 
1.049 
(0.257) 
1.346 
(0.324) 
Idiosyncratic 
shock impacts 
1.003 
(0.058) 
0.803 
(1.090) 
1.120** 
(0.055) 
0.922 
(0.095) 
0.752** 
(0.086) 
0.979 
(0.071) 
Covariate shock 
impacts 
1.030 
(0.035) 
1.090** 
(0.046) 
1.071 
(0.049) 
1.041 
(0.035) 
0.998 
(0.041) 
0.944 
(0.038) 
Network-reliance       
First-degree 
relatives 
1.009 
(0.119) 
1.500** 
(0.292) 
1.030 
(0.145) 
1.399** 
(0.219) 
0.967 
(0.117) 
1.033 
(0.138) 
Extended family 0.845 
(0.052) 
0.854** 
(0.067) 
0.823*** 
(0.057) 
0.856** 
(0.060) 
1.022 
(0.060) 
0.971 
(0.052) 
Friends 0.960 
(0.065) 
0.870 
(0.075) 
1.009 
(0.077) 
0.928 
(0.077) 
0.972 
(0.059) 
0.918 
(0.057) 
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 Multiple 
price list 
 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
question 
Income 
series 
Inheritance 
series 
Maize price 
gamble 
Rice price 
gamble 
Village head 1.045 
(0.048) 
1.044 
(0.066) 
0.927 
(0.050) 
0.858** 
(0.057) 
0.952 
(0.041) 
1.080* 
(0.044) 
Connections to 
authorities 
0.964 
(0.029) 
0.950 
(0.033) 
1.019 
(0.025) 
1.039 
(0.027) 
0.982 
(0.021) 
0.959** 
(0.020) 
Village 
population 
0.998 
(0.002) 
1.001 
(0.002) 
1.001 
(0.002) 
1.001 
(0.002) 
1.000 
(0.002) 
1.002 
(0.002) 
Village 
population 
squared 
1.000 
(1.55e-06) 
1.000 
(1.90e-06) 
1.000 
(1.85e-06) 
1.000 
(0.002) 
1.000 
(1.47e-06) 
1.000 
(1.45e-06) 
       
F statistic  
(18, 272) 
3.50*** 4.05*** 2.94***
a
  3.64*** 1.99** 1.75** 
Sensitivity
b
  39.51% 25.56% 15.23% 13.39% 14.86% 71.47% 
Specificity
c
  84.11% 95.51% 98.53% 99.24% 92.32% 45.16% 
Pseudo R-
squared
d
  
0.116 0.200 0.128 0.151 0.054 0.049 
Notes: Odds ratios are in bold with their robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are clustered at the 
household level. The maize yield and rice yield gambles are not shown because in each model the null hypothesis 
that all slope parameters are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected at the 10% level.  
a
 F(18, 271) for the income series. 
b
 Sensitivity refers to the predictions that the dependent variable is 1, conditional on observed values of 1 
c
 Specificity refers to the predictions that the dependent variable is 0, conditional on observed values of 0. 
d 
Pseudo R-squared values reported are from the unclustered logistic regression models. Pseudo R-squared values 
cannot be reported for the clustered models because they rely on likelihood ratios which are inapplicable to survey 
data since maximum likelihood estimation assumes that observations are independently and identically distributed. 
Despite the close similarity in results from the unclustered and clustered models, these reported Pseudo R-squared 
values should be interpreted with caution.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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2.6.3 INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF RISK PREFERENCES 
To examine whether there is intergenerational transmission of risk preferences, in separate 
regression analyses we explore whether risk preferences of the respondent’s mother and father 
can explain the respondent’s own risk preferences. Respondents were asked, “When you were 
young and still dependent on your parents, would you say that your mother was avoiding taking 
risks or fully prepared to take risks?" and then identified their mother's risk preferences based on 
the self-assessment scale. The same question was asked about the respondent's father. Because 
55 respondents were unable to assess their parents' risk preferences, either because they did not 
feel they could make an accurate assessment or they did not grow up with their mother and/or 
father, we decided not to include parental risk aversion in the main analyses shown hitherto. This 
measure of parental risk aversion has the obvious disadvantage that the assessment is made by 
the children years later rather than by the parents themselves. Nevertheless, the measurement 
assesses perceptions of parental risk preferences which may influence respondents (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). 
We find weak evidence of intergenerational transmission of risk preferences. When the 
mother’s and/or father’s risk preferences are included in the regression analyses, the only 
assessment technique in which parental risk preferences are significant is the MPL (results are 
shown Table 2.9). The more risk averse the mother, the less risk averse the respondent, while the 
more risk averse the father, the more risk averse the respondent. These results deviate from 
previous studies which find that risk preferences of both the mother and father are positively 
related to children's risk preferences (Dohmen et al., 2012; Levin and Hart, 2003); however, 
these studies were conducted in developed countries and had better measurements of parental 
risk preferences since risk preferences were assessed from parents themselves. Further research 
is required to be able to make more conclusive statements about the impact of childhood 
experiences on risk preferences in a developing country.  
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Table 2.9: Intergenerational transmission of risk preferences 
Type of regression  Tobit 
Dependent variable Constant relative risk 
aversion 
Risk preference scale -1.73 to 1.36 
Observations 490 
Lower limit 1.8% 
Upper limit 13.3% 
Constant 1.326 (0.408) 
Gender 0.105* (0.061) 
Age 0.006** (0.003) 
Education -0.026*** (0.010) 
Help norm -0.233*** (0.082) 
Share norm 0.101 (0.078) 
Organization membership -0.051 (0.045) 
Dependency ratio -0.166 (0.158) 
Poorest tercile -0.072 (0.086) 
Wealthiest tercile 0.089 (0.086) 
Idiosyncratic shock impacts 0.019 (0.015) 
Covariate shock impacts 0.010 (0.010) 
Network-reliance  
First-degree relatives -0.009 (0.050) 
Extended family -0.045** (0.018) 
Friends 0.005 (0.019) 
Village head 0.013 (0.013) 
Connections to authorities -0.016** (0.006) 
Village population -0.001** (0.001) 
Village population squared 9.21e-07** (4.64e-07) 
Mother’s risk preferencea  -0.081+ (0.049) 
Father’s risk preference 0.078* (0.042) 
  
F-statistic (20, 254) 3.22*** 
Pseudo R-squared
b
  0.067 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and linearized in the first model which accounts 
for cluster effects at the household-level. 
a
 Mother’s and father’s risk preferences were assessed by the respondents themselves via the self-assessment scale 
(see Section 2.6.3 for more information).   
b 
Pseudo R-squared is from the unclustered model. The Pseudo R-squared value cannot be reported for the clustered 
model because it relies on the likelihood ratio which is inapplicable to survey data since maximum likelihood 
estimation assumes that observations are independently and identically distributed. Despite the results from the 
unclustered and clustered models being very similar, the reported Pseudo R-squared value should be interpreted with 
caution. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.         
+ Significant at the 15% level. 
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2.6.4 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
The following robustness tests were undertaken to assess whether the main implications and 
interpretations of the regression analyses remain the same under varying model specifications: 
(1) replacing wealth index terciles with expenditure terciles based on either 2007 or 2010 
expenditure data; (2) changing the dependent variables from the midpoint of the CRRA to 
categorical values; (3) changing the specification of the tobit models to OLS; (4) changing the 
specification of the logistic models to linear probability models (i.e., OLS); (5) changing the 
specification of the logistic models to probit; (6) expanding the definition of extreme risk 
aversion in the logistic models; (7) excluding respondents who had never completed the first year 
of primary school; (8) specifying membership in organizations as an index variable based on 
how active the respondent is in the organization, similar to Narayan and Pritchett (1999); (9) 
removing all social capital variables; (10) removing respondents in the self-assessment scale and 
the financial risk tolerance question who selected the middle or average category, respectively; 
and (11) including dummy variables representing the respondent’s ethnicity. In these robustness 
checks, some variables lose their significance and others become significant. However, in all but 
three cases,
11
 the main implications and interpretations of statistically significant factors remain 
unchanged. 
2.7 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
2.7.1 COMPARISON TO OTHER STUDIES 
The finding that the majority of respondents are risk averse supports other studies (e.g., 
Anderson and Mellor, 2009; Holt and Laury, 2002) and confirms that risk aversion, rather than 
risk neutrality, should be considered when analyzing smallholder decisions. The mean CRRA 
from the MPL in our study, 0.66, compares closely to other studies, such as 0.63 in northern 
                                                 
11
 The first case is in robustness test (6): greater network-reliance with the village head becomes statistically 
significant (P < 0.10) in the MPL logistic regression model when the definition of extreme risk aversion is expanded 
to include respondents who chose 7 safe options. The second case is in robustness tests (4) and (5): knowing more 
local authorities becomes statistically significant (P < 0.10) in predicting extreme risk aversion in the inheritance 
series when the model specification is changed from logistic to OLS or to probit. The third case is in robustness test 
(7): greater idiosyncratic shock impacts have a statistically significant (P < 0.10) negative impact on the odds of 
being extremely risk averse in the MPL when respondents who had never completed the first year of primary school 
are excluded from the analysis.  
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Vietnam (Tanaka et al., 2010) and 0.67 in Denmark (Harrison et al., 2007). Responses to the self-
assessment scale (mean = 5.58) and the financial risk tolerance question (mean = 2.87) are also 
similar to those in other studies although respondents in our case tend to assess themselves as 
being more risk averse: the mean is slightly below 5 in Cesarini et al. (2009) in the self-
assessment scale in a sample from Sweden and the mean is 2.39 in the financial risk tolerance 
question in Gilliam et al. (2010) in a sample from the United States. Results from the income and 
inheritance series follow a similar pattern: while 17.7% and 14.3% are in the most risk averse 
category in the income series and inheritance series in this study, respectively, in Anderson and 
Mellor (2009) only 4.1% and 5.2% are in these categories.  
Although the R-squared values are low, they compare well to those in other studies. For 
example, the R-squared of the self-assessment scale in our study is 0.22, while that in a study by 
Dohmen et al. (2012) is 0.23. OLS models based on risk preferences elicited from the MPL in 
Tanaka et al. (2010) have R-squared values of about 0.08: If we use an OLS model instead of a 
two-limit tobit model to examine determinants of risk preferences based on the MPL, the R-
squared value is 0.13.   
The distribution and correlations of risk preferences based on the different elicitation methods 
provides evidence that measured risk aversion varies when assessed through non-hypothetical 
and hypothetical methods as well as through different decision domains. Correlations between 
the only non-hypothetical method (the MPL) and the hypothetical methods are lower than those 
among the hypothetical methods. Furthermore, based on the distribution of responses, 
respondents appear less risk averse in the self-assessment scale and financial risk tolerance 
question compared to the MPL. Other studies also find that risk aversion is lower when elicited 
through hypothetical techniques (e.g., Harrison, 2006; Holt and Laury, 2002). The degree of risk 
aversion elicited from the income, inheritance, maize, and rice series is much higher than in the 
MPL. This may be because these methods lack risk neutral or risk preferring options and involve 
much more substantial (though hypothetical) gains and losses compared to the windfall gain in 
the MPL. In general, the results show that the degree of risk aversion greatly differs by elicitation 
technique. Therefore, comparing risk preferences elicited through non-hypothetical and 
hypothetical methods or through different decision domains should be done with caution. Others 
also find that risk preferences are not stable across contexts (e.g., Barseghyan et al., 2011) and 
that framing effects may influence observed behavior (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). 
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Correlations between risk preferences in our study are, for the most part, higher than those in 
other studies. For example, the correlation between the MPL and the self-assessment scale is 
0.114 (P < 0.01) in Gloede et al. (2011) for subjects in Vietnam, while that in our study is 0.228 
(P < 0.01). Anderson and Mellor (2009) find no significant correlation between the MPL and 
income series and a correlation of 0.22 (P < 0.05) between the MPL and inheritance series, while 
we find correlations of 0.165 (P < 0.01) and 0.147 (P < 0.01), respectively. Moreover, the 
correlation between the income series and inheritance series in Anderson and Mellor (2009) is 
0.175 (P < 0.10), while that in our study is 0.425 (P < 0.01). Correlations may be, for the most 
part, higher and more statistically significant in this study because interview techniques relied on 
verbal, pictorial, and written methods which may have resulted in more accurate responses 
(Duklan and Martin, 2002). Correlations, however, are quite weak, particularly between the 
maize or rice series with the other methods. This may result from the elicitation methods 
measuring risk aversion for different decision domains as well as the previously mentioned lack 
of risk neutral and risk preferring options in the hypothetical scenarios eliciting a CRRA.  
Inconsistencies were present between the income and inheritance series. One explanation could 
be prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In the inheritance series, we did not tell 
respondents to assume that they would not receive an inheritance other than the hypothetical one 
in the scenario. Therefore, respondents who expect to receive a substantial inheritance may have 
internalized this expectation as a reference point in the inheritance series, which may have 
affected their responses. This, however, has little relevance in the study area: when respondents 
were asked at the beginning of the interview if their household expects to receive a substantial 
inheritance, major funds, or assets, only 7% stated yes. This indicates that for the vast majority of 
respondents, the reference point for the inheritance series is the same – i.e., a reference point of 
no inheritance.  
The literature offers conflicting evidence about if and how respondent characteristics affect 
risk aversion. For example, we find that risk aversion decreases with education, confirming 
results in other studies (e.g., Gilliam et al., 2010) while deviating from others (e.g., Tanaka et al., 
2010). Previous studies find a positive relationship between risk aversion and wealth (e.g., 
Cohen and Einav, 2007), while others find a negative one (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002). We find 
evidence that respondents in both the poorest and wealthiest terciles are more risk averse than 
those in the middle wealth tercile. While respondents in the poorest tercile may be more risk 
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averse because they have fewer assets to rely upon, respondents in the wealthiest tercile may be 
more risk averse because of a relatively weak preference for status, which may reflect the 
Communist Party’s emphasis on equality and the prior organization of farm households into 
cooperatives (Carlsson et al., 2007). Moreover, the wealthier may be satisfied with their living 
standard and may not want to take risks which may threaten their lifestyle, while those in the 
middle tercile may still want to achieve a higher living standard.  
The literature suggests that shocks, especially covariate shocks, may impact risk preferences 
(Doss et al., 2008; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). Impacts from 
shocks may depend on decisions taken by the household before the shock occurred based on risk 
preferences. For example, risk preferences may influence cropping patterns and selling decisions. 
Therefore, shock impacts may be partly endogenous. We find that covariate shocks have a 
significantly positive effect on risk aversion in the financial risk tolerance question models only, 
while idiosyncratic shocks have a significant positive effect on risk aversion in several models. 
Illness of a household member is the most common idiosyncratic shock. In the maize prices 
gamble, however, greater impacts from idiosyncratic shocks have an unexpected negative impact 
on risk aversion. Although government-provided health insurance covers general administrative 
fees and low-cost treatments, households must pay 70% of the costs for more serious treatments. 
Therefore, households must pay the lion's share for severe illnesses. All shock coefficients, 
however, have only a small effect on risk aversion given their low Beta-coefficients.  
2.7.2 IMPACTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ON RISK PREFERENCES 
Since social capital's influence on individual risk preferences has not been explicitly analyzed 
before, we cannot make comparisons with other studies. Instead, we discuss the results in light of 
previous literature on social capital. We find that cognitive social capital, namely norms, are 
important determinants of risk preferences: In most models, respondents agreeing with the 
helping others norm are significantly less risk averse, while those agreeing with the sharing gains 
with others norm are significantly more risk averse. The helping others norm may be particularly 
important for coordinating action between households when public or private sector substitutes 
are lacking (Collier, 2002). An explanation for the strong and significant positive impact on risk 
aversion from agreeing with the sharing gains with others norm may result from generalized 
reciprocity, which may prevent “one from accumulating much more than the average” (Cashdan, 
1985, p. 456). Moreover, expectations of sharing with others may lower the risk premium since 
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individuals may be less willing to take risks if they believe that they would have to share their 
success with others. 
Surprisingly, organizational membership – one of the most widely used proxies of social 
capital – is statistically significant in two models only and has a positive impact on risk aversion. 
Its positive effect may result from an emphasis on equality since mass organizations are largely 
functional groups attached to the Communist Party (Gray, 1999; Kerkvliet et al., 2003). This 
attachment may also explain why organizational membership is insignificant in most models: 
Social capital benefits from these organizations may be less than those from locally-formed 
organizations. Furthermore, Grootaert and van Bastalaer (2002) observe that organizational 
membership is not a relevant social capital indictor in countries where informal networks are 
more important.  
Network-reliance is an important determinant of risk preferences; however, its directional 
impact on risk aversion depends on the particular social network. For example, network-reliance 
with extended relatives has a negative impact on risk aversion, while that with first-degree 
relatives has a positive one. In almost all models, network-reliance with friends or with the 
village head is insignificant, highlighting the importance of family in the traditional Vietnamese 
society. Although it may seem counterintuitive, the positive impact of network-reliance with 
first-degree relatives supports findings in other studies. For example, Sharma and Zeller (1997) 
find that credit groups containing a higher proportion of relatives have higher default, which may 
be because of cultural factors which “make it difficult to impose sanctions on relatives” (Sharma 
and Zeller, 1997, p. 1738). Moreover, social capital literature suggests that "fierce loyalties and 
familial attachments” may discourage people from “advancing economically" (Woolcock, 1998, 
p. 171). In addition, incomes among first-degree relatives are likely to be more highly correlated 
and if a risky investment supported by an intra-household investment fails, the household would 
be affected by the loss more severely than if the money had been borrowed from extended family 
members. Another factor is that people may be more committed to repay and to reciprocate loans 
to first-degree relatives, which may result in individuals choosing less risky investment 
strategies.  
Village population and its square demonstrate that low closure is effective in reducing 
individual's risk aversion assessed from the MPL technique, but only up to a certain point – a 
village with about 1,300 residents. Socially distant individuals can exert less social pressure and 
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reciprocal obligations are less certain. In addition, it is more difficult in large communities to 
gather information about households, monitor and enforce contracts, and coordinate activities 
(De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Murgai et al., 2002; Rosenzweig, 1988).  
In summary, the analysis of how social capital impacts risk preferences demonstrates the 
importance of analyzing different forms of social capital separately as well as including less 
tangible forms of social capital, namely norms.  
2.7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE ELICITATION METHODS USED 
 There are a number of limitations of the elicitation methods used to assess risk preferences. 
First, the self-assessment scale may be biased due to framing effects since 23% selected the 
easily-identifiable middle category. We recommend that the self-assessment scale be re-scaled, 
such as from 0 to 9, to avoid an easily identifiable middle category. Second, in the income, 
inheritance, maize, and rice series, the certainty effect that people underweight probable 
outcomes compared with certain outcomes may have led respondents to choose the certain 
outcome over riskier ones (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Therefore, these measures may have 
overestimated the degree of risk aversion. Moreover, these methods lacked risk neutral or risk 
preferring options which may explain why they found much higher degrees of risk aversion than 
the MPL which included such options. Third, there is low applicability of the income and 
inheritance series and the MPL to real life decisions of smallholders in developing countries who 
have few opportunities to change their income earning activity or to receive windfall gains. 
Fourth, there are many drawbacks to the financial risk tolerance question, such as the dual thrust 
of response categories since they assume not only a willingness to take risks, but also an 
expectation of returns. We propose excluding expectations of returns from the response 
categories. Moreover, the conversion of responses from the financial risk tolerance question into 
numerical categories of risk aversion is problematic (Hanna and Lindamood, 2004). Fifth, the 
direction of causality of some respondent characteristics is unknown. Tanaka et al. (2010, p. 557) 
write, “Do preferences cause economic circumstances (e.g., through business formation), or do 
circumstances create preferences”?  
Although the explanatory power of the models is similar to that in other studies, it is still low – 
particularly in the maize and rice gambles. One reason for the low explanatory power in these 
series may be that the four available price and yield options were not able to adequately capture 
varying degrees of risk aversion. Moreover, between 32% and 54% selected the first option (a 
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100% chance of the median price or yield), signifying that the second option (a 50/50 chance of a 
15% lower/higher price or yield from the median) may have been deemed too risky. Thus, we 
propose offering respondents more refined yield and price options, such as a 5% higher/lower 
price or yield from the median.  
Despite these limitations, we are confident that respondents understood the questions well 
because of the various interview techniques employed such as visual, oral, and written 
explanations. Empirical support of respondents’ comprehension of the questions is seen, for 
example, in the low number of inconsistent responses within the MPL, income series, and 
inheritance series, as well as in the high percentage of respondents with the same risk 
classification in the income and inheritance series. Nevertheless, the low level of predictive 
power of the models clearly signals that other factors, such as personality traits and childhood 
experiences, are likely to be important in determining risk preferences. 
2.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Comparing risk preferences based on the nine elicitation methods yields several interesting 
findings. First, the results provide evidence that specific factors are significant determinants of 
risk preferences across most elicitation methods: gender, age, education, norms about helping 
others, norms about sharing gains with others, impacts from idiosyncratic shocks, network-
reliance with extended family, and connections to local authorities. The significance of several 
social capital proxies suggests that people's risk preferences are embedded in social institutions. 
Second, respondents, on average, have a high degree of risk aversion, although this is not 
surprising considering the risks they face, such as illness, natural disasters, and livestock disease 
outbreaks, as well as the lack of adequate formal insurance mechanisms and little government 
assistance to buffer shocks. The greater impact of idiosyncratic shocks on risk preferences rather 
than covariate shocks, however, was unexpected. Third, even though correlations between most 
risk preference measures are statistically highly significant, they are rather weak in magnitude. 
This suggests that risk preference measures related to various decision domains should be 
compared with caution. Fourth, the low explanatory power of respondent characteristics in 
explaining risk preferences indicates that the examined factors can only partly account for risk 
preferences and that other characteristics may explain more variance. The low explanatory power 
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may also indicate that the methods used to elicit risk preferences may not be suitable in 
developing countries. 
Comparing the elicitation methods allows insights into which method may be better adapted to 
assess risk preferences of smallholder farmers in a developing country. Although the MPL is the 
gold standard to assess risk preferences, there are several disadvantages of this method: it is 
expensive, requires numeracy, is time-intensive to train interviewers and to explain to 
respondents, and windfall gains are atypical for smallholders. Nevertheless, the MPL has clear 
advantages. Unlike hypothetical survey methods, it is incentive compatible and lacks framing 
effects which may shape behavior. The self-assessment scale may be the best alternative to the 
MPL since it has behavioral validity with responses to the MPL, is easier to administer and 
comprehend, and can be adapted to different scenarios (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2012). Although, the 
income series has several disadvantages – it has framing effects, is more difficult to comprehend, 
and requires more time to explain than the self-assessment scale – it involves potential losses. 
The question should be re-phrased to better reflect smallholders’ lives, such as posing a question 
about a decision to reallocate land to a new cash crop with possible gains and losses. 
Several opportunities present themselves for future research. First, the very low explanatory 
power of the models of risk preferences based on the maize and rice gambles is disappointing 
and underscores the importance of continued research on how to elicit risk preferences based on 
real life decisions. Second, more research is needed on the stability of risk preferences over time 
to analyze if and how risk preferences are affected by positive or negative shocks. Third, 
examining the explanatory power of risk preference measures in observed economic behavior 
would be relevant to test the validity of the methods. Fourth, identifying more explanatory 
factors of risk preferences, such as upbringing and past experiences is needed. 
This research has several implications for policymakers. The result that most respondents are 
risk averse – with a large proportion being very risk averse – indicates that smallholders may be 
unwilling to change their production system by investing in new inputs or a new production 
system, for example, even if credit opportunities exist (e.g., Giné and Yang, 2009). The 
avoidance of investments deemed too “risky”, which could otherwise increase households’ 
productive capacity, may keep the poor trapped in poverty (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; 
Morduch, 1994; Dercon, 1996). Education measures may enable smallholders to more 
realistically assess risks and make better-informed investment decisions. Policymakers should be 
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aware that encouraging risk-reducing or risk-increasing technologies may have different welfare 
impacts on smallholders based on their risk preferences and socio-economic characteristics 
(Picazo-Tadeo and Wall, 2011). Because of the high degree of risk aversion, policymakers and 
extension agents should recommend that smallholders invest step-wise in new opportunities or 
technologies. Open-ended interviews with village heads confirm that smallholders are reluctant 
to invest in new technologies without first witnessing their success. Ideally, farmers could 
actively participate in the hands-on operations of trial plots to help overcome any risk aversion. 
For example, Conley and Udry (2010) find that farmers imitate agricultural decisions of 
neighbors who had experienced successful agricultural production. The need for social protection 
policies and better health insurance coverage is apparent based on the finding that idiosyncratic 
shocks increase risk aversion. Moreover, risk-reducing policies such as agricultural insurance 
and other safety nets could be targeted to the most risk averse individuals – women, people 
whose households recently suffered from large idiosyncratic shocks, the older, and the less 
educated. 
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3 THE IMPACT OF IDIOSYNCRATIC AND COVARIATE 
SHOCKS ON CHANGES IN RISK PREFERENCES 
BETWEEN THE LEAN AND HARVEST SEASONS FOR 
SMALLHOLDER FARMERS IN VIETNAM 
THEA NIELSEN, MANFRED ZELLER 
Abstract 
Previous studies emphasize that shocks cause households to fall into poverty traps and to remain 
there because of risk aversion. Despite this well-known connection between shocks and risk 
aversion with poverty traps, there has been no attempt to discern whether shocks influence risk 
preferences to change in a developing country. We examine whether shocks, social capital, and 
other characteristics influence changes in risk preferences from the lean season to the harvest 
season from household heads and spouses in a random sample of 300 households engaged in 
smallholder agriculture in northwestern Vietnam. The elicitation techniques encompass a non-
hypothetical lottery game and six hypothetical methods. Except for one assessment method, risk 
preferences are not stable across seasons. Shocks and other characteristics significantly change 
risk preferences between seasons. Based on the findings, we provide policy recommendations to 
help households better cope with shocks and encourage them to pursue new livelihood strategies. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Adverse shocks can push households under a poverty threshold, causing them to fall into 
poverty traps. This can result in detrimental short-term and even permanent outcomes for health, 
education, and income (Carter et al., 2007; Hoddinott, 2006). Households may be unable to 
escape poverty traps because they may be too risk averse and thus pursue low-risk, low-return 
livelihood strategies (Dercon, 1996; Lybbert and McPeak, 2012; Morduch, 1994; Rosenzweig 
and Binswanger, 1993). Although the literature emphasizes this connection between shocks and 
risk aversion with poverty traps, there has been no attempt to date to discern whether shocks 
influence risk aversion. If shocks cause individuals to become even more risk averse, this could 
increase the likelihood that households remain trapped in poverty because of pursuing more 
extreme low-risk, low-return livelihood strategies. This study examines whether risk preferences 
are stable from the lean season to the harvest season and whether shocks cause risk preferences 
to change among smallholder farmers living in an upland environment characterized by poverty 
and food insecurity in northwestern Vietnam.  
Risk is a situation where alternative outcomes exist with known probabilities and is distinct 
from uncertainty since the former entails unknown probabilities (Knight, 1921).
12
 Some people 
prefer taking risks and are thus risk lovers, others avoid taking risks and are thus risk averse, and 
others have no preference for or against risk and are thus risk neutral. There are many methods 
available to assess risk preferences including pairwise choice (e.g., Hey et al., 2009), willingness 
to pay or accept (e.g., Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992), the Becker DeGroot Marschak 
mechanism (e.g., James, 2007), lottery choice task decisions (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002), self-
assessment questions (e.g., Cesarini et al., 2009), and hypothetical scenarios (e.g., Anderson and 
Mellor, 2009). In addition, risk preferences can be inferred from real life choices, such as the 
ratio of risky assets to less risky assets (e.g., Gilliam et al., 2010) or insurance deductibles (e.g., 
Cohen and Einav, 2007). Here, we elicit risk preferences using a lottery game with actual 
payouts – the so-called gold standard –, two widely applied self-assessment methods (the 
financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale), and four locally-adapted methods 
                                                 
12
 According to Knight (1921, p. 46), "while a single situation involving a known risk may be regarded as uncertain, 
this uncertainty is easily converted into effective certainty; for in a considerable number of such cases the results 
become predictable in accordance with the laws of chance, and the error in such prediction approaches zero as the 
number of cases is increased".  
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involving hypothetical price and yield gambles of the main cash crop (maize) and main food 
crop (rice).  
There are only a handful of studies which have elicited risk preferences over time using more 
than one method (Guiso et al., 2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Vlaev et al., 2009). The 
majority of studies eliciting risk preferences over time rely on one technique only (e.g., Andersen 
et al., 2008; Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008; Chiappori and Paiella, 2011; Doss et al., 2008; 
Harrison et al., 2005; Sahm, 2008). Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, the only other 
study to examine changes in risk preferences over time in a developing country is Doss et al. 
(2008), although they measure risk perceptions based on a subjective and ordinal measure of 
self-identified risks rather than risk preferences based on a measure which can be compared to 
other studies. Findings from previous studies on the stability of risk preferences over time greatly 
vary. In some, risk preferences are stable (e.g., Andersen et al., 2008; Chiappori and Paiella, 
2011; Cohen and Einav, 2007; Harrison et al., 2005), while in others they are unstable (e.g., Doss 
et al, 2008; Guiso et al., 2011; Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Sahm, 2008). One cause for this 
disparity is that these studies elicited risk preferences using quite disparate methods, such as 
lottery games or gambles (Andersen et al., 2008; Baucells and Villasís, 2010; Harrison et al., 
2005; Vlaev et al., 2009), hypothetical income gambles (Baucells and Villasís, 2010; Sahm, 
2008; Vlaev et al., 2009), self-assessment questions (Baucells and Villasís, 2010; Guiso et al., 
2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Vlaev et al., 2009), rankings of self-identified risks (Doss et 
al., 2008), and real-life decisions about insurance contracts (Cohen and Einav, 2007) or the share 
of risky assets (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008; Chiappori and Paiella, 2011; Malmendier and 
Nagel, 2011). Studies which elicited risk preferences based on real-life decisions found that risk 
preferences are stable, which may be explained by "sticky" decisions: it requires a high time 
input to reallocate assets into or out of stocks or to choose new insurance deductibles. On the 
other hand, studies which elicited risk preferences using self-assessment questions found that 
risk preferences are unstable (Guiso et al., 2011; Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Vlaev et al., 2009) 
and studies which elicited risk preferences using gambles found a variety of outcomes: unstable 
risk preferences (Guiso et al., 2011), stable risk preferences (Andersen et al., 2008; Harrison et 
al., 2005), and only "modest changes" in risk preferences (Sahm, 2008). Besides differences in 
the elicitation methods among these studies, the time between surveys varied from three months 
(Vlaev et al., 2009) to six years (Sahm, 2008). Based on our literature review, we infer that the 
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different methods themselves rather than the various time lags between surveys are more 
influential in determining whether risk preferences are found to be stable. 
Studies examining risk preferences over time have analyzed impacts of both time-variant and 
time-invariant variables on risk preference changes (Andersen et al., 2008; Brunnermeier and 
Nagel, 2008; Chiappori and Paiella, 2011; Guiso et al., 2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; 
Sahm, 2008) or failed to examine any influencing factors (Baucells and Villasís, 2010; Meier and 
Sprenger, 2010; Vlaev et al., 2009; Zeisberger, et al., 2012). Our review of these studies which 
examined determinants of risk preference changes over time does not allow us to provide any 
definite conclusions about if, how, or why risk preferences may change over time. For example, 
while Sahm (2008) found that time-invariant characteristics such as gender, race, and education 
were significant in determining changes in risk preferences over time, other studies found no 
such relation (Andersen et al., 2008; Doss et al., 2004; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). Several 
studies have found that time-variant characteristics – namely, changes in wealth, assets, or 
income – did not affect risk preference stability over time (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008; 
Chiappori and Paiella, 2011; Doss et al., 2008; Guiso et al., 2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; 
Sahm, 2008), while Malmendier and Nagel (2011) found that low stock market returns decreased 
the willingness to take financial risk over time.  
A few studies have analyzed whether shocks are significant in changing risk preferences. Most 
studies have found that national- or community-level shocks are significant (Doss et al., 2008; 
Guiso et al., 2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Sahm, 2008), while household- or individual-
level shocks are not (Doss et al., 2008; Guiso et al., 2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Sahm, 
2008). For example: Sahm (2008) found that major life events, such as a job loss or diagnosis of 
a serious health condition, did not change risk preferences over time for older respondents in the 
U.S., yet that general changes in the macroeconomic environment did; Doss et al. (2008) found 
that household-level shocks and changes in livestock assets did not change rankings of self-
identified risks over time for respondents in East Africa, yet that community-level shocks did; 
and Malmendier and Nagel (2011) found that income did not influence changes in financial risk 
tolerance in the U.S., but that general stock market returns did. Therefore, the literature indicates 
that covariate shocks rather than idiosyncratic shocks may be more influential in changing risk 
preferences over time. Since idiosyncratic shocks, such as a job loss or major illness, can affect 
one’s lifetime income quite severely, it is somewhat surprising to us that idiosyncratic shocks 
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were not found to affect risk preferences. On the other hand, perhaps risk preference changes are 
an outcome of a collective communication process that may be triggered by a covariate shock 
which affected peers as well, and an outcome of communication which may cause individuals to 
adopt the group’s pessimism and become more risk averse. Covariate shocks, such as ever-
increasing stock prices, may also work the other way, making people more risk-loving over time 
through communication and a community or even country-wide optimism about the future. 
Idiosyncratic shocks are less talked about in groups and thereby are less influenced by social 
processes and common opinion. In addition, households may be able to borrow from others in 
the area to cope with idiosyncratic shocks, but may be less able to do so if a covariate shock 
occurs (e.g., Platteau and Abraham, 1987). Therefore, risk preference changes may be more 
affected by covariate rather than idiosyncratic shocks.  
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has examined whether social capital affects 
risk preference changes over time. Previous studies have focused on how social networks 
function as an informal insurance mechanism against potential downfalls in consumption 
(Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Platteau and Abraham, 1987) or in 
assets (Carter et al., 2007), how social capital influences formation of risk pooling groups 
(Attanasio et al., 2012; Barr et al., 2012; Murgai et al., 2002), and how social capital encourages 
firms to take risks (Steer and Sen, 2010). These studies suggest that individuals with more 
extensive networks and hence greater access to consumption credit, assistance in-kind, and 
capital markets are better able to cope with risks. Therefore, such individuals may have more 
stable risk preferences since they may be better able to smooth consumption over time. Social 
capital may be particularly important when government or private sector substitutes for risk 
coping mechanisms are not available or accessible (Collier, 2002; Murgai et al., 2002). We 
hypothesize that for most proxies of social capital, individuals with greater access to social 
capital may be better able to cope with negative shocks and therefore have more stable risk 
preferences or may have less stable risk preferences because or more social obligations at 
different times of the year. 
In contrary to previous studies which used only one or a few elicitation methods, we 
systematically apply three widely-applied methods to elicit risk preferences as well as four 
locally-adapted methods to test whether findings differ by method. These methods are a lottery 
game – the so-called gold standard – developed by Holt and Laury (2002), a self-assessment 
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scale developed by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), the financial risk 
tolerance question which originates from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer 
Finances, and four locally-adapted methods involving gambles of prices and yields for maize and 
rice based on Hill (2009). This study provides several contributions to the literature by: 1) 
examining the stability of risk preferences from the lean season to the harvest season based on 
seven elicitation methods for smallholder farmers in a developing country; and 2) identifying 
determinants, including social capital and idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, of changes in risk 
preferences across seasons. To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous study which 
analyzes the stability of risk preferences elicited from such a wide range of techniques for 
respondents living in a developing country or which examines whether various facets of social 
capital influence changes in risk preferences over time. Moreover, this is the first study to 
examine if shocks can change risk preferences of respondents living in a developing country. We 
analyze how changes in risk preferences are affected by: the time component of a shock by 
examining shock impacts experienced at different intervals in time prior to the interview date; 
and by the characteristic of the shock by examining drought, livestock death, other covariate 
shock, and idiosyncratic shock impacts. Influencing factors of changes in risk preferences across 
seasons are examined for each of the seven assessment methods separately, thereby allowing for 
more robust evidence of our findings across elicitation methods. Examining changes in risk 
preferences elicited from such a variety of methods also allows us to test whether different 
elicitation methods matter for both outcomes and determinants of risk preferences stability.   
In summary, previous studies are inconsistent in demonstrating whether risk preferences are 
stable over time and in identifying influencing factors for their instability. Therefore, this study 
may help disentangle the effect of the elicitation method on the stability of risk preferences over 
time and provide more robust evidence of findings across the elicitation methods. Moreover, this 
study seeks to contribute to closing the knowledge gap on how time-variant and time-invariant 
factors influence changes in risk preferences. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: 
Section 3.2 presents the study area with regards to the importance of shocks and social capital, 
Section 3.3 describes the risk preference elicitation techniques, Section 3.4 presents the 
conceptual framework, Section 3.5 describes the regression models and data used, Section 3.6 
examines and discusses the results, and Section 3.7 provides conclusions as well as research and 
policy recommendations.  
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3.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA 
This study was conducted in Yen Chau district, a marginal upland area in northwestern 
Vietnam. Yen Chau is inhabited primarily by ethnic minorities of which the largest are Black 
Thai and H’mong, accounting for 55% and 20% of the district’s population, respectively. Kinh 
(“ethnic Vietnamese”) constitute another 13%. Rice is grown in paddy fields in the lowlands 
mainly for home consumption, although nearly half do not produce enough rice to meet their 
consumption needs. Maize, on the other hand, is grown in the uplands as a cash crop with the 
vast majority of households selling almost all harvested maize. Nearly all households are 
engaged in maize production on steep slopes which results in high levels of soil erosion. 
Although outsiders may perceive this production system to be a risky livelihood strategy since it 
degrades soil and relies heavily on high-yielding maize varieties and hence fertilizer, respondents 
perceive it as a very low-risk income earning activity: When asked to rank nine agricultural 
activities in terms of their riskiness for household income, less than 10% selected maize as being 
the most or second most risky agricultural activity and less than 5% selected maize as being the 
third or fourth most risky agricultural activity. Therefore, respondents consider maize production 
to be one of the least risky agricultural activities to earn income. Social capital is important in 
Yen Chau to secure credit which is mainly used to finance food purchases, agricultural inputs, 
social events, education, and health care. Most loans are collateral-free and are lent by neighbors, 
acquaintances, or relatives who live within the village or district. Thus, most credit transactions 
rely on social collateral rather than physical collateral (Karlan et al., 2009).  
The average daily per capita expenditures are equivalent to $2.35 in purchasing power parity 
(PPP).
13
 Food security is a concern: Nearly three-quarters of household heads reported worrying 
about exhausting food supplies before there was either enough earned income or before the next 
harvest season. One cause of food insecurity is shocks; the most frequent shocks are drought, 
livestock death, yield loss from pests or diseases, and illness of a household member. For 
example, nearly all households reported losses from a drought in the unusually cold winter of 
2010/2011 which resulted in widespread livestock deaths. To cope with this extreme winter, 
                                                 
13
 The average daily per capita expenditures in 2010 were 19,740 Vietnamese dong (VND). These expenditures were 
updated for inflation and converted to their purchasing power parity (PPP) equivalent: 10,178.57 VND/$1 PPP 
(General Statistics Office, 2012; The World Bank, 2012).  
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households resorted to consumption smoothing (by using savings and selling livestock) and asset 
smoothing (by reducing food and non-food consumption): Four-fifths of households affected by 
the drought reported reducing consumption and over half reported reducing food consumption to 
cope with the drought. In addition, households sold livestock, changed agricultural practices, 
sought off-farm employment, and/or took out loans. Previous studies have identified shocks as a 
major cause for households to fall into poverty (e.g., Carter et al., 2007). Household heads in Yen 
Chau confirmed this: 29% stated that the most important cause for households to fall into 
poverty is drought and 20% stated that it is the illness or death of a working household member. 
Mechanisms to cope with negative shocks also impact non-poor households who may not be 
vulnerable to falling into poverty, such as by depleting assets. 
In summary, the study area is characterized by poverty, food insecurity, a heavy reliance on 
social capital, and covariate and idiosyncratic shocks.  
3.3 METHODS TO ELICIT RISK PREFERENCES  
Seven methods were applied to elicit risk preferences: a non-hypothetical lottery game, two 
self-assessment techniques (the financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale), and 
four locally-adapted hypothetical gambles involving varying prices and yields of the main cash 
crop (maize) and main food crop (rice) in Yen Chau. The non-hypothetical method, a lottery 
game, involved actual payouts whereas the hypothetical methods asked respondents to assess 
their own risk preferences or involved gambles which were hypothetical only. In all methods 
applied, larger numbers indicate a higher degree of risk aversion. Other methods to elicit risk 
preferences include willingness to pay or accept, the Becker DeGroot Marschak mechanism, 
hypothetical income and inheritance gambles, and inferring risk preferences from real life 
choices such as the ratio of risky assets to less risky assets. Willingness to pay/accept gambles 
and the Becker DeGroot Marshak mechanism were not applied because they would be too 
difficult for respondents to comprehend and require high time-inputs to train enumerators and 
explain to respondents. Income and inheritance gambles were not applied given concern of their 
inapplicability in the area, which was found in Chapter 2. In addition, data availability prevented 
eliciting risk preferences from real-life decisions. Finally, respondent fatigue was a concern.  
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3.3.1 NON-HYPOTHETICAL ELICITATION METHOD 
 The only non-hypothetical elicitation method applied is a lottery game called the multiple 
price list technique (hereafter, MPL) based on Holt and Laury (2002). In the MPL, subjects were 
given a set of ten choices between two options – a relatively safer option (Option A) and a 
relatively riskier option (Option B). Each option had two possible payouts with different 
probabilities of each payout being realized (see Table 3.1). The payouts in the safer option had a 
lower variance than those in the riskier option. In the first four choices, the expected value 
(which was not shown to subjects) of the safer option was greater than that of the riskier option, 
whereas in the last six choices the opposite was the case because the probability of the high 
payout being realized increased by 10 percentage points in both options with each subsequent 
choice. Risk preferences are based on the point at which subjects switched from the safer option 
to the riskier one. According to expected payouts, approximately risk neutral people will switch 
to the riskier option in the fifth choice, while risk preferring and risk averse people will switch to 
the riskier option before and after the fifth choice, respectively.  
Table 3.1: Choices in the multiple price list 
C
h
o
ic
e 
(r
o
w
) Probability of 
high and low 
payouts 
Payouts in the safer option 
(Option A) in ‘000 VND 
Payouts in the riskier option 
(Option B) in ‘000 VND 
 
Low High Low High E(A) Low High E(B) 
E(A)- 
E(B) 
1 0.90 0.10 33.0 41.0 33.8 2.0 79.0 9.7 24.1 
2 0.80 0.20 33.0 41.0 34.6 2.0 79.0 17.4 17.2 
3 0.70 0.30 33.0 41.0 35.4 2.0 79.0 25.1 10.3 
4 0.60 0.40 33.0 41.0 36.2 2.0 79.0 32.8 3.4 
5 0.50 0.50 33.0 41.0 37 .0 2.0 79.0 40.5 -3.5 
6 0.40 0.60 33.0 41.0 37.8 2.0 79.0 48.2 -10.4 
7 0.30 0.70 33.0 41.0 38.6 2.0 79.0 55.9 -17.3 
8 0.20 0.80 33.0 41.0 39.4 2.0 79.0 63.6 -24.2 
9 0.10 0.90 33.0 41.0 40.2 2.0 79.0 71.3 -31.1 
10 0 1.0 33.0 41.0 41 .0 2.0 79.0 79 .0 -38.0 
Notes: Payouts were adjusted for inflation. In the second survey round (in the harvest season), Option A had payouts 
of 35,000 VND and 44,000 VND and Option B had payouts of 2,000 VND and 85,000 VND. The purchasing power 
parity in 2011 is 10,179 VND/$1 (The World Bank, 2012).  
The highest payout amount, 79,000 VND, is equivalent to about 3.3 times the average daily 
per capita expenditures in our sample, 23,905 VND or $2.35 at purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Therefore, the highest potential payout can be considered substantial for respondents. To help 
subjects understand the ten choices, each choice was explained one at a time along with pie 
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charts and explanations of probabilities via a ten-sided die (Appendix 6.7 contains the 
instructions and choices). After all ten choices had been completed, subjects were shown their 
selections and given an opportunity to change any responses before one of the ten choices was 
randomly selected for an actual payout. 
There are several approaches to analyze selections in the MPL. Similar to other studies using 
this technique (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002), we base risk preference labels on the total number of 
safer options chosen (see Table 3.2). Moreover, we calculate the constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) interval based on the CRRA utility function: 
U(Y) = Y^(1 - r)/(1 – r) for r ≠ 1                                                        (1) 
where r is the CRRA and Y is the payout amount in the lottery.
14
 The CRRA is less than 0 for 
subjects who are risk lovers, equal to 0 for subjects who are risk neutral, and greater than 0 for 
subjects who are risk averse. The CRRA is preferable to other risk aversion parameters since it 
has a scale invariance property. Thus, the CRRA can be compared across studies. Using this 
utility function, we can calculate the lower and upper bounds of a subject’s CRRA. Risk 
preferences are determined by the midpoint of the CRRA interval though subjects who chose the 
safer option nine (zero) times are assigned a CRRA equal to the lower (upper) bound of the 
CRRA interval since the upper (lower) bound equals infinity (negative infinity). Eight 
respondents were excluded that had selected the safer option in the last choice since the 
probability of winning the high payout is 100% in the this choice and therefore it is not rational 
to select the safer option which has a lower guaranteed payout. 
                                                 
14 
We adopt the terminology of CRRA based on other studies using the MPL technique. The correct terminology for 
the above described CRRA, however, is a partial risk aversion coefficient since the utility function is defined in 
terms of gains and losses rather than wealth (Hardaker et al., 2004).  
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Table 3.2: Risk preferences based on the multiple price list (N = 530)  
Total number 
of safer 
options 
chosen 
Risk preference label
a
  Constant relative 
risk aversion 
interval 
Percent of 
subjects in the 
lean season 
Percent of 
subjects in the 
harvest season 
0 Extremely risk loving r < -1.73 1.7 4.0 
1 Highly risk loving -1.73 >  r < -0.96 0.9 2.3 
2 Very risk loving -0.96 > r < -0.49 0.8 0.9 
3 Risk loving -0.49 > r < -0.15 2.6 3.0 
4 Approx. risk neutral -0.15 > r < 0.15 10.2 15.1 
5 Slightly risk averse 0.15 > r < 0.41 11.7 20.9 
6 Risk averse 0.41 > r < 0.67 19.8 22.1 
7 Very risk averse 0.67 > r < 0.97 17.7 17.9 
8 Highly risk averse 0.97 > r < 1.36 20.2 9.8 
9 Extremely risk averse r > 1.36 14.3 4.0 
Notes: 
a 
Labels are similar to those in previous studies; however, we separate respondents who never chose the safer option 
from those who chose the safer option once and we label respondents who chose the safer option four times as being 
“approximately risk neutral” rather than “risk neutral”.  Moreover, we exclude eight subjects who chose the safer 
option in the last choice. 
3.3.2 HYPOTHETICAL ELICITATION METHODS 
The six hypothetical methods to assess risk preferences are two widely applied self-assessment 
techniques (the financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale) and four locally-
adapted hypothetical questions involving price and yield gambles for maize and rice.  
Unlike the other methods, the financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale allow 
subjects to explicitly identify their own willingness to take risks.  The financial risk tolerance 
question originates from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances and has 
been widely applied in the U.S. to gauge risk preferences (e.g., Gilliam et al., 2010). 
Respondents were asked the amount of financial risk they are willing to take: (1) substantial 
financial risks, expecting to earn substantial returns; (2) above average financial risks, expecting 
to earn above average returns; (3) average financial risks, expecting to earn average returns; or 
(4) not willing to take any financial risks (shown in Appendix 6.8). The self-assessment scale is 
based on the German Socio-Economic Panel Study conducted by the German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW Berlin) and has also been widely applied to elicit risk preferences. In 
addition, Dohmen et al. (2012) have confirmed the behavioral validity of this measurement. In 
the self-assessment scale, subjects were shown a scale with integers ranging from 0 (= fully 
avoiding risks) to 10 (= fully prepared to take risks) and asked to point to the integer best 
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matching their willingness to take risks (shown in Appendix 6.9). Afterwards, responses were 
rescaled so that 0 represents the most risk preferring and 10 the most risk averse. Unlike the 
other assessment methods in which a CRRA interval is elicited, risk preferences are categorical 
classification in these two techniques. 
The last set of hypothetical methods to assess risk preferences consists of gambles with 
varying yields and prices of maize and rice. The maize and rice gambles relate to local conditions 
and are thus more familiar to respondents because they relate to the main cash crop and food 
crop, respectively. The gambles are based on Hill (2009); however, we use yields and prices 
which lie within the minimum and maximum ranges in the study area. Respondents were asked 
which of four options of varying yields and prices for maize and rice they would prefer every 
year, assuming that prices and yields remain constant, respectively. Each gamble includes four 
options: The first option has a 100% chance of the median price or yield from Yen Chau, while 
each subsequent option has a 50/50 chance of a price or yield which is 15% lower or higher than 
the median (Appendix 6.12-6.15 contain the rice and maize gambles). Based on the scenario 
chosen, a CRRA interval can be calculated. We determine risk preferences based on the midpoint 
of the CRRA interval; however, unlike the MPL, the maize and rice gambles include no explicit 
risk neutral or risk preferring options. In the first (second) survey round, median yields and 
prices were based on data from 2009 (2010). Prices were adjusted for inflation.
15
 Enumerators 
read the question aloud and pie charts were used as visuals to further aid comprehension.  
Assessing risk preferences from such a wide range of techniques – a lottery game with actual 
payouts, two hypothetical self-assessment-type questions (a financial risk tolerance question and 
a self-assessment scale), and four hypothetical yield and price gambles of maize and rice – 
allows us to examine whether determinants of risk preference instability across seasons vary by 
elicitation technique and provide more robust findings across the elicitation methods.  
                                                 
15
 Updating these gambles in the second survey round based on data in 2010 had very slight changes in the CRRA 
intervals because of needing to round numbers to make sense for the local currency. Because changes in the CRRA 
intervals were so small, we applied the same CRRA intervals for the second survey round as in the first survey 
round. The same holds true for the MPL technique in which gambles in the second survey round were also adjusted 
to account for inflation.  
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3.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO IDENTIFY CHANGES IN RISK PREFERENCES 
ACROSS SEASONS 
There is no consensus on whether risk preferences change over time and if so, what causes 
these changes. Although previous studies have analyzed whether time-invariant characteristics, 
such as gender, influence the stability of risk preferences, they fail to provide a conceptual 
framework. Based on theoretical justifications and the inclusion of particular parameters in 
previous studies, we hypothesize that changes in risk preferences across seasons are a function of 
the season in which risk preferences were elicited (the lean season or the harvest season), the 
decision domain, time-invariant characteristics, and time-variant characteristics.  
Risk preferences were first assessed in the lean season in April and May of 2011 after an 
unusually cold and dry winter and then reassessed seven to eight months later in the maize 
harvest season. The season in which risk preferences were elicited could affect risk preferences 
given the different conditions of households in each season as well as varying emotions at these 
different times of the year. Previous studies have found that emotions, past experiences, and even 
moods can induce changes in risk preferences (e.g., Guiso et al., 2011; Kuhnen and Knutson, 
2011; Leith and Baumeister, 1996; Lerner and Keltner, 2011; Slovic et al., 2004). In the lean 
season, households wait to harvest rice and are either depleting stored rice, purchasing rice, or 
borrowing rice from others. Some households mix cassava, an inferior food item in Yen Chau, 
with rice to avoid having to purchase rice. Maize is harvested in November and December and is 
a major source of cash income. Weddings and other ceremonies are more common in the months 
after the harvest season than at any other time of the year. Although weddings are a jovial event 
involving heavy drinking, households are obligated to give monetary gifts. Given these different 
situations: on the one hand, respondents could become less risk averse in the harvest season if 
elicited risk preferences reflect more current situations since cash is more plentiful and 
households are better able to purchase food and other essentials in the harvest season; on the 
other hand, respondents could become more risk averse if risk preferences reflect the future more 
since respondents could be anxious about the possibility of another harsh winter. Nevertheless, 
risk preferences may not change at all. In classical theory, individuals have one value function 
throughout their lifetime wealth and thus risky decisions should take into account the same value 
function and would be subject to the same risk preferences (Cohen and Einav, 2007). 
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The decision domain refers to the sphere in which the assessment method pertains to and is 
captured by the various elicitation methods relating to non-hypothetical windfall gains (the 
MPL), income-generating activities (the maize gambles), household food security (the rice 
gambles), financial investments (the financial risk tolerance question), an overall willingness to 
take risks (the self-assessment scale), self-identification of risk preferences (the financial risk 
tolerance question and self-assessment scale), and gambles (the MPL, maize gambles, and rice 
gambles). The decision domain has been found to be an important factor to consider in 
measuring risk preferences (e.g., MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Soane and Chmiel, 2005) 
and thus may be a determinant of the stability of risk preferences across seasons. For example, 
households may become less risk averse in the harvest season according to the MPL because 
cash is more plentiful then and therefore potential winnings from the lottery game may not be as 
important relative to the household’s cash supply compared to when risk preferences were first 
elicited during the lean season when cash was scarcer. Moreover, learning effects may be greater 
in the lottery game compared to the other methods since the lottery game is more complicated for 
respondents to comprehend compared to the other methods. Learning effects may influence 
respondents to become less risk averse in the second survey round since respondents may be 
better able to estimate expected values in the second survey round and thus may not be as risk 
averse compared to the first survey round, as was shown in Chapter 2. In the rice and maize 
gambles, respondents may be more risk averse in the harvest season through their anticipation of 
another harsh winter with limited access to food. Changes in risk preferences based on the two 
self-assessment-type questions (the financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale) 
may differ from the other methods. These two methods could represent past experiences (i.e., 
how respondents feel that they coped with past difficulties), the present situation (i.e., how 
respondents feel on the day of the interview), or future experiences (i.e., how respondents expect 
they will cope with future difficulties). Again, if risk preferences reflect more an anticipation of 
future experiences, respondents may become more risk averse in the harvest season in 
anticipation of another harsh winter, yet if they reflect the current situation more, then 
respondents may be less risk averse in the harvest season.  
Descriptions and summary statistics of the time-invariant characteristics hypothesized to 
influence changes in risk preferences across seasons are shown in Table 3.3. Although some 
variables labeled as time-invariant can clearly change over time, such as age and education, some 
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did not change over the seven months between the lean and harvest seasons (such as gender and 
age) and others are unlikely to change. For example, social capital is quite persistent and likely to 
remain stable over seven months (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003). 
Therefore, we label these variables as time-invariant.  
The time-invariant individual-level variables include gender, age, and education. Women may 
become more risk averse in the harvest season because men gamble and drink more in the 
harvest season. In addition, women may be more concerned with how to extend the family 
budget as far into the winter as possible: Cash is important in the coming months since nearly 
half of households do not grow enough rice to meet consumption needs and rice is harvested in 
October and November, usually before the maize is harvested. The older and less educated may 
become more risk averse because they may have fewer available mechanisms to cope with the 
upcoming winter compared to younger and more educated respondents. While some previous 
studies have found that education has a decreasing effect on risk aversion over time and that age 
and female gender have an increasing effect (Guiso et al., 2011; Sahm, 2008), others have found 
that these characteristics exert no influence (Doss et al., 2008; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011).  
The other time-invariant variables are proxies of social capital. The most widely accepted 
definition of social capital is by Putnam (1995, p. 67) who defines social capital as "features of 
social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit". As described in Section 3.2, social networks are important 
avenues in Yen Chau to obtain credit. Informal lenders dominate the credit market with most 
being neighbors, acquaintances, or relatives who live within the village or district. Relying upon 
family and acquaintances promotes information flows, trustworthy behavior, cooperation, and 
sanctions (Attanasio et al., 2012; Coleman, 1988; Karlan et al., 2009). Based on findings in 
previous studies that social capital is effective in risk-sharing (Attanasio et al., 2012; Eswaran 
and Kotwal, 1990; Platteau and Abraham, 1987), we hypothesize that, in general, respondents 
with greater access to social networks will have more stable risk preferences since they may be 
better able to smooth consumption and to cope with risks from season to season. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics and summary of time-invariant characteristics (N = 538) 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
deviation 
Individual-level variables   
Gender Dummy = 1 if the respondent is female, 0 otherwise  0.52 0.50 
Age Age of respondent in years. 44.43 11.74 
Education Years of formal schooling completed. 5.78 3.98 
Helping others 
norm 
Dummy = 1 if the respondent agrees that others in 
the village are expected to help a household who 
takes a risk and loses, 0 otherwise. 
0.66 0.47 
Sharing with others 
norm 
Dummy = 1 if the respondent agrees that a 
household who takes a risk and gains is expected to 
share its gain with others in the village, 0 otherwise. 
0.46 0.50 
Organizational 
membership 
Number of organizations the respondent is a 
member of 
1.36 0.76 
    
Household-level variables
a
    
Dependency ratio Ratio of household dependents (< 15 or > 64 years of 
age) to non-dependents. 
0.29 0.22 
Network-reliance 
with…  
The sum of “easy” responses from: “If you or another 
household member asked, would it be easy or not 
easy to borrow money for education (or for health 
expenses, a positive social event, a negative social 
event, or to borrow a water buffalo, or to ask for 
labor) from (see social networks below)" 
  
First-degree 
relatives 
 5.77 0.88 
Extended family 4.47 1.97 
Friends  4.80 1.84 
Village head  3.95 2.70 
Connections to 
authorities  
The number of authorities at the commune, district, 
or provincial level that members of the household 
know personally 
3.24 
 
4.70 
Village population
b
 Number of people living in the village 547.64 272.86 
Notes: 
a
 An additional household-level variable hypothesized to influence changes in risk preferences across seasons is the 
wealth tercile of the household based on a wealth index which includes a range of indicators capturing multiple 
dimensions of poverty (see Footnote 18 for more details).  
b
 The square of village population is another hypothesized influencing factor of changes in risk preferences across 
seasons. 
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To capture distinct concepts of social capital, we use several proxies. Although doing so is 
recommended in the literature, most studies rely on one proxy only. The distinct concepts of 
social capital are the following: low and high closure which means having loose networks and 
sharing many common friends, respectively (Burt, 1995; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973); 
structural social capital which includes more observable social structures such as networks 
(Grootaert, 2002); cognitive social capital which includes less tangible elements such as norms 
and reciprocity (Grootaert, 2002); and linking social capital which involves relationships 
between people who interact across formal or institutionalized power in society (Szreter and 
Woolcock, 2004). The social capital proxies in this study are norms of helping others (cognitive 
social capital), norms of sharing gains with others (cognitive social capital), membership in 
organizations (structural social capital), the ease of relying upon various social networks 
(structural and cognitive social capital), connections to local authorities (linking social capital), 
and the village population and its square (to capture low vs. high closure). Data for these 
variables were collected in the lean season. All but three correlation coefficients of these various 
social capital proxies are lower than 0.3 and the regression analyses in Section 3.6.2 confirm that 
these proxies indeed measure distinct concepts of social capital.
16
 Below, we specify our 
hypotheses for how these various facets of social capital may influence risk preference changes 
across seasons. 
Norms capture reciprocity which is critical for coping with risks (Lyon, 2000; Murgai et al., 
2002; Platteau and Abraham, 1987) and may be particularly important in Vietnam given the 
country's emphasis on equality through its political system and previous organization of farms in 
cooperatives. Norms may influence risk preference stability because of increased social pressure 
to share gains with others during the harvest season. Information is incredibly fluid and 
transparent within and between villages in Yen Chau. Therefore, when cash is plentiful in the 
harvest season, a household may not want to make a risky investment knowing that others may 
view this household as having excess cash to spare. Therefore, respondents who agree with the 
                                                 
16 
The highest correlation is between the helping others norm and sharing gains with others norm (Spearman 
correlation coefficient = 0.564, P = 0.000); the second highest is between network-reliance with friends and 
network-reliance with the village head (Spearman correlation coefficient = 0.487, P = 0.000); and the third highest is 
between network-reliance with first-degree relatives and network-reliance with extended family (Spearman 
correlation coefficient = 0.358, P = 0.000). 
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sharing gains with others norm may become more risk averse in the harvest season since they 
may feel more obligated to share their cash income with others at this time of the year. In 
addition, we hypothesize that the sharing gains with others norm will be more important in 
determining changes in risk preferences across seasons than the norm about helping others who 
take a risk and fail because it is more common for households to share gains (i.e., income from 
the maize harvest) with others in the harvest season through cash gifts at celebrations and events 
at that time of the year. Therefore, the importance of the sharing gains with others norms is likely 
to be greater than that of the helping others norm.  
The other individual-level measure of social capital is membership in organizations, which 
underscores Putnam’s concept that civic engagement gives rise to social capital (Putnam, 1995). 
Many studies have used membership in organizations as an indicator of social capital (e.g., 
Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). The most frequent organizations people in Yen Chau belong to are 
the Farmer Union and Women Union, which are highly bureaucratic and have strong ties to the 
government (Gray, 1999; Kerkvliet et al., 2003). If people with greater access to social networks 
through organizations are expected to share their gains from the maize harvest with more people, 
such as through ceremonial gifts, they may become more risk averse in the harvest season. On 
the other hand, people with greater access to these social networks may become less risk averse 
in the harvest season because of attending more celebratory events and acquiring a more risky 
vibe at these jovial social events. Yet, attending ceremonies in the harvest season may be 
predictable and therefore organizational membership may not affect risk preference changes 
across seasons. Moreover, people with greater access to social capital through organizations may 
have more stable risk preferences if they are better able to smooth consumption.  
Network-reliance and connections to local authorities are proxies for social capital at the 
household-level because they were asked to the household head only and are assumed to be 
relevant for all household members. Network-reliance variables capture the degree to which 
households can rely on first-degree relatives, extended family, friends, and the village head and 
are included based on the concept that “networks create trust when agents use connections as 
social collateral to facilitate informal borrowing” (Karlan et al., 2009, p. 1308).17 Based on the 
                                                 
17
 Our measurement of network-reliance is consistent with Fafchamps’ (1999) notion of risk-sharing via 
consumption credit and assistance in-kind as well as Simmel’s (1950) concept of reciprocity transactions. 
Reciprocity transactions are "giving and returning the equivalence", such as favors between neighbors, without 
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importance of family in traditional Vietnamese society (Hoang et al., 2006) and previous studies 
which found family ties to be important in risk sharing (Attanasio, et al., 2012; Murgai et al., 
2002; Rosenzweig, 1988), we hypothesize that network-reliance with family members may be 
more important in determining changes in risk preferences across seasons than network reliance 
with others. The final social capital proxy is the village population and its square, which measure 
the concepts of high closure and low closure. Again, we are unsure of the directional impact on 
risk preferences of greater network reliance as well as the village population and its square given 
the above reasoning – the influence of past or current situations versus future outlooks, the 
influence of attending more social events such as weddings, and the hypothesis that households 
with greater access to social networks may have more stable risk preferences.  
Other time-invariant household-level variables are the poorest and wealthiest tercile of the 
wealth index and the household's dependency ratio. The wealth index includes a range of 
indicators, capturing multiple dimensions of poverty.
18
 We hypothesize that individuals living in 
households in the poorest tercile and with higher dependency ratios will have less stable risk 
preferences because of a lower capacity to cope with shocks (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003) and 
because of facing greater credit constraints (Simtowe et al., 2008). We are uncertain, however, of 
the direction of the impact: respondents living in poorer households and households with greater 
dependency ratios may become less risk averse in the harvest season if risk preferences are more 
of a reflection of the current situation. On the other hand, respondents living in such households 
may become more risk averse in the harvest season in light of the approaching winter.  
Besides the above characteristics that are unlikely to change over seven months yet which may 
influence risk preference changes from the lean season to the harvest season, impacts from 
                                                                                                                                                             
which social cohesion could not exist (Simmel, 1950, p. 387). Instead of a borrowing limit (Karlan et al., 2009) or 
the number of ties the household can rely on for help or who depends on the household for help (De Weerdt and 
Dercon, 2006; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), our measurement of network-reliance captures the ability to rely on 
various networks to borrow not only money, but also a water buffalo or labor given their importance for agricultural 
households. Moreover, we analyze the impact of network-reliance with distinct social networks; namely, first-degree 
relatives, extended family, friends, and the village head. 
18
 Households were classified into wealth terciles based on a linear composite index which measures the relative 
wealth status of a household within our sample relying on data from 2006 and 2007. The index is constructed by 
principal component analysis (Dunteman, 1994) and represents households’ scores on the first principal component 
extracted, which follows a standard normal distribution. 
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shocks may determine risk preference changes since past experiences, fear, and anxiety have 
been found to influence risk preferences (e.g., Guiso et al., 2011; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011; 
Lerner and Keltner, 2011; Slovic et al., 2004). To better qualify the impact of shocks, monetary 
losses from shocks were divided by the household’s annual average per capita expenditures from 
data collected in 2010. This allows a better representation of shock impacts for each household. 
The shock variables are first differences and therefore equal the difference between the monetary 
shock impacts experienced between the harvest season and lean season minus the monetary 
shock impacts experienced seven to eight months before the lean season. For example, if a 
household's per capita annual expenditures equal 30 million VND and the household incurred a 
loss valued at 10 million VND from the death of a water buffalo between the lean season and the 
harvest season and no livestock deaths were reported seven months prior to the lean season, then 
the first-differenced shock impact variable for livestock deaths would equal one-third (10 million 
VND/30 million VND). To analyze whether impacts from more recent shocks have a greater 
effect on risk preference changes, we examine idiosyncratic and covariate shock impacts 
experienced at different intervals in time prior to the interview (within two months, three to four 
months, five to six months, and seven to eight months before the interview). Moreover, we 
examine whether the type of shock is important for risk preference changes by analyzing impacts 
from drought, livestock deaths, other covariate shocks, and idiosyncratic shocks. Besides 
negative shocks, we include positive shock impacts; namely, social event expenditures and gifts.  
As discussed in the introduction, although the impact of shocks on smallholders' risk 
preferences has not been examined before, the literature suggests that greater shock impacts – 
particularly covariate shocks – may increase their risk aversion (Doss et al., 2008; Eswaran and 
Kotwal, 1990; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) and that shocks experienced closer to the interview 
may have a greater influence on risk preferences compared to shocks experienced at a later date 
(Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). Thus, we hypothesize that covariate shocks as well as shocks 
experienced closer to the survey date will have a greater affect on risk preferences.  
3.5 DATA AND REGRESSION MODELS USED 
Data were collected in a random sample of 300 households, representative of Yen Chau 
district, Son La Province in northwestern Vietnam. A cluster sampling procedure was followed in 
which first a village-level sampling frame was constructed. All villages in Yen Chau district were 
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included except for those in four sub-districts bordering Laos because of difficulties in obtaining 
research permits there. Of these villages, 20 were randomly selected using the Probability 
Proportionate to Size (PPS) method (Carletto, 1999) based on the number of households in each 
village. Within each selected village, 15 households were then randomly selected using updated, 
village-level household lists as the sampling frames. This sampling procedure results in a self-
weighting sample since the PPS method accounts for the difference in the number of households 
between villages (Carletto, 1999).  
Risk preferences were elicited from 549 respondents residing in 291 households in the lean 
season in April and May of 2011. Seven to eight months later during the maize harvest season in 
November and December of 2011, risk preferences were elicited again for 540 respondents 
residing in 288 households. Nine respondents could not be re-interviewed during the harvest 
season because they were either deceased, sick, or absent for an extended period of time. Two 
respondents with missing information for some explanatory variables (the social capital proxies) 
were excluded from the analysis. The number of respondents for each assessment method varies 
from 530 to 538 because some respondents answered inconsistently or selected “do not know” in 
some elicitation methods and not in others. Moreover, when comparing risk preferences elicited 
in the lean and harvest seasons, following Guiso et al. (2011) we exclude censored responses. 
Responses are censored if a respondent chose either the most or least risk averse category in both 
survey rounds. For example, if a respondent selected the most risk averse option in the maize 
yield gamble and became more risk averse in the harvest season, this person had no choice to 
select a more risk averse option in the second survey round.  
The stability of risk preferences from the lean season to the harvest season is analyzed through 
basic statistical methods (such as examining distributions, the significance of mean changes, and 
correlations of risk preferences across seasons) as well as through first-difference regressions. 
First-difference regressions rather than fixed effects regressions were chosen because we are 
interested in determinants of changes in risk preferences across seasons rather than determinants 
of risk preferences in general. For example, rather than analyzing average effects of gender, age, 
shocks, etc., on risk preferences, we examine whether risk preferences change across seasons and 
if so, what influenced these changes. Using first-difference regressions allows us to examine in-
depth the effects of various time-variant and time-invariant characteristics on changes in risk 
preferences elicited at two very different times of the year. First-difference regressions remove 
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any observed or unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in preferences and individual 
characteristics as well as control for aggregate shocks. This technique has been applied in other 
studies examining determinants of changes over time in risk preferences (Andersen et al., 2008; 
Baucells and Villasis, 2010; Chiappori and Paiella, 2011; Guiso et al., 2011) and discount rates 
(Meier and Sprenger, 2010). In first-difference regressions, the dependent variable equals the 
change in risk preferences from the lean season to the harvest season and is calculated by 
subtracting the elicited risk preference in the lean season in April and May of 2011 from that in 
the harvest season in November and December of 2011. Therefore, a positive (negative) 
dependent variable indicates that respondents become more (less) risk averse from the lean 
season to the harvest season and a dependent variable equal to zero indicates that there was no 
change in risk preferences.  
Similar to the dependent variable (risk preference changes over time), the shock impact 
variables are also first-differences. Interpretations of the first-differenced shock variables vary. 
Thus, we provide explanations of how these variables can be interpreted. A positive Beta-
coefficient of a first-differenced shock variable could indicate that greater shock impacts 
experienced between seasons (compared to those experienced seven to eight months before the 
lean season, when risk preferences were first elicited) have an increasing effect on risk aversion 
in the harvest season; however, a positive Beta-coefficient could also indicate that greater shock 
impacts experienced before the lean season have a decreasing effect on risk aversion in the 
harvest season. A negative Beta-coefficient of a first-differenced shock variable could indicate 
that greater shock impacts experienced between seasons (compared to those seven to eight 
months before the lean season) have a decreasing effect on risk aversion in the harvest season; 
however, a negative Beta-coefficient could also indicate that greater shocks experienced seven to 
eight months before the lean season have an increasing effect on risk aversion in the harvest 
season. Effects of shocks may take months to impact the household, in which case shocks 
experienced farther away from the interview may affect risk preferences. Because of these 
varying interpretations of the first-differenced shock variables, we provide robustness checks via 
pooled OLS regressions.  
All models adjust for cluster effects within households and the reported standard errors are 
robust. Cluster effects need to be accounted for at the household-level because household-level 
variables are the same for both a household head and spouse. Not accounting for cluster effects 
92 
 
would lead to underestimation of the population variance because the variation of the error term 
would be the same for two respondents residing in the same household. In the following section, 
the results are presented and discussed.  
3.6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section first examines elicited risk preferences in each season and then analyzes if and 
how risk preferences changed from the lean season to the harvest season. Then we identify and 
discuss influencing factors of risk preference changes across seasons.   
3.6.1 COMPARING THE DEGREE OF RISK AVERSION ELICITED IN BOTH SEASONS 
In both seasons, most elicitation methods indicate that respondents are quite risk averse, 
although the degree of risk aversion varies by method. The highest degree of risk aversion is 
found in risk preferences elicited from the maize and rice gambles, while the lowest is found in 
risk preferences elicited from the financial risk tolerance question. The left and right panels of  
Figure 3.1 display the distribution of responses to the MPL in the lean and harvest seasons, 
respectively. CRRA values greater than, equal to, and less than zero indicate risk aversion, 
approximate risk neutrality, and a preference for risk, respectively. The figure shows that most 
respondents are risk averse: less than 10% can be classified as preferring risk in both seasons and 
10% and 15% can be classified as being approximately risk neutral in the lean and harvest 
seasons, respectively. Table 3.4 shows risk preferences based on the financial risk tolerance 
question. The majority of respondents in both seasons selected the option indicating that they are 
willing to take on an average level of financial risk. The share of respondents selecting that they 
are not willing to take any financial risk dropped from about one-fifth in the lean season to one-
tenth in the harvest season. Very few respondents in either season indicated that they are willing 
to take substantial financial risk. Figure 3.2 displays the distribution of responses based on the 
self-assessment scale. The plurality selected the easily-identifiable middle category, 5, while very 
few selected either extreme. In both seasons, more respondents selected a number on the end of 
the scale closer to the risk averse side, 10, compared to those who selected a number on the end 
of the scale closer to the risk preferring side, 0. Table 3.5 provides risk preferences based on the 
maize and rice gambles. In the lean season, the plurality selected the second most risk averse 
option (Option 2) in the maize yield, maize price, and rice yield gambles, while the majority 
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selected the most risk averse option (Option 1) in the rice price gamble. In the harvest season, the 
majority selected the most risk averse option in each of the gambles. 
 
Figure 3.1: Risk preferences according to the multiple price list in the lean season (left panel) 
and harvest season (right panel) (N = 530) 
  
Notes: The midpoint of the CRRA interval for approximately risk neutral respondents in the above figures is 0.003 
because of needing to round numbers to make sense for the local currency.  
Table 3.4: Risk preferences according to the financial risk tolerance question, in percent (N = 
537) 
 Substantial 
financial risk 
Above 
average 
financial risk 
Average 
financial risk 
Not willing to 
take any 
financial risk 
Lean season 6.3 19.7 54.9 19 
Harvest season 2.8 18.2 73.4 5.6 
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Figure 3.2: Risk preferences according to the self-assessment scale in the lean season (left panel) 
and harvest season (right panel) (N = 538) 
 
Notes: A few respondents chose a number between two integers. These were rounded to the nearest whole number 
for visual purposes in the above figures. Moreover, no respondent selected "1" in the harvest season. 
Table 3.5: Risk preferences according to the maize and rice gambles, in percent (N = 535) 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
Constant relative 
risk aversion  
r > 3.36 
 
1.20 > r < 3.36 0.58 > r < 1.20 r < 0.58 
 
Scenario 100% chance 
of median 
yield or pricea 
50/50 chance of a 
15% higher/ 
lower yield or 
price from 
median 
50/50 chance of 
a 30% higher/ 
lower yield or 
price from 
median 
50/50 chance of 
a 45% higher/ 
lower yield or 
price from 
median 
Lean season     
Maize yield gamble 32.0   44.5  11.6  12.0  
Maize price gamble 33.5  42.8  12.0  11.8  
Rice
b
 yield gamble 35.7  43.9  11.4  9.0  
Rice price gamble 54.0  31.4  9.5  5.0  
Harvest season     
Maize yield gamble 62.1  31.6  5.2  1.1  
Maize price gamble 68.0  29.3  2.1  0.6  
Rice yield gamble 61.3  34.0  3.7  0.9  
Rice price gamble 72.0  24.9  2.2  0.9  
Notes:  
a
 Medians in the lean (harvest) season are from 2009 (2010): In the first (second) survey round, the median maize 
yield was 6.8 (6.0) tons/hectare, the median maize price was 3,900 (5,000) VND/kg, the median rice yield is 5.0 
(4.8) tons/hectare, and the median rice price is 6,550 (9,000) VND/kg. Prices were adjusted for inflation.  
b
 Rice refers to unhusked rice in the summer season.  
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We now quantify the significance of changes in risk preferences across the seasons. Censored 
responses are now excluded from all subsequent analyses. Table 3.6 includes the number and 
percentage of censored responses in each of the assessment methods as well as the distribution of 
respondents who became less risk averse, had no change in risk preferences, or became more risk 
averse from the lean season to the harvest season. These distributions show that the plurality 
became less risk averse based on the MPL and self-assessment scale, did not change risk 
preferences based on the financial risk tolerance question, and became more risk averse based on 
the maize and rice gambles. These results are confirmed when examining the mean difference in 
risk preferences elicited in the two seasons. The Pearson Chi-square statistic of Type I error 
shows that the null hypothesis of no association between risk preferences elicited in both seasons 
cannot be rejected at the 1% level for the MPL and self-assessment scale, but it can be rejected 
for the financial risk tolerance question and for the maize and rice gambles. Correlations of risk 
preferences across seasons are statistically significant for each of the elicitation methods at the 
1% level except for the financial risk tolerance question (P < 0.10). Correlations based on the 
MPL and self-assessment scale are rather weak, while those in the maize and rice gambles are 
stronger. Correlations may be lower when risk preferences are based on the MPL and self-
assessment scale since there are a higher number of options within these methods. Other studies 
have found that correlations of risk preferences over time are quite weak: Sahm (2008) found a 
correlation of 0.18 when using income gambles, Guiso et al. (2011) found a correlation of 0.12 
when using a financial risk tolerance-like question, and Vlaev et al. (2009) found a correlation of 
0.28 when using a self-assessment scale which ranged from 1 to 5 and an insignificant 
correlation of 0.20 when using lotteries; however, Meier and Sprenger (2010) found a correlation 
of 0.56 when using the same self-assessment scale applied in this study. 
To summarize, respondents became significantly less risk averse according to the MPL and 
self-assessment scale, more risk averse according to the maize and rice gambles, and had no 
change in risk aversion according to the financial risk tolerance question. Thus, for all but one 
elicitation method, risk preferences are not static from the lean season to the harvest season. Risk 
preferences of smallholders in Vietnam may be more unstable over seven to eight months than 
risk preferences of people from developed countries because of higher vulnerability to poverty 
and greater uncertainty across seasons for smallholders. What caused respondents' risk 
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preferences to change from the lean season to the harvest season? This question is explored in 
the following section. 
Table 3.6: Changes in risk preferences over time for non-censored respondents 
 Multiple 
price list 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
question 
Self-
assessment 
scale 
Maize 
yield 
Maize 
price 
Rice 
yield 
Rice 
price 
Number (%) of 
censored 
respondents 
8 
(1.5%) 
10 
(1.9%) 
1 
(.2%) 
114 
(21.3%) 
136 
(25.4%) 
122 
(22.8%) 
211 
(39.4%) 
Sample size 
(non-censored 
respondents 
only) 
522 527 537 421 399 413 324 
Decrease in 
risk aversion 
57.7% 29.6% 47.5% 17.8% 13.0% 20.6% 25.9% 
No change in 
risk aversion 
15.5% 47.2% 16.4% 19.2% 18.5% 18.2% 14.8% 
Increase in risk 
aversion  
26.8% 23.1% 36.1% 62.9% 68.4% 61.3% 59.3% 
Mean change 
in risk 
aversiona  
(standard 
deviation) 
-.373*** 
(1.006) 
-.05 
(.922) 
-.250** 
(2.581) 
.759*** 
(1.288) 
.941*** 
(1.176) 
.673*** 
(1.242) 
.603*** 
(1.377) 
Type I error 
probabilityb  
84.21 17.18** 122.86 75.59*** 72.36*** 95.37*** 124.06**
* 
Correlation 
over timec 
.149*** .074* .137*** -.270*** -.233*** -.276*** -.521*** 
Notes:  
a
 Paired sample t-test of the mean difference being significantly different from 0 is indicated for each respondent. A 
negative (positive) mean difference indicates that respondents became less (more) risk averse in the harvest season 
compared to the lean season. 
b
 Pearson Chi-squared statistic of the null hypothesis of no association in risk preferences elicited in the lean and 
harvest seasons.   
c
 Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported due to the non-continuous nature of the variables.  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
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3.6.2 DETERMINANTS OF RISK PREFERENCE CHANGES ACROSS SEASONS 
This subsection explores influencing factors of changes in risk preferences across seasons 
using first-difference regressions. The effects of the time component of the shock and the 
characteristic of the shock are explored in separate regression analyses, shown in Table 3.7 and 
Table 3.8, respectively. F-tests indicate that the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients are 
jointly zero can be strongly rejected in most models. Exceptions are the maize price gambles 
which are not presented, as well as the rice yield and rice price gambles in Table 3.8 (P = 0.145 
and P = 0.160, respectively). The R-squared ranges from a low of 0.06 in the rice yield gamble 
(in Table 3.8) to 0.14 in the financial risk tolerance question (in Table 3.7).  
We first examine how time-invariant characteristics affect changes in risk preferences from the 
lean season to the harvest season based on results in both Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. When 
comparing the influence of time-invariant characteristics on risk preference changes across 
seasons, there are only two main differences between the tables: In Table 3.8, the helping others 
norm becomes statistically insignificant in the maize yield gamble and the difference in gifts 
received from positive social events becomes statistically significant in the rice yield gamble. 
Only a few time-invariant variables are significant in changing risk preferences across several 
models: female gender, norms of helping others, norms of sharing gains with others, the 
household's relative wealth status, and connections to authorities. A few variables are significant 
in one or two models only: age, organizational membership, the household's dependency ratio, 
and all but one network-reliance variable. Moreover, three variables are not significant in any 
model: the village population and its square, as well as network-reliance with friends. The 
relative impact of most explanatory variables on changes in risk preferences across seasons is 
quite small. Moreover, no definite conclusions can be made on how social capital influences 
changes in risk preferences across seasons given the varying directional impacts of its different 
proxies. For example, respondents who are members of more organizations became less risk 
averse in the harvest season, while those who know more local authorities became more risk 
averse. An explanation for this is that people may be more obligated to share their income in the 
harvest season with local authorities, while people who are members of more organizations may 
become less risk averse from absorbing a jovial, risk-taking atmosphere at ceremonies involving 
heavy drinking in the harvest season. 
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A major finding is that explanatory variables in the two methods in which respondents self-
identify their risk preferences (the financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale) 
often have the opposite effect on changes in risk preference compared to the other assessment 
techniques. For example, females became more risk averse in the harvest season than they were 
in the lean season according to the MPL and rice price gamble, but became less risk averse 
according to the financial risk tolerance question. Education, norms, and connections to local 
authorities follow similar trends. In fact, network-reliance with extended family is the only 
significant variable which has the same directional impact on risk preferences when comparing 
the two self-identification methods to the other elicitation methods. Thus, the results demonstrate 
that influencing factors of changes in risk preferences across seasons vary greatly when risk 
preferences are based on methods relying upon respondents to self-identify their risk preferences 
compared to methods which rely upon gambles. An explanation for this is that respondents’ 
answers in the self-identification methods may reflect their desired risk preferences rather than 
actual risk preferences. Another explanation is that these questions may reflect past experiences 
related to how respondents handled already-experienced risks, rather than reflect how they 
currently or would handle risks. After all, the maize and rice gambles asked respondents to 
choose yields and prices for the future, whereas the financial risk tolerance and self-assessment 
scale asked respondent to assess the degree of risk they are currently willing to take.  
In Table 3.7 and Table 3.8, differences in expenditures for positive social events (mainly 
weddings) have no effect on changes in risk preferences in any of the elicitation methods and 
gifts received from positive social events have a decreasing effect on risk aversion in one method 
only, the rice yield gamble (in Table 3.8). In robustness checks, we applied pooled OLS 
regressions to analyze average effects of positive social event expenditures and gifts on risk 
preferences (results not shown). We find that positive social event expenditures have a 
decreasing effect on risk aversion in the self-assessment methods (the financial risk tolerance 
question and self-assessment scale) and that gifts received from positive social events also have a 
decreasing effect on risk aversion in the risk yield series. Their relative impact on risk 
preferences is nevertheless small.  
We now turn to the analysis of if and how shocks change risk preferences. We first examine 
results in Table 3.7, in which the shock impact variables are specified by time. The results show 
that the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on risk preferences based on the two self-assessment 
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methods also differ from the other elicitation methods. Greater differences in idiosyncratic shock 
impacts have a decreasing effect on risk aversion according to these two methods (see Table 3.7), 
whereas they have an increasing effect based on the two rice gambles, which is what we would 
theoretically expect based on findings in previous studies that negative or fear-inducing events 
increase risk aversion (e.g., Guiso et al., 2011). Moreover, none of the covariate shock variables 
are significant in changing risk preferences across seasons based on the two self-identification 
methods, whereas they are for most of the other methods. A peculiar result is that the difference 
in impacts from covariate shocks experienced three to four months prior to the interview have a 
decreasing effect on risk aversion based on the MPL, maize yield gamble, and rice price gamble, 
whereas the difference in covariate shock impacts experienced seven to eight months prior to the 
interview have an expected increasing effect on risk aversion based on the MPL. Further 
investigation finds that shocks that occurred three to four months before the interview were 
mainly livestock deaths, whereas shocks that occurred seven to eight months before the interview 
were mainly drought. Impacts on the household from livestock deaths may take a longer time to 
set-in than those of drought. Therefore, a negative Beta-coefficient could indicate that livestock 
deaths which occurred before the lean season still have an increasing effect on risk aversion in 
the harvest season. However, in Table 3.8 in which shocks are broken down by type, impacts 
from livestock death are not significant in determining risk preference changes in any of the 
elicitation methods and drought impacts are significant in the financial risk tolerance question 
only. The lack of significance of impacts from livestock deaths on changes in risk preferences 
supports Doss et al. (2008) who found that changes in livestock assets do not change rankings of 
self-identified risks over time. One explanation for the unexpected finding that impacts from 
drought did not affect risk preference changes in most methods is that losses from droughts may 
be difficult for respondents to estimate since the drought affected the rice crops harvested after 
data on shock impacts prior to the lean season were collected in April and May.  
 An important result in Table 3.7 is that shocks experienced closer to the interview do not have 
a greater influence on risk preference changes compared to shocks experienced farther away 
from the interview. This runs contrary to Malmendier and Nagel (2010) who found that more 
recent investment returns have stronger effects on risk preferences in the U.S.; however, financial 
investments in the U.S. are more liquid than lumpy assets such as livestock in Yen Chau, which 
may have implications for how long it takes shocks to impact risk preferences. Our hypothesis 
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that shocks may take a long time to affect risk preferences is also confirmed by the negative sign 
of most covariate shock variables significant in Table 3.7, which indicate that shocks experienced 
before the lean season may still have an increasing effect on risk aversion in the harvest season. 
It is important to consider that the effect of all shock impact variables on risk preferences 
changes are very small. For example, the Beta-coefficient of the difference in idiosyncratic 
shocks experienced two months prior to the interview (in Table 3.7) indicates that if the 
household experienced an idiosyncratic shock two months prior to the harvest season equal to 
their per capita annual expenditures and the household experienced no idiosyncratic shocks in 
the two months prior to the lean season, an individual living in this household would assess 
themselves 0.453 integers lower on the self-assessment scale (which is from zero to ten and has a 
mean difference of -0.250 between seasons) and their CRRA would be just 0.285 higher in the 
harvest season based on the rice yield series (which has a mean difference of 0.673 between 
seasons) in the harvest season, given that all other independent variables are held constant. Thus, 
these impacts on risk preference changes are small relative to the estimated loss incurred. 
Nevertheless, if the household experiences several severe shocks, this may have a large affect on 
risk preference changes. For example, if a household experienced three idiosyncratic shocks with 
impacts equal to their per capita annual expenditures seven to eight months prior, three to four 
months prior, and two months prior to the harvest season and had experienced no such shocks in 
the eight months prior to the lean season, their CRRA would be 0.98 greater (0.285 + 0.253 + 
0.442) in the harvest season according to the rice yield series (which has a mean difference of 
0.673 between seasons), given that all other independent variables are held constant. Since 
shocks are a frequent phenomenon in Yen Chau, this may lead to significant increases in risk 
aversion over time.  
In robustness checks, we applied pooled OLS regressions to analyze the average effect of 
idiosyncratic and covariate shocks specified by time on risk preferences (results not shown). We 
find support for the above findings that more recent shocks do not have a greater effect on risk 
preferences and that the relative impacts of shocks on risk preferences are small. In addition, we 
find the peculiar result that idiosyncratic shocks have a decreasing effect on risk aversion 
according to the self-assessment scale; however, we find the expected result that idiosyncratic 
shocks have an increasing effect on risk aversion according to the maize and rice gambles. We 
also find that greater covariate shock impacts occurring three to four months prior to the 
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interview have a decreasing effect on risk aversion according to the MPL, maize yield gamble, 
and rice yield gamble, but that covariate shocks occurring seven to eight months prior to the 
interview have an increasing effect on risk aversion according to the MPL. 
The influence of different types of shocks on risk preference changes across seasons shown in 
Table 3.8 are more in line with theoretical expectations: greater differences in shock impacts 
have an increasing effect on risk aversion in the harvest season. Nevertheless, shock impacts are 
again very small. For example, if a household did not experience an idiosyncratic shock in the 
eight months prior to the interview in the lean season and a household member became ill or died 
between the lean and harvest seasons resulting in a loss equivalent to the their per capita annual 
expenditures, the midpoint of the CRRA interval for an individual living in this household would 
increase by a mere 0.054 according to the MPL (from a mean change of -0.373) and 0.065 
according to the rice yield gamble (from a mean change of 0.673), assuming that all other 
independent variables are held constant. In robustness checks via pooled OLS regressions to 
examine the average effect of shocks specified by type on risk preferences (results not shown), 
impacts from drought, other covariate shocks, and idiosyncratic shocks have an increasing effect 
on risk aversion based on the financial risk tolerance question. Moreover, greater impacts from 
other covariate shocks have an increasing effect on risk aversion based on the MPL. On the other 
hand, impacts from livestock deaths and idiosyncratic shocks have a decreasing effect on risk 
aversion based on the rice price gamble.  
In general, the results show that negative shocks affect risk aversion and positive shocks do 
not. Nevertheless, the impacts of shocks on risk aversion across the various techniques are not 
consistent since they vary in degree and directional impact depending on the shock and the 
elicitation method. 
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Table 3.7: Determinants of changes in risk preferences across seasons with shocks by time 
 Multiple 
price list 
 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
question 
Self-
assessment 
scale 
Maize yield 
gamble 
Rice yield 
gamble 
Rice price 
gamble 
Observations 522 527 537 421 413 324 
Constant -1.998*** 
(0.640) 
0.663 
(0.446) 
1.124 
(1.199) 
1.157 
(0.761) 
0.555 
(0.779) 
-0.584 
(1.096) 
Gender 0.247*** 
(0.082) 
-0.226*** 
(0.076) 
-0.132 
(0.191) 
0.078 
(0.116) 
0.017 
(0.119) 
0.393** 
(0.151) 
Age 0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
Education 0.002 
(0.012) 
0.020* 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.035) 
-0.032* 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.018) 
0.037 
(0.023) 
Helping others 
norm 
0.161 
(0.117) 
0.497*** 
(0.105) 
1.406*** 
(0.275) 
-0.277* 
(0.167) 
-0.228 
(0.161) 
-0.344* 
(0.189) 
Sharing gains 
norm 
-0.050 
(0.104) 
-0.400*** 
(0.092) 
-0.741*** 
(0.260) 
0.198 
(0.151) 
0.306** 
(0.151) 
0.571*** 
(.176) 
Dependency 
ratio 
0.108 
(0.210) 
0.189 
(0.206) 
-0.129 
(0.632) 
-0.554 
(0.374) 
-0.288 
(0.313) 
0.584 
(0.433) 
Poorest tercile 0.333*** 
(0.121) 
-0.179* 
(0.104) 
-0.988*** 
(0.339) 
0.246 
(0.186) 
0.281 
(0.176) 
0.185 
(0.242) 
Wealthiest 
tercile 
0.014 
(0.122) 
-0.192* 
(0.104) 
-0.656** 
(0.313) 
0.072 
(0.159) 
-0.076 
(0.149) 
-0.264 
(0.199) 
Network-
reliance with… 
      
First-degree 
relatives 
0.065 
(0.088) 
-0.110* 
(0.057) 
-0.110 
(0.139) 
-0.085 
(0.097) 
-0.026 
(0.113) 
-0.011 
(0.127) 
Extended family 0.025 
(0.025) 
0.068*** 
(0.023) 
0.021 
(0.063) 
0.068* 
(0.036) 
0.054 
(0.034) 
0.046 
(0.045) 
Friends 0.045 
(0.029) 
-0.012 
(0.030) 
-0.127 
(0.081) 
0.023 
(0.045) 
0.011 
(0.045) 
-0.002 
(0.052) 
Village head -3.3e-05 
(0.018) 
0.012 
(0.016) 
0.173*** 
(0.051) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
0.031 
(0.024) 
-4.4e-04 
(0.026) 
Connections to 
authorities 
0.007 
(0.058) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
0.078*** 
(0.029) 
-0.034** 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
Organizational 
membership 
0.068 
(0.058) 
-0.135** 
(0.052) 
-0.275* 
(0.153) 
-0.043 
(0.091) 
-0.074 
(0.092) 
0.024 
(0.115) 
Village 
population 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-4.2e-04 
(0.001) 
1.1e-04 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-7.5e-04 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Village 
population 
squared 
-1.4e-07 
(6.2e-07) 
3.0e-07 
(6.0e-07) 
-3.1e-07 
(1.7e-06) 
6.5e-07 
(9.1e-07) 
5.9e-07 
(8.8e-07) 
7.0e-07 
(1.1e-06) 
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(continued from previous page) 
 Multiple 
price list 
 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
question 
Self-
assessment 
scale 
Maize yield 
gamble 
Rice yield 
gamble 
Rice price 
gamble 
Difference in 
idiosyncratic 
shock impacts 
that 
occurred…before 
the survey  
      
2 months prior 0.079 
(0.070) 
-0.103* 
(0.058) 
-0.453*** 
(0.170) 
0.265 
(0.082) 
0.285*** 
(0.077) 
0.018 
(0.173) 
3 to 4 months 
prior 
0.047 
(0.055) 
0.026 
(0.057) 
0.238 
(0.180) 
0.121 
(0.113) 
0.253* 
(0.146) 
0.277* 
(0.164) 
5 to 6 months 
prior 
0.081 
(0.070) 
-0.022 
(0.036) 
-0.274*** 
(0.104) 
-0.081 
(0.126) 
0.024 
(0.117) 
0.002 
(0.194) 
7 to 8 months 
prior 
0.067 
(0.103) 
0.050 
(0.069) 
-0.244 
(0.169) 
0.045 
(0.200) 
0.442*** 
(0.130) 
0.450*** 
(0.166) 
Difference in 
covariate shock 
impacts that 
occurred…before 
the survey 
      
2 months prior 0.072 
(0.103) 
0.206 
(0.127) 
0.236 
(0.364) 
-0.028 
(0.222) 
-0.066 
(0.188) 
0.010 
(0.171) 
3 to 4 months 
prior 
-0.071*** 
(0.019) 
0.032 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.050) 
-0.109** 
(0.046) 
-0.051 
(0.053) 
-0.095* 
(0.050) 
5 to 6 months 
prior 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
0.044 
(0.051) 
0.024 
(0.033) 
0.035 
(0.031) 
0.044 
(0.038) 
7 to 8 months 
prior 
0.078** 
(0.039) 
0.032 
(0.029) 
-0.052 
(0.102) 
0.043 
(0.051) 
0.047 
(0.049) 
0.035 
(0.047) 
Difference in 
positive social 
event impacts 
-0.046 
(0.055) 
-0.031 
(0.039) 
-0.136 
(0.190) 
-0.031 
(0.054) 
0.013 
(0.055) 
0.016 
(0.143) 
Difference in gift 
impacts from 
positive events 
0.087 
(0.094) 
-0.025 
(0.056) 
0.108 
(0.201) 
-0.041 
(0.073) 
-0.068 
(0.081) 
0.121 
(0.267) 
       
F statistic F(26, 260)  
= 2.06*** 
F(26, 257)  
= 3.70*** 
F(26, 261) 
= 3.47***  
F(26, 235)  
= 2.18*** 
F(26, 226)  
= 1.85*** 
F(26, 203)  
= 1.45* 
R
2
  0.090 0.138 0.135 0.094 0.082 0.100 
Notes: First-difference regressions were applied. Coefficients are shown in bold with their robust standard errors in 
parentheses. All regressions are clustered at the household level. The maize price gamble is not shown because it is 
not overall statistically significant.  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 3.8: Determinants of changes in risk preferences over with shocks by type 
 Multiple 
price list 
 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
question 
Self-
assessment 
scale 
Maize yield 
gamble 
Rice yield 
gamble 
Rice price 
gamble 
Observations 522 527 537 421 413 324 
Constant -1.940*** 
(0.667) 
0.698 
(0.435) 
1.128 
(1.198) 
1.288 
(0.793) 
0.661 
(0.814) 
-0.636 
(1.089) 
Gender 0.247*** 
(0.082) 
-0.223*** 
(0.076) 
-0.127 
(0.191) 
0.076 
(0.116) 
0.014 
(0.119) 
0.389** 
(0.151) 
Age 0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
Education 0.005 
(0.012) 
0.021** 
(0.011) 
0.008 
(0.034) 
-0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
0.040* 
(0.022) 
Helping others 
norm 
0.190 
(0.120) 
0.492*** 
(0.108) 
1.360*** 
(0.279) 
-0.255 
(0.170) 
-0.186 
(0.164) 
-0.332* 
(0.192) 
Sharing gains 
norm 
-0.079 
(0.105) 
-0.392*** 
(0.094) 
-0.713*** 
(0.260) 
0.175 
(0.153) 
0.272* 
(0.155) 
0.587*** 
(0.183) 
Dependency 
ratio 
0.158 
(0.209) 
0.173 
(0.203) 
-0.376 
(0.626) 
-0.459 
(0.382) 
-0.158 
(0.312) 
0.744* 
(0.424) 
Poorest tercile 0.323*** 
(0.117) 
-0.174* 
(0.203) 
-0.897*** 
(0.338) 
0.239 
(0.188) 
0.259 
(0.180) 
0.133 
(0.243) 
Wealthiest 
tercile 
0.027 
(0.126) 
-0.162 
(0.104) 
-0.562* 
(0.314) 
0.125 
(0.166) 
-0.016 
(0.155) 
-0.231 
(0.197) 
Network-
reliance with… 
      
First-degree 
relatives 
0.060 
(0.090) 
-0.122** 
(0.055) 
-0.128 
(0.136) 
-0.095 
(0.100) 
-0.032 
(0.119) 
-0.024 
(0.119) 
Extended family 0.022 
(0.025) 
0.074*** 
(0.024) 
0.026 
(0.066) 
0.069* 
(0.037) 
0.052 
(0.036) 
0.053 
(0.045) 
Friends 0.048 
(0.030) 
-0.012 
(0.030) 
-0.125 
(0.081) 
0.036 
(0.045) 
0.020 
(0.045) 
0.001 
(0.051) 
Village head -0.005 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.173*** 
(0.051) 
0.020 
(0.025) 
0.020 
(0.023) 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
Connections to 
authorities 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.072** 
(0.030) 
-0.037** 
(0.014) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
Organizational 
membership 
0.060 
(0.059) 
-0.140*** 
(0.052) 
-0.281* 
(0.151) 
-0.042 
(0.094) 
-0.062 
(0.095) 
0.038 
(0.117) 
Village 
population 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-4.1e-04 
(7.7e-04) 
-1.3e-04 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Village 
population 
squared 
-2.5e-07 
(6.3e-07) 
3.3e-07 
(5.9e-07) 
3.9e-08 
(1.7e-06) 
7.5e-07 
(9.2e-07) 
7.6e-07 
(9.0e-07) 
7.0e-07 
(1.1e-06) 
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(continued from previous page) 
 Multiple 
price list 
 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
question 
Self-
assessment 
scale 
Maize yield 
gamble 
Rice yield 
gamble 
Rice price 
gamble 
Drought 0.002 
(0.020) 
0.037** 
(0.015) 
0.036 
(0.058) 
0.003 
(0.042) 
0.024 
(0.039) 
0.037 
(0.045) 
Livestock death -0.031 
(0.033) 
0.020 
(0.023) 
2.4e-04 
(0.063) 
-0.046 
(0.063) 
-0.048 
(0.061) 
-0.055 
(0.064) 
Other covariate 
shocks 
0.054 
(0.052) 
0.082** 
(0.038) 
-0.070 
(0.166) 
0.139* 
(0.083) 
0.193** 
(0.085) 
0.152 
(0.139) 
Idiosyncratic 
shocks 
0.054** 
(0.023) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
0.054 
(0.058) 
-0.027 
(0.045) 
0.065* 
(0.037) 
0.004 
(0.069) 
Expenditures for 
positive events 
-0.043 
(0.055) 
-0.042 
(0.041) 
-0.159 
(0.192) 
-0.020 
(0.055) 
0.022 
(0.058) 
-0.017 
(0.154) 
Value of gifts 
received from 
positive events 
0.074 
(0.092) 
-0.017 
(0.055) 
0.099 
(0.200) 
-0.073 
(0.067) 
-0.146* 
(0.075) 
0.095 
(0.275) 
       
F statistic F(22, 264)  
= 1.68** 
F(22, 261)  
= 3.93*** 
F(22, 265)  
= 3.22*** 
F(22, 239)  
= 1.80** 
F(22, 230)  
= 1.34
a
 
F(22, 207)  
= 1.32
b
  
R
2
  0.070 0.131 0.118 0.078 0.056 0.078 
Notes: First-difference regressions were applied. Coefficients are shown in bold with their robust standard errors in 
parentheses. All regressions are clustered at the household level. The maize price gamble is not shown because it is 
not overall statistically significant.  
a
 The rice yield gamble is only marginally statistically significant overall (P = 0.145).  
b
 The rice price gamble is only marginally statistically significant overall (P = 0.160).  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
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3.6.3 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON RISK PREFERENCES  
There are some limitations to the elicitation methods applied in this study. We address these 
limitations below and offer recommendations for future research on risk preferences.  
The MPL is considered to be the gold standard to elicit risk preferences, is incentive 
compatible, and lacks framing effects. However, there are many disadvantages to this method. 
First, the MPL measures windfall gains which are not applicable to most smallholder farmers. 
Second, it is expensive since training costs are higher and payouts are non-hypothetical. Third, it 
is time-intensive to manage logistically. Fourth, it involves high time inputs to explain to 
respondents. Fifth, it requires numeracy. Sixth, it is more difficult for respondents to comprehend 
than the other methods since it involves varying probabilities. In addition, luck and superstitions 
may have influenced choices (Knight, 1921). For these reasons, we do not recommend the MPL 
for eliciting risk preferences, particularly in a developing country. The method may be suitable in 
a developed country among educated respondents, yet the payouts should be high enough so that 
they are significant for respondents which may constrain budgets.  
The two self-identification methods, the financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment 
scale, also have disadvantages. The financial risk tolerance question is problematic for several 
reasons, such as the dual thrust of response categories since they assume not only a willingness 
to take risks, but also an expectation of returns. For future research, we propose excluding 
expectations of returns from the response categories or to test the bias resulting from the 
inclusion of expectations of returns in field experiments. The conversion of responses into 
numerical categories (Hanna and Lindamood, 2004) and the unfamiliar nature of financial 
investments for many are additional complications. The self-assessment scale may be a good 
alternative to the MPL and financial risk tolerance question since it has behavioral validity with 
responses to the MPL, is easier to administer and comprehend, is less expensive, and can be 
adapted to different scenarios (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2012) to assess preferences for different types 
of risks such as for income, food security, and investment decisions. Nevertheless, risk 
preferences assessed from the self-assessment scale may be biased due to framing effects since 
the plurality selected the easily-identifiable middle category, 5, on the scale from 0 to 10. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that people prefer to select the middle option. For example, 
it has been found that people who view choices A, B, and C will often find B more attractive 
than C, but if they view the choices B, C, and D, they will say that C is more attractive than B 
107 
 
(Benartzi and Thaler, 2002). For future research, we recommend that the self-assessment scale be 
re-scaled, such as from 0 to 9, to avoid an easily identifiable middle category. A major drawback 
of these two self-assessment methods is that unlike the other methods, they do not elicit a CRRA 
which can be compared across contexts. Moreover, across the various elicitation methods, 
determinants of changes in risk preferences across seasons based on these two methods tended to 
have the opposite effect compared to the other elicitation methods and the effects were often 
contrary to expectations and theoretical foundations. Some explanations for this anomaly are: 
responses may have reflected how respondents would like their risk preferences to be or how 
they would like others to view their risk preferences to be rather than how they actually are; and 
responses may be a reflection of confidence in how past situations were handled rather than a 
reflection of how current or future situations would be handled. Therefore, we recommend 
explicitly including a time dimension in these methods, such as specifying whether the 
respondent should assess their current willingness to take risks, their (recent) past willingness to 
take risks, or their (near) future willingness to take risks. Given the above reasons as well as the 
inability to compare these methods across different contexts, the current state of these methods 
are less preferable compared to methods eliciting a CRRA.  
We also tested four locally-adapted gambles involving prices and yields of the main cash crop 
(maize) and food crop (rice). A disadvantage of the maize and rice gambles is that the certainty 
effect that people underweight probable outcomes compared with certain outcomes may have led 
respondents to choose the certain outcome over the riskier ones (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Therefore, these measures may overestimate the degree of risk aversion since the certain 
outcome (Option 1) entailed the greatest degree of risk aversion. Moreover, there were no risk 
neutral or risk preferring options in these methods and the gambles may have been incapable of 
capturing varying degrees of risk aversion. In particular, the second most risk averse option 
(Option 2) in the gambles, which entailed a 50/50 chance of a 15% greater or lower price or yield 
than the median, may have been interpreted as too risky compared to the most risk averse option 
(Option 1) which was a 100% chance of the median price or yield. This may explain why these 
methods elicited much higher degrees of risk aversion than the MPL. We suggest altering the 
gambles to create more refined CRRA intervals by including more choices which are closer in 
value, such as differences of 5% or 10% rather than 15%. In our opinion, the maize and rice 
gambles have the greatest potential for assessing risk preferences of smallholders since they 
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elicit a CRRA which is comparable across studies and contexts, were relatively easy for 
respondents to comprehend, and involve decisions which are more applicable and familiar to 
respondents. The method could also be adapted to other regions of the world based on local cash 
and food crops.  
There are also some data limitations. Few households experienced shocks within some of the 
two-month intervals. Therefore, the precision of estimates in Table 3.7 are not as strong as those 
in Table 3.8 for which there were a larger number of households experiencing shocks within the 
four shock types. In addition, interpretations of varying degrees of risk aversion in the two self-
assessment type questions (the financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale) may 
have changed over time. For example, a six on the scale may mean something different to the 
same respondent in November than it did in April. In addition, some respondents may not have 
been able to accurately estimate losses from shocks and some of these losses may not have 
occurred yet, but may have been anticipated by respondents. For example, if a household 
member fell ill, the estimated loss of the illness up until the interview date does not include 
estimated losses into the future as well.  
Despite these limitations, we are confident that respondents understood the questions well 
because of the various interview techniques employed, such as combinations of visual, oral, and 
written explanations (Duklan and Martin, 2002). Nevertheless, the low level of predictive power 
of the models clearly signals that other factors are likely to be important in determining changes 
in risk preferences from the lean season to the harvest season, such as individual’s economic, 
weather, and political, social, and financial outlooks. Other explanations for unstable risk 
preferences include measurement error, learning effects, and fundamentally unstable preferences 
(Binswanger, 1980; Meier and Sprenger, 2010).  
3.7 CONCLUSIONS  
Previous literature has established that shocks cause households to fall into poverty traps and 
that risk aversion can cause households to remain trapped in poverty (Carter et al., 2007; Dercon, 
1996; Hoddinott, 2006; Lybbert and McPeak, 2012; Morduch, 1994; Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger, 1993). This study has analyzed whether risk preferences assessed from seven 
elicitation techniques are stable for smallholder farmers in northwestern Vietnam from the lean 
season to the harvest season and then examined influencing factors of changes in risk preferences 
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across seasons using first-difference regression analyses. The results indicated that for all but one 
assessment method – the financial risk tolerance question – risk preferences were not stable 
across seasons. Respondents became less risk averse according to the lottery game and self-
assessment scale, while they became more risk averse according to the maize and rice gambles.  
The first-difference regression analyses provided empirical evidence that specific shocks and 
proxies of social capital are significant in causing risk preferences to change from the lean 
season to the harvest season. We found that cognitive social capital (proxied by norms) and 
linking social capital (proxied by connections to local authorities) are more influential in 
determining changes in risk preferences in the harvest season compared to low vs. high closure 
(proxied by the village population and its square) and structural social capital (proxied by 
membership in organizations and network-reliance). Moreover, several time-invariant 
characteristics influenced changes in risk preferences across seasons, such as gender and 
education. Examining the influence of shocks by time and type in separate analyses highlighted 
the importance of separating various shocks to examine their impact on risk preference stability. 
Contrary to expectations, more recent shocks did not have a greater effect on risk preference 
changes. Robustness checks using pooled OLS regression analyses supported this finding. In 
regressions which analyzed impacts of specific types of shocks, losses from livestock deaths had 
no significant effect on changes in risk preferences across seasons, although losses from other 
covariate shocks and idiosyncratic shocks did. Although the relative impact on changes in risk 
preferences across seasons as a result of shocks is quite small, households experiencing several 
shocks may have significant increases in risk aversion over time.   
Comparing the elicitation methods allows insights into which methods may be better adapted 
to assess risk preferences of smallholder farmers in a developing country. We discussed the 
limitations of each of the seven elicitation methods applied in this study and offered 
recommendations for their improvement in Section 3.6.3. In summary, we assess the maize and 
rice gambles as having the greatest potential for examining risk preferences of smallholders since 
they elicit a CRRA which is comparable across studies and contexts, were found to be relatively 
easy for respondents to comprehend, involve decisions which are more applicable and familiar to 
respondents, and can be adapted to other regions based on local cash and food crops. We are 
wary of accepting lottery gambles as the gold standard and suggest that given the importance of 
measuring risk aversion, more research on eliciting risk preferences from different measures 
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needs to be conducted similar to past research on finding appropriate methods to elicit household 
income through Living Standards Measurement Studies in which there were many tests of 
different versions of the questionnaire. The quest for better methods should be continued.  
We offer some policy recommendations based on our findings that smallholders are very risk 
averse in both seasons and that some types of shocks cause smallholders to become even more 
risk averse over time. Recommendations which could mitigate the increasing impact of shocks 
on risk aversion include effective cash or food transfer programs, lower deductibles for medical 
expenses, and agricultural insurance. Given the high degree of risk aversion and the perception 
among smallholders that the current livelihood strategy – maize production on steep slopes 
which highly erodes the soil – is a low-risk income earning activity, respondents should be 
supported by the government to adopt new technologies and production systems which do not 
entail as much environmental degradation, yet which may be viewed as too risky (Feder et al., 
1985). Support for adopting new production systems could be in the form of credit and/or 
subsidized inputs. Local field trials are another mechanism to promote the adoption of new 
production systems and technology. These would allow smallholders to better assess risks 
associated with new production systems. Follow-up interviews with village heads elicited the 
importance of seeing and visiting field trials first-hand before smallholders might adopt new 
systems. Although over half of household heads stated that the most important way to escape 
poverty is hard work, previous research indicates that the poor remain poor (Lybbert et al., 2004; 
Naschold, 2012). Households should be supported to recover quickly from shocks and to make 
investments perceived as risky. Such support could open the door to new livelihood strategies.  
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4. DO INFLUENCING FACTORS OF WIVES’ 
EMPOWERMENT AND HUSBANDS’ DOMINANCE 
DIFFER BY FINANCIAL DECISION IN RURAL 
VIETNAM?  
THEA NIELSEN 
Abstract 
Women’s empowerment in decision-making has intrinsic value and is influential for a variety 
of important outcomes, though few studies analyze its sources. We examine determinants of 
wives’ empowerment and husbands’ dominance in ten intra-household financial decisions – 
taking out and repaying four types of loans, family budgeting, and saving – in northwestern 
Vietnam. The results show that several sources of decision-making power vary by financial 
decision and subtle nuances are lost through aggregated indices of decisions about loans. 
Influencing factors of wives’ empowerment include her ability to speak Vietnamese, education, 
women-controlled income, household income, network-reliance with extended family, and child 
dependents.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Women’s empowerment not only has intrinsic value (Kabeer, 1999; G. Sen and Batliwala, 
2000), but also is influential for a variety of tangible outcomes, including child health, food 
security, education, and contraceptive use (Allendorf, 2007; Doss, 1996; Hashemi et al., 1996; 
Jejeebhoy, 2003; Schuler et al., 1997; B. Sen and Hulme, 2004; Smith and Haddad, 2000; 
Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000; Thomas, 1990). In addition, women's empowerment is 
regarded as critical for achieving poverty reduction and human rights (Malhotra and Schuler, 
2005). Although several studies have explored the impact of exposure to credit or savings 
programs on women’s empowerment (Ashraf et al., 2010; Hashemi et al., 1996; Holvoet, 2005; 
Swain and Wallentin, 2007), none have examined what factors increase or decrease 
empowerment for taking out and repaying loans of various amounts. Other studies, for example, 
have examined determinants of women’s empowerment in decisions about credit in general, 
household expenditures, and/or mobility, often combining various decision domains together 
(Allendorf, 2007; Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Garikipati, 2008; Kantor, 2003; Pitt et al., 2006; 
Rahman and Rao, 2004; Yusof and Duasa, 2010). We focus on women’s role in financial 
decisions because such decisions may impact strategic life choices (Kabeer, 1999) and both 
reflect and create a particularly transformative power in women’s improved status within the 
household (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Kabeer, 2001). Moreover, identifying sources of 
empowerment in specific financial decisions can help direct policies to improve women’s 
decision-making power in distinct financial domains which, in turn, may improve other 
important development goals.  
Despite its wide use, empowerment is an amorphous concept since it is rarely precisely defined 
(Goetz and Gupta, 1996; G. Sen and Batliwala, 2000), a universal definition is lacking (Haque et 
al., 2011; Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2011), and it represents a complex phenomenon (Kabeer, 2001) 
operating at multiple levels (Mabsout and Staveren, 2010). We adopt the most widely accepted 
definition (Haque et al., 2011) from Kabeer (2001, p. 81): empowerment is "an expansion in the 
range of potential choices available to women so that actual outcomes reflect the particular set of 
choices which the women in question value.” Bargaining power contains the concept of 
empowerment since it is the “influence component of empowerment” and is defined as “the 
agent’s ‘relative ownership’ of a particular decision” (Khwaja, 2005, p. 274). Although Kabeer 
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defines empowerment as a process, most quantitative studies, including ours, rely on cross-
sectional data.  
Intra-household bargaining power and empowerment are determined by influencing factors at 
the individual-, household-, and institutional-level (Mabsout and Staveren, 2010),
19
 all of which 
are interrelated (Blumberg and Coleman, 1989; Mabsout and Staveren, 2010; Moore, 1994; 
Narayan, 2005). Influencing factors at the: individual-level include education, attitudes, inherent 
characteristics, and bargaining skills; household-level include control over resources and income, 
including each spouse’s threat point20; and institutional-level include legal rights, political 
structures, and gendered institutions (Agarwal, 1997; Blumberg and Coleman, 1989; Espinal and 
Grasmuck, 1997; Lundberg et al., 1997; Mabsout and Staveren, 2010; Mason, 2005; Quisumbing 
and Maluccio, 2000; A. Sen, 1990; Weber et al., 2004). Gendered institutions include customs, 
norms, and gender ideologies and are defined as “asymmetric social norms, beliefs and practices 
affecting men’s and women’s behavior differently, and often unequally” (Goetz, 1997; Mabsout 
and Staveren, 2010; Staveren and Obebode, 2007). This paper examines factors at the individual-
, household-, and institutional-level which may influence husbands’ and wives’ decision-making 
power in intra-household financial decisions.  
Rather than directly measure empowerment, most studies utilize proxies. These proxies 
include assets or non-labor income (Doss, 1996; Kusago and Barham, 2001; Schultz, 1990; 
Thomas, 1990), share of income (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 2008; 
Kusago and Barham, 2001), primary economic activity (Swain and Wallentin, 2007), education 
(Fletschner, 2009; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003), assets brought into marriage (Fletschner, 
2009; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003), mobility (Chakrabarti et al., 2012; Hashemi et al., 1996; 
Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2011), and age and health differences between spouses (Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek, 2008). Despite the wide use of proxies, there are many disadvantages to their 
application: proxies are removed from decision-making processes since they measure potential 
rather than actualized choice which may lead to biased conclusions (Kabeer, 1999); social norms, 
rather than specific household dynamics, may prevent women from accessing markets or holding 
                                                 
 
20
 A threat point is the “the utility level which is guaranteed to the individual if no agreement or bargain is achieved” 
(Manser and Brown, 1980, pp. 35-36)  should the marriage either dissolve (McElroy, 1990) or have a non-
cooperative solution (Kabeer, 2001; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). 
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similar assets as men (Kabeer, 2001); and proxies may be context dependent and thus difficult to 
compare across cultures (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000). Therefore, to better understand intra-
household dynamics, rather than use proxies, direct measures of empowerment and bargaining 
power from husbands and wives were elicited separately based on respondents’ perceptions of 
their own roles in intra-household decision-making processes.  
This study is innovative in several aspects. First, we analyze and compare sources of 
bargaining power and empowerment in decisions not only to take out, but also to repay four 
types of loans. Second, we compare sources of empowerment in loan decisions to those in family 
budget and savings decisions. Third, we include risk preferences and various proxies of social 
capital as explanatory factors of empowerment. Fourth, we compare factors influencing 
empowerment to those influencing bargaining power, which contains the concept of 
empowerment since it is the “influence component of empowerment” and is defined as “the 
agent’s ‘relative ownership’ of a particular decision” (Khwaja, 2005, p. 274). Bargaining power 
is thus a more refined measure of empowerment since it measures the degree to which a woman 
is empowered, whereas decision-making power refers to both empowerment and bargaining 
power. Fifth, based on husbands’ perceptions of their own role in financial decisions, we examine 
sources of husbands' dominance and bargaining power in financial decisions. Finally, we assess 
decision-making roles for credit offered mainly through traditional mechanisms, i.e., the informal 
credit market. Most studies have examined women's decision-making roles in credit offered 
through microfinance programs or self-help groups (Ashraf et al., 2010; Garikipati, 2008; Goetz 
and Gupta, 1996; Hashemi et al., 1996; Holvoet, 2005; Kabeer, 2001; Pitt et al., 2006; Swain and 
Wallentin, 2007); however, access to formal financial services is extremely limited in developing 
countries (United Nations, 2009), particularly to smallholder farmers.  
This paper proceeds as follows: the following section presents the study context in terms of 
existing gender norms and financial markets; Section 4.3 describes the sampling procedure, data 
collection, hypothesized influencing factors of decision-making power, and the empirical 
strategy; Section 4.4 presents and discusses the results; and the concluding section offers 
research and policy recommendations.    
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4.2  STUDY CONTEXT 
This study takes place in Yen Chau district, Son La province, in northwestern Vietnam. Yen 
Chau is mountainous and inhabited primarily by ethnic minorities. Black Thai and H’mong 
account for 55% and 20% of the district’s population, respectively, and Kinh (“ethnic 
Vietnamese”) constitute 13%. Household are engaged in smallholder agriculture with the two 
main crops being rice for home consumption and maize for cash income. Below, we describe the 
gender context and available credit and savings markets. 
In Yen Chau, both men and women work in the fields; however, men tend to do more 
physically-demanding work and women tend to be responsible for small livestock and vegetable 
production (Beuchelt, 2008). Women are additionally responsible for household and childcare 
tasks. If they have any spare time, they often prepare dowry gifts. Women in Vietnam work, on 
average, six to eight hours more than men (The World Bank and Department for International 
Development, 1999). Although official rights and laws are quite advanced in terms of gender 
equality, traditional customs influenced by feudal and patriarchal Confucianism promote unequal 
gender relations (Beuchelt, 2008; Dalton et al., 2002; Hatcher et al., 2005; Que, 2000). In case of 
divorce, women have poor fallback positions since they have difficulty in obtaining assets 
(Hatcher et al., 2005) and patriarchal tradition passes inheritance to sons (United Nations, 2005; 
International Fund for Agricultural Development et al., 2004; Que, 2000). Domestic violence is 
widespread: The majority of ever-married women have experienced emotional abuse and nearly 
one-third have experienced physical violence by their husbands (General Statistical Office of 
Vietnam, 2010). The sex ratio at birth also indicates gender inequality: 110.4 boys are born for 
every 100 girls in Vietnam’s Northern midlands and mountain areas (General Statistics Office, 
2012a). 
Formal credit is offered by two state-owned banks, the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (VBARD) and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP). The VBSP 
targets poor households, providing loans without collateral requirements at subsidized interest 
rates through the following mass organizations: the Women Union, Farm Union, Veteran Union, 
and Youth Union (Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, n.d.). The VBARD, the leading commercial 
bank in the country, has the most extensive network of branches in rural areas (Banking with the 
Poor Network, n.d.). Unlike the VBSP, the VBARD provides higher-value loans with collateral 
requirements. The vast majority of loans, however, are provided by informal sources.  
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Informal lenders dominate the credit market, leaving the two formal lenders a much smaller 
role. To better understand the importance of gender and social capital in securing credit, 
information on credit transactions covering the years 2008 to 2011 for the 250 households 
analyzed in this study are presented in Table 4.1 (the following section describes how these 
households were randomly selected). Over 90% of small, medium, and large agricultural loans 
were from informal sources. Most loans from informal sources are from neighbors, 
acquaintances, or relatives who live within the village or district. Social capital is also used to 
secure formal loans: Intermediaries, such as unions, friends, neighbors, village heads, and 
relatives, were used to secure about three-quarters and one-fifth of loans from the VBSP and 
VBARD, respectively. Therefore, most credit transactions rely on social collateral rather than 
physical collateral (Karlan et al., 2009). The most common primary uses of small and medium 
loans were for purchasing food and agricultural inputs, while the most common primary uses of 
large loans were for purchasing livestock, agricultural inputs, and food as well as for financing 
education. 
Gender inequality is present in credit transactions. As shown in Table 4.1, the larger the loan 
size, the less likely the woman is the borrower: women were borrowers of 42% of small loans, 
31% of medium loans, 17% of large loans, and 9% of large agricultural loans. In addition, 
women seldom receive loans from the formal credit market: Of the 157 loans provided by the 
VBSP, 31 were to women and of the 64 loans provided by the VBARD, only 4 were to women. 
Reasons for the low number of women borrowers from formal institutions may include demand-
side constraints such as conflicts with household responsibilities, lower literacy, lack of 
experience with financial institutions, higher risk aversion, and social pressures (Fletschner, 
2009). Moreover, women are required to have their husband's identification card to apply for 
credit at a formal bank if his name is on the Land Use Certificate.
21
 The gender of the household 
member who applies for a loan, however, does not inform us about the actual intra-household 
decision-making processes related to taking out and repaying loans. For example, for loans under 
the woman's name, Kabeer (2001) found that 10% of women had almost no role in decision-
                                                 
21
 Land Use Certificates (known as "Red Books") are land titles which grant the holder the right to inherit, transfer, 
sell, lease, and mortgage land use rights. Land use rights are valid for 20 years for annual crops and 50 years for 
perennial crops. Land titles were granted between 1991 and 1999 in Yen Chau district. Land Use Certificates issued 
since 2011 include the wife's name, but those issued before do not. 
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making about the loan's use and Goetz and Gupta (1996) found that nearly 40% of women had 
little or no managerial control over loans in their name.  
Budgeting and saving also are critical for households in Yen Chau since the majority of cash 
income typically originates from maize which is harvested once. Moreover, nearly half of 
households do not grow enough rice to meet their consumption needs and therefore rely on 
savings or credit to purchase rice. Very few households deposit money into savings accounts and 
there are no savings groups, so households save on their own. Therefore, examining decision-
making processes about family budgeting and saving in addition to those about credit allows 
better understanding and a more complete overview of how important financial decisions are 
made within households. 
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Table 4.1: Credit history in Yen Chau District from 2008-2011 
Loan type Small Medium Large Large agricultural 
Loan size  
(Vietnamese 
dong) 
> 10,000 
≤ 200,000 
> 200,000 
< 2,000,000 
≥ 2,000,000, 
 
≥ 2,000,000 
 
Equivalent in U.S. 
dollar PPP
a
   
> 0.98 
≤ 19.65 
> 19.65 
< 196.51 
≥ 196.5 
 
≥ 196.5 
Loan use Any Any Excludes large 
agricultural loans 
In-kind loans for 
agricultural inputs 
Women borrowers 42% 31% 17% 9% 
Lenders -Informal (97%) 
-Farmer Union 
(2%) 
-Women Union 
(2%) 
-Informal (98%) 
-Women Union (2%) 
-Informal (52%) 
-Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies (31%) 
-Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development (13%) 
-Unions (5%)b 
-Informal (92%) 
-Government 
company (4%) 
-Farm Union (2%) 
-Village Board 
(1%) 
-Private company 
(1%) 
If informal lender, 
relation to 
borrower 
-Neighbor or 
acquaintance 
(55%) 
-First degree 
relative 
(31%) 
-Other relative 
(7%) 
-Other (8%) 
-Neighbor or 
acquaintance (46%) 
-First degree relative 
(35%) 
-Other relative 
(11%) 
-Other (5%) 
-Close friend (3%) 
-First degree relative 
(38%) 
-Neighbor or 
acquaintance (37%) 
-Other relative (15%) 
-Close friend (5%) 
-Other (5%) 
-Neighbor or 
acquaintance (70%) 
-Other relative 
(9%) 
-First degree 
relative 
(7%) 
-Other (13%) 
-Close friend (2%) 
If informal lender, 
location of 
residence 
-Within village 
(74%) 
-Elsewhere in 
district (24%) 
-Outside district 
(2%) 
-Within village 
(67%) 
-Elsewhere in 
district (31%) 
-Outside district 
(1%) 
-Within village (60%) 
-Elsewhere in district 
(36%) 
-Outside district (5%) 
-Within village 
(44%) 
-Elsewhere in 
district (51%) 
-Outside district 
(4%) 
Primary purpose 
of loan 
-Food purchase 
(47%) 
-Agricultural 
inputs (25%) 
-Social events 
(5%) 
-Health care 
expenses (5%) 
-Non-farm 
activity (5%) 
 
-Food purchase 
(32%) 
-Agricultural inputs 
(18%) 
-Health care (12%) 
-Social events (12%) 
-Repayment of other 
debt (5%) 
-Livestock (13%) 
-Agricultural inputs 
(10%) 
-Food purchase (10%) 
-Agricultural 
equipment (9%) 
-Education (8%) 
-Non-farm activity 
(7%) 
-Health care (7%) 
-Social events (6%) 
-Repayment of other 
debt (6%) 
-Agricultural inputs 
(100%) 
Notes: Data are for households who took out a loan in the past four years among 250 households with both spouses 
present. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding and/or excluding categories with small percentages 
(categories with less than 1% for lenders and less than 5% for the primary purpose of the loan).  
a
 Based on the 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) (10,179 VND = $1 PPP) (The World Bank, 2012). 
b
 These are the Women Union, Farm Union, Veteran Union, and Elderly Union.  
125 
 
4.3  DATA AND METHODS 
4.3.1 SAMPLING PROCEDURE AND DATA COLLECTION 
Data were collected separately from both household heads and spouses in 2011 in a random 
sample of 300 households, which is representative of Yen Chau district. A cluster sampling 
procedure was followed in which first, a village-level sampling frame was constructed. All 
villages in the district were included except for those in four sub-districts bordering Laos because 
of difficulties in obtaining research permits there. Of these villages, 20 were randomly selected 
using the Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) method (Carletto, 1999) based on the number 
of households in each village. Within each selected village, 15 households were then randomly 
selected using village-level household lists as the sampling frames. This sampling procedure 
results in a self-weighting sample since the PPS method accounts for the difference in the 
number of households between villages (Carletto, 1999). Because some respondents had severe 
health problems, all 300 households could not be interviewed: data were collected from 291 
households. This study analyzes intra-household decision-making dynamics in households with 
both a husband and wife present for the majority of the year. This excludes 34 single-headed 
households, most of which are headed by widowed women. We also excluded five households 
who did not grow either rice or maize in 2011 since we are primarily interested in decision-
making for households engaged in agricultural production. Two households with missing data are 
also excluded. Thus, the final sample consists of 250 couples.
22
 
Husbands and wives were interviewed separately and asked about their own intra-household 
decision-making roles in family budgeting, saving, and taking out and repaying four types of 
loans (shown in Table 4.1). They could respond that they are the sole, main, or joint decision-
maker. These concepts were clearly explained to respondents.
23
 Nevertheless, we elicit 
perceptions only since first-hand decision-making processes were not observed. Ambiguity is 
reduced, however, by avoiding general questions about decision-making roles, such as asking 
                                                 
22
 These couples consist of a husband and a wife. Given the traditional society, there are no unmarried couples or 
same-sex couples in the sample.  
23
 We explained the decision-making roles as follows: a sole decision-maker is the only person who makes decisions 
and therefore does not need to discuss or seek agreement with others; a main decision-maker dominates the 
decision-making process, though others may be involved; and a joint decision-maker makes decisions together with 
others withno one having a dominant role. Please refer to Appendix 6.17 for more information.  
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about who decides on “issues of borrowing money” as in Pitt et al. (2006), which may elicit 
more normative statements rather than statements based on actual behavior (Schuler et al., 1997). 
Moreover, measuring perceptions of decision-making power is consistent with the concept that 
bargaining power is a function of an individual’s perceived contribution or greater sense of self-
worth (Agarwal, 1997; Haddad et al., 1994; Kabeer, 2001; A. Sen, 1987, 1990; G. Sen and 
Batliwala, 2000). According to A. Sen (1987, p. 12), “Perceptions (including illusions) have an 
influence – often a major impact – on actual states and outcomes.” There are several reasons why 
husbands and wives were interviewed separately. Based on the underlying assumption that 
households are composed of individuals with unique preferences who may make decisions alone 
or together (Browning et al., 1994), respondents may make decisions without the knowledge of 
others in the household and may want to keep information private from others. Moreover, there 
was a general concern that if interviews were conducted together, responses may differ from 
those generated from separate interviews (cf., Bateman and Munro, 2009), particularly given 
qualitative evidence suggesting that men tend to dominate interviews.   
The measurement of empowerment is based on whether the respondent has any say in the 
decision-making process, whereas the measurement of bargaining power captures the degree of 
say. To create the bargaining power index, a score of 0 is given if the respondent had no say, 1 if 
the respondent had joint say, and 2 if the respondent had main or sole say (hereafter, primary 
say). Few wives claimed sole or main decision-making authority, so these responses are 
aggregated. Based on bargaining power in loan decisions, three aggregated indices were created: 
The first index is an aggregation of decisions to repay the four loan types, the second is an 
aggregation of decisions to take out the four loan types, and the third is an aggregation of 
decisions to both takeout and repay the four loan types. Similar to other studies using aggregated 
bargaining power indices, each decision has equal weight (Ashraf et al., 2010; Hashemi et al., 
1996; Li and Xiaoyu, 2011). The indices range from 0 (indicating no say in each decision) to 2 
(indicating primary say in each decision). There are several disadvantages of analyzing 
bargaining power through an aggregated index. The aggregation of decisions is based on 
assumptions of their relative importance. In our bargaining power index, the assumption is that 
decisions about all four loan types are equally important for bargaining power. In addition, 
decisions related to dissimilar domains are often aggregated. For example, Ashraf et al. (2010) 
aggregate decisions about small and large expenditure items, assistance to family members, the 
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number of children to have, and the use of family planning. As shown in Table 4.1, the primary 
uses of each loan type greatly vary. Moreover, households with different decision-making 
patterns may have equivalent index scores. For example, a woman with joint decision-making 
power over several decisions may have the same index score as a woman with primary decision-
making power over a few decisions. Lastly, an index assumes that having more bargaining power 
is better; however, one can imagine situations in which having more bargaining power is more of 
a burden than a blessing. For example, is a woman with a husband who is unwilling or unable to 
make decisions more empowered than a woman who jointly participates in decision-making with 
her husband? The main rationale of analyzing bargaining power using aggregated indices is to 
examine whether indices are able to represent an accurate picture of influencing factors of intra-
household decision-making in comparison to analyzing decision-making power in separate 
decisions.  
4.3.2 HYPOTHESIZED INFLUENCING FACTORS OF BARGAINING POWER AND EMPOWERMENT 
Based on theories and previous studies of intra-household decision-making dynamics, we 
hypothesize that individual-, household-, and institutional-level factors may influence women’s 
decision-making power for financial decisions. These variables include proxies of social capital – 
membership in unions,
24
 network-reliance, and political connections – based on findings which 
suggest that social capital may influence intra-household decision-making power (Agarwal, 
1997; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000). Moreover, the most recent World Development Report 
explains that "social capital is the only factor that allows women to feel empowered even when 
facing high levels of domestic violence in their communities" (The World Bank, 2011, p. 95). In 
this section, we clarify the measurement of the explanatory variables and hypothesize their 
influence on wives’ decision-maker power in the financial decisions examined in this paper. 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 provide descriptions of the individual-level and household-level 
variables, respectively, as well as their summary statistics and their hypothesized influence on 
women's decision-making power for loan decisions.  
The following individual-level variables may influence wives' decision-making power 
                                                 
24
 There are no other organizations that respondents are members of besides unions.  
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 Birthplace: a woman born outside of Yen Chau district may have inferior fallback 
options in case of divorce since she may have more difficulty in returning to her 
parents' home, which may have a negative effect on her decision-making power.   
 Ability to speak Vietnamese: women unable to speak Vietnamese may have more 
difficulty making decisions about larger loans because informal lenders and bank 
representatives from outside the village may not speak local languages.  
 Education: women who have completed more education may have greater decision-
making power in financial decisions (cf., Allendorf, 2007; Garikipati, 2008; Pitt et al., 
2006; Rahman and Rao, 2004) because they may be better informed about loan 
opportunities and about how to budget and save. Education may also allow women to 
assess loan opportunities and potential investments through improved numeracy. 
Furthermore, education may help women place more value on their role and status in 
society, which, in turn, may help improve their decision-maker power.  
 Off-farm employment: off-farm employment may increase wives’ decision-making 
power (Allendorf, 2007; Rahman and Rao, 2004) since it can increase information 
access, social networks, income, and contribution to the household (Haddad et al., 
1994). We hypothesize that the effect may be greater for repaying loans since women 
with off-farm employment may be able to repay loans with money they earn 
themselves, without having to ask others. Off-farm employment may be endogenous to 
decision-making power since it is possible that intra-household decision-making power 
may affect the decision to work off-farm (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Goetz and 
Gupta, 1996). Exogeneity of off-farm employment in the logistic regression models 
was tested via the Smith and Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity.
25
 We fail to reject the 
                                                 
25
 This test was conducted via the probexog command in STATA (Baum, 1999). We conducted this test using two 
instrumental variables: whether the respondent thinks that land reallocation within the village after the Land Use 
Certificate expires will not occur and whether the respondent thinks that income fluctuation in the past five years has 
been five or greater on a scale of 0 (representing no income fluctuation) to 10 (representing extreme income 
fluctuation). In each of the models, both instrumental variables are correlated with the possible endogenous variable 
(off-farm employment) and are uncorrelated with the dependent variable. Diagnostic tests for the instrumental 
variables were conducted using the ivreg2 command in STATA (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2007). Results from 
unteridentification tests, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic (Stock and Yogo, 2005), and overidentification 
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null hypothesis that the models are appropriately specified with the off-farm 
employment status being exogenous. Therefore, instrumental variables are not needed 
to correct for endogeneity.  
 Women-controlled income: this is proxied by small livestock revenue based on 
qualitative evidence that women are traditionally in charge of small livestock 
production in the study area (Beuchelt, 2008). Fletschner and Carter (2008) used a 
similar approach in which they proxied women’s control over the family budget by the 
proportion of family wealth held in small animals. We, on the other hand, use revenue 
rather than asset value or profit because it was easier for respondents to estimate 
revenue and, in terms of potential impacts on decision-maker power, the impact of 
revenue may be more relevant because of its greater visibility. We hypothesize that 
women-controlled income will have an increasing effect on wives' decision-making 
power (Thomas, 1990).  
 Risk aversion: individuals who are more risk averse may prefer not to participate in or 
to have less say in decisions to take-out loans because they may view using credit to be 
too risky (Boucher et al., 2008). Moreover, risk preferences may, in part, measure other 
personality characteristics and attitudes that could be influential in financial decisions 
(Fletschner et al., 2010). We hypothesize that being more risk averse will decrease 
decision-making power for large loans. Risk preferences were measured through a 
variation of pairwise choice lotteries, the multiple price list technique, which is 
considered the gold standard to assess risk preferences. This method was popularized 
by Holt and Laury (2002) and has subsequently been used in a number of studies. 
Respondents were given a set of ten choices between two options – a relatively safer 
option with a lower variance of payouts and a relatively riskier option with a higher 
variance of payouts. With each subsequent choice, the probability of winning the higher 
payout increased. The options were non-hypothetical since one was randomly selected 
for payout. Risk preferences are based on the total number of safer options chosen, with 
                                                                                                                                                             
tests indicate that the instrumental variables are valid and relevant, though are weakly correlated with the possible 
endogenous regressor.  
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higher numbers indicating more risk aversion (Appendix 6.7 provides the instructions, 
an example, and the choices). 
 Membership in unions: we hypothesize that the more unions the wife is a member of, 
the greater her decision-making power. Greater participation in social networks may 
increase access to information about financial opportunities (Conley and Udry, 2010), 
which, in turn, may increase their say in financial decisions.  
The following household-level variables may impact women's decision-making power: 
 Marriage length: qualitative evidence suggests that recently married couples in Yen 
Chau tend to make more decisions together and that spouses may establish separate 
spheres as the marriage progresses. This may mean, for example, that wives’ decision-
making power for small loans may increase with marriage length since nearly half of 
small loans are for food purchases, the traditional responsibility of women. Previous 
studies have found a positive impact of women’s age or marriage length on their 
decision-making power (Allendorf, 2007; Rahman and Rao, 2004; Yusof and Duasa, 
2010).  
 Child dependency ratio: we hypothesize that higher child dependency ratios will have a 
decreasing impact on wives’  decision-making power over large loans because she may 
not have sufficient time to assess available investments or partake in these decisions. 
On the other hand, she may have more decision-making power for small loans given 
their primary use – food purchases.   
 Number of other women living in the household: we hypothesize that the more women 
living in a household, the less decision-making power the wife will have. This 
hypothesis is based on theory (Mason, 1986) and previous research which have found 
negative impacts on decision-maker power if the mother-in-law resides in the house 
(Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2011). In Yen Chau, mother-in-
laws and later daughters and daughter-in-laws may pose threats since it is customary 
for the wives of sons to move into the household upon marriage.  
 Income: proxied by the household's average daily per capita expenditures based on data 
collected in two periods of 2010. While some studies have found that household wealth 
increases women’s empowerment (Allendorf, 2007; Garikipati, 2008; Mabsout and 
Staveren, 2010), others have found the opposite (Bernasek and Bajtelsmit, 2002; Pitt et 
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al., 2006; Rahman and Rao, 2004) or no effect (Yusof and Duasa, 2010). Based on 
bargaining power theory, as household income increases, women’s decision-making 
power may decrease because their relative contribution to the household is likely to 
fall.  
 Network-reliance with various social networks (first-degree relatives, extended family, 
friends, the village head, and unions): measures structural social capital which includes 
more observable social structures such as networks and also measures cognitive social 
capital which includes less tangible elements such as norms and reciprocity (Grootaert 
and van Bastalaer, 2002). Greater network-reliance with relatives may have a larger 
positive influence on wives’ decision-making power than network-reliance with non-
relatives given the importance of family in traditional Vietnamese society (Hoang et al., 
2006). Women living in households with greater network-reliance with relatives may 
have greater financial decision-making power because of an easier way to secure loans 
compared to going to the formal sector which involves higher transaction costs. 
Political connections: this variable equals the number of people any household member 
knows personally who are members of mass unions. This measures linking social 
capital which is relationships between people who interact across formal or 
institutionalized power (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004). We hypothesize that greater 
linking social capital is likely to have a negative impact on wives’ decision-making 
power because men are more likely to benefit from connections to local authorities.  
Because gendered institutions may influence decision-making power (Cleaver, 2005; 
Fletschner and Carter, 2008; Mabsout and Staveren, 2010; G. Sen and Batliwala, 2000), we 
examine whether the following institutional-level factors influence wives’ intra-household 
financial decision-making power: 
 Ethnicity: previous experiences in the study area suggest that Black Thai and H’mong 
women have a lower status in the household than Kinh women; however, high and 
statistically significant correlations of ethnicity with birthplace and with the ability to 
speak Vietnamese prevent the inclusion of ethnicity in the regression analyses. Instead, 
separate analyses explore this hypothesis.  
 Birthplace: both an individual- and institutional-level variable. If Yen Chau has more 
restrictive gendered institutions than other districts, wives born outside Yen Chau may 
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have more decision-making power because of their past experiences of more egalitarian 
gendered institutions.  
Besides analyzing sources of wives’ decision-making power, sources of husbands’ bargaining 
power and dominance in financial decisions are examined. Influencing factors are similar to 
those for wives, though there are a few key differences. Rather than including the husband's 
ability to speak Vietnamese, we include the wife's inability to speak Vietnamese since all but one 
husband in the sample can speak Vietnamese. Women-controlled income is also excluded.  
Pearson’s Chi-Square tests examine whether there are statistically significant relationships 
between the hypothesized individual-level sources of decision-making power and being a wife or 
husband (shown in Table 4.2). Wives have completed less formal education, are members of 
fewer unions, and are more risk averse. There is no significant difference in the relationship with 
the off-farm employment status. The other variables – marriage length, child dependency ratio, 
number of other women, income, network-reliance, and political connections – are household-
level variables.  
In the following section, empirical strategies for how to assess influencing factors of wives' 
and husbands' decision-making power are presented.  
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Table 4.2: Hypothesized individual-level sources of decision-making power 
Variable Description Hypothesized 
impact on wives’ 
decision-making 
power in loan 
decisions 
Wives 
(N = 250) 
Husbands 
(N = 250) 
  Mean 
(s.d.) 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
Born in district  Dummy = 1 if the wife was 
born in Yen Chau district, 0 
otherwise 
? 0.80 
(0.40) 
- 
Speak 
Vietnamese
a
  
Dummy = 1 if the respondent 
can speak Vietnamese, 0 
otherwise 
+ 0.89***
b 
(0.32)
 
1.00*** 
(0.06) 
Education Years of formal schooling 
completed 
+ 4.77*** 
(3.65) 
6.61*** 
(3.93) 
Off-farm 
employment 
Dummy = 1 if the respondent 
works off-farm, 0 otherwise  
+ 0.33 
(0.47) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
Women-
controlled 
income
c
  
Proxied by annual small 
livestock revenue in 2010, in 
million Vietnamese dong  
+ 3.77 
(8.37) 
- 
Risk 
preferences 
Number of safer options 
chosen in the multiple price 
list technique (higher numbers 
indicate more risk aversion)
d
  
+ for small loans 
– for large loans 
– for taking out 
+ for repaying 
6.66*** 
(1.93) 
6.21*** 
(1.97) 
Membership in 
unions 
Number of unions the 
respondent is a member of 
+ 1.16*** 
(0.59) 
1.55*** 
(0.86) 
Notes:  
a
 In the regression analyses examining husbands' decision-making power, the wife's inability to speak Vietnamese is 
included as an explanatory factor given that all but one husband in the sample are able to speak Vietnamese. 
b
 Pearson’s Chi-Square test of whether there is a statistically significant relationship between the independent 
variable and whether the respondent is a wife or husband are reported.  
c
 This variable is excluded from the regression analyses examining husbands' decision-making power.   
d 
Selecting four safer options indicates approximate risk neutrality and selecting less than four indicates risk loving. 
Just 10.8% of both wives and husbands are approximately risk neutral and 4% and 7.2% of wives and husbands, 
respectively, as risk loving.  
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 4.3: Hypothesized household-level sources of wives' decision-making power  
Variable Description Hypothesized 
impact on 
wives' 
decision-
making power 
in loan 
decisions 
Mean 
(s.d.) of 
husbands 
and wives 
(N = 500) 
Marriage length  Years the couple has been married
a
 + for small 
loans 
22.29 
(11.74) 
Child dependency 
ratio 
Ratio children under 14 years of age living in the 
household to the total number of people living in 
the household 
– 0.23 
(0.19) 
Number of other 
women in house 
Number of women living in the household other 
than the wife 
– 0.73 
(0.83) 
Income   
 
Average daily per capita expenditures in 2010, in 
thousand Vietnamese dong 
– 19.81
b
 
(6.51) 
Network-reliance The sum of “easy” responses from: “If you or 
another household member asked, would it be 
easy or not easy to borrow money for education 
(or for health expenses, a positive social event, a 
negative social event, or to borrow a water 
buffalo, or to ask for labor) from (see social 
networks below)." The maximum is six for each 
social network category, with the exception of 
unions which has a maximum of five.
c
  
  
First-degree 
relatives 
 + 5.78 
(0.84) 
Extended family  + 4.53 
(1.95) 
Friends  + 4.80 
(1.84) 
Village head  + 3.98 
(2.68) 
Unions   + 2.14 
(2.05) 
Political 
connections 
Number of people any household member knows 
personally
d
 who are members of the Community 
Party, People’s Committee, Women Union, or 
Fatherlands Front Union at the commune level 
– 1.16 
(0.69) 
Notes:
  
a
 Because of lack of survey data on marriage length, we estimated the marriage length based on the median age of 
marriage in rural areas for women in Vietnam, 21 years (Committee for Population, Family and Children and ORC 
Macro, 2003) and the wife's age. Since the median age at first marriage has not increased in the past 25 years 
(Committee for Population, Family and Children and ORC Macro, 2003), it is also applicable to older respondents.
 
b
 This is equivalent in purchasing power parity (PPP) to $2.36 after updating expenditures for inflation and given 
that 10,178.57 VND/$1 PPP (General Statistics Office, 2012b; The World Bank, 2012).   
c
 The ease of borrowing a water buffalo/cow from unions was not asked because it is not applicable. 
d
 This concept was explained as a two-way relationship in which people talk to each other and know at least basic 
information about one another. 
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4.3.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Influencing factors of wives’ empowerment are analyzed using binary logistic regression 
models for each decision separately. The dependent variable equals 1 if she has any say in the 
decision-making process (joint or primary say) and equals 0 if is she has no say. The number of 
observations in each model varies between 205 and 228 because respondents were excluded if 
they stated that the decision is not made in their household.
26
 In the binary logistic regression 
models of wives’ empowerment in taking out and repaying small loans, the null hypothesis that 
all regression coefficients equal zero could not be rejected. Therefore, ordinal logistic regression 
models examine influencing factors of wives’ bargaining power in these two decisions.27 The 
dependent variable equals 0 if the wife has no say, 1 if she has joint say, and 2 if she has primary 
say. Both binary and ordinal logistic regression models use maximum likelihood estimation. 
Influencing factors of husbands being the dominant decision-maker are explored using binary 
logistic regression models in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the husband states that he 
is the primary decision-maker and equals 0 otherwise. To investigate whether aggregated indices 
conceal important observations from the models exploring each loan decision separately, 
influencing factors of husbands' and wives' bargaining power in loan decisions based on 
aggregated indices are assessed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for respondents 
living in households that made decisions about all four loan types. Correlations among the 
explanatory variables in the subsample of wives and of that of husbands are no greater than the 
absolute value of 0.50 and the mean variance inflation factors are 1.42 and 1.54, respectively, 
indicating that collinearity does not pose a problem (Midi et al., 2010). 
                                                 
26
 In a few cases, one spouse reported that a particular financial decision is made together with his/her spouse while 
his/her spouse said that the decision is not applicable to their household. In such cases, we excluded both 
respondents from the analysis of the respective decision. 
27
 Because of violations of the proportional odds assumption, ordinal logistic regression models could not be used to 
explore influencing factors of bargaining power for the other loan decisions. We could have analyzed wives’ 
bargaining power for family budget and savings decisions with ordinal logistic regression models; however, for ease 
of interpretation we apply binary logistic regression models instead. 
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4.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section presents and discusses descriptive results on wives' and husbands' intra-household 
decision-making power before examining determinants of decision-making power. 
4.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INTRA-HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING POWER AND EMPOWERMENT 
Descriptive statistics of intra-household bargaining power and empowerment based on wives’ 
and husbands’ perceptions of their own roles in family budget and savings decisions are shown 
in Table 4.4. Pearson’s Chi-Square tests examine whether there is a statistically significant 
relationship between bargaining power and empowerment and being a wife or husband. Although 
husbands have more bargaining power (i.e., their degree of say) in family budget and savings 
decisions, there is no difference between husbands’ and wives’ empowerment (i.e., their having 
any say) in these decisions. Distributions indicate that wives are more likely to state that 
decisions are made jointly, while husbands are more likely to state that they are the main or sole 
decision-maker. 
Husbands have significantly more bargaining power in taking out and repaying all four loans 
(see Table 4.5). Nevertheless, perceptions of their bargaining power differ greatly by the type of 
loan. Moreover, wives' bargaining power decreases with the size of the loan. Another observation 
is that while very few husbands – 3.9% to 7.3% – state that they have no say in each loan 
decision, few wives state that they are the primary decision-maker, with the exception of small 
loans. The majority of small loan decisions are made by husbands and wives alone, indicating 
that most of these loans are taken out and repaid without requiring approval from others. On the 
other hand, the majority of large loans and large agricultural loans are made jointly. There are 
also variations in decision-making power based on whether the decision is to take out or to repay 
the loan: more wives and husbands state that they are the sole decision-maker for repaying large 
loans and large agricultural loans as opposed to taking these loans out. Asymmetric information 
between the reported bargaining power by wives and husbands is apparent. Husbands are more 
likely to state that they are the main or sole decision-maker, while wives are more likely to state 
that decisions are made jointly, supporting findings by Kabeer (2001).  
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Table 4.4: Bargaining power and empowerment in family budget and savings decisions 
 Family budget Savings 
 Wives Husbands Wives Husbands 
Observations 217 217 212 212 
No say 27.6% 23.5% 18.9% 19.8% 
Joint say 40.1% 30.0% 50.0% 39.2% 
Main say 7.4% 20.3% 6.1% 15.6% 
Sole say 24.9% 26.3% 25.0% 25.5% 
Mean bargaining power
a
    
(s.d.) 
1.05***
b
 
(0.77) 
1.23*** 
(0.81) 
1.12* 
(0.70) 
1.21* 
(0.75) 
Mean empowerment
c
 
(s.d.) 
0.72 
(0.45) 
0.76 
(0.43) 
0.81 
(0.39) 
0.80 
(0.40) 
Notes:  
a
 The bargaining power index equals: 0 if the respondent has no say; 1 if the respondent has joint say; and 2 if the 
respondent has primary (main or sole say) say in the decision.  
b 
Pearson’s Chi-Square test of whether there is a statistically significant relationship between bargaining power or 
empowerment and whether the respondent is a wife or husband are reported. 
c
 The empowerment score equals 0 if the respondent has no say and 1 if the respondent has any say. 
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1%. 
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Table 4.5: Bargaining power and empowerment in credit decisions  
 Taking out loans  Repaying loans 
 Wives Husbands Wives Husbands 
Small loans     
Observations 205 205 205 205 
No say 12.7% 7.3% 13.2% 7.3% 
Joint say 22.0% 14.6% 22.0% 14.6% 
Main say 4.4% 6.3% 3.4% 3.9% 
Sole say 61.0% 71.7% 61.5% 74.1% 
Mean bargaining power
a
 
(s.d.) 
1.53**
b
 
(0.71) 
1.71** 
(0.60) 
1.52** 
(0.72) 
1.71** 
(0.60) 
Mean empowerment
c
 
(s.d.) 
0.87* 
(0.33) 
0.93* 
(0.26) 
0.87* 
(0.34) 
0.93* 
(0.26) 
Medium loans     
Observations 214 214 214 214 
No say 15.0% 4.7% 15.9% 3.9% 
Joint say 70.6% 46.3% 67.8% 64.5% 
Main say 4.2% 22.0% 3.7% 29.4% 
Sole say 10.3% 27.1% 12.6% 2.2% 
Mean bargaining power 
 (s.d.) 
1.00*** 
(0.54) 
1.42*** 
(0.58) 
1.00*** 
(0.57) 
1.44*** 
(0.59) 
Mean empowerment  
(s.d.) 
0.85*** 
(0.36) 
0.95*** 
(0.21) 
0.84*** 
(0.37) 
0.95*** 
(0.21) 
Large loans     
Observations 228 228 223 223 
No say 12.7% 3.9% 13.2% 4.4% 
Joint say 83.8% 64.5% 81.6% 58.8% 
Main say 2.2% 29.4% 1.3% 24.1% 
Sole say 1.3% 2.2% 3.9% 12.7% 
Mean bargaining power 
 (s.d) 
0.91*** 
(0.39) 
1.28*** 
(0.53) 
0.92*** 
(0.42) 
1.32*** 
(0.56) 
Mean empowerment  
(s.d.) 
0.87*** 
(0.33) 
0.96*** 
(0.20) 
0.87*** 
(0.34) 
0.96*** 
(0.20) 
Large agricultural loans     
Observations 223 223 223 223 
No say 17.9% 5.4% 17.9% 5.4% 
Joint say 76.2% 60.1% 74.4% 57.4% 
Main say 3.1% 27.8% 2.7% 23.8% 
Sole say 2.7% 6.7% 4.9% 13.5% 
Mean bargaining power 
 (s.d) 
0.88*** 
(0.47) 
1.29*** 
(0.56) 
0.90*** 
(0.50) 
1.32*** 
(0.57) 
Mean empowerment  
(s.d.) 
0.82*** 
(0.39) 
0.95*** 
(0.23) 
0.82*** 
(0.39) 
0.95*** 
(0.23) 
Notes:  
a
 The bargaining power index equals: 0 if the respondent has no say; 1 if the respondent has joint say; and 2 if the 
respondent has primary (main or sole) say in the decision.  
b 
Pearson’s Chi-Square test of whether there is a statistically significant relationship between bargaining power or 
empowerment and whether the respondent is a wife or husband are reported. 
c
 The empowerment score equals 0 if the respondent has no say and equals 1 if the respondent has any say. 
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.  
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4.4.2 INFLUENCING FACTORS OF WIVES’ EMPOWERMENT IN FINANCIAL DECISIONS 
Binary and ordinal logistic regression models are used to explore sources of wives’ 
empowerment in each financial decision separately. In binary logistic regressions (shown in 
Table 4.6), odds ratios report the predicted change in the odds of being empowered in each 
financial decision (except for small loans) from a one-unit increase in the predictor, given that all 
other variables are held constant. In ordinal logistic regression models representing decisions to 
take out and repay small loans (shown in Table 4.7), odds ratios report changes in the odds of the 
predictor in terms of cumulative groups and can be interpreted in two ways given that all other 
predictors are held constant: first, the change in the odds of being the primary decision-maker 
versus the odds of being either a joint decision-maker or having no say in the decision from a 
one-unit increase in the predictor; and second, the change in the odds of being the primary or 
joint decision-maker versus the odds of having no say in the decision from a one-unit increase in 
the predictor. The null hypothesis that all regressor coefficients equal zero can be rejected in each 
model. Robustness checks confirm that the main implications and interpretations of statistically 
significant factors remain the same against the removal of insignificant variables, though some 
variables become marginally significant in the reduced model and others become insignificant.
28
  
                                                 
28
 Variables which become insignificant in reduced models after removing previously insignificant variables from 
the full model are: birthplace in the family budgeting model; the poorest income tercile in the taking out and 
repaying small loans models and in the taking out medium loans model; marriage length in the taking out and 
repaying medium loans models; membership in organizations in the repaying large loans model; network-reliance 
with extended family in the repaying large loans model; and network-reliance with the village head in the taking out 
large agricultural loans model.  
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Table 4.6: Binary logistic regression of wives’ empowerment in financial decisions 
 Family 
budgeting 
Saving Taking out 
medium 
loans 
Repaying 
medium 
loans 
Taking out 
large loans 
Repaying 
large loans 
Taking out 
large 
agricultural 
loans 
Repaying 
large 
agricultural 
loans 
Observations 217 212 214 214 228 228 223 223 
Constant 0.874 5.876 12.111 2.720 9.499 11.171 22.047 5.690 
 (1.482) (11.334) (26.100) (5.828) (22.791) (25.408) (44.869) (11.631) 
Born in district 0.174** 0.190** 0.380 0.458 0.755 0.940 0.442 0.644 
(0.118) (0.139) (0.267) (0.323) (0.548) (0.634) (0.276) (0.401) 
Can speak Vietnamese 5.823** 8.386*** 6.467** 7.904** 11.555*** 4.041 6.966** 7.419** 
(4.745) (6.687) (5.174) (6.381) (10.893) (3.458) (5.362) (5.756) 
Education 1.285*** 1.146* 1.181* 1.190** 1.205* 1.188* 1.182** 1.093 
(0.084) (0.083) (0.102) (0.104) (0.125) (0.113) (0.098) (0.089) 
Off-farm employment 1.691 1.071 1.948 2.432 3.305* 3.506** 1.465 2.359* 
(0.688) (0.490) (1.028) (1.317) (2.166) (2.165) (0.709) (1.206) 
Women-controlled 
income 
0.925*** 0.954* 0.937* 0.942* 0.889*** 0.909*** 0.902*** 0.924*** 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) 
Risk aversion 0.943 0.936 1.023 1.129 1.137 1.144 0.945 1.098 
(0.094) (0.102) (0.120) (0.130) (0.162) (0.154) (0.115) (0.132) 
Marriage length 0.996 0.967* 0.958* 0.959* 0.907*** 0.907*** 0.948** 0.934*** 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) 
Number of other 
women in house 
0.678 0.669 0.647 0.517** 0.831 0.793 0.560** 0.550** 
(0.168) (0.198) (0.208) (0.168) (0.305) (0.274) (0.165) (0.161) 
Ratio of children to 
total residents = 0 
1.057 1.551 2.597 1.884 2.982 5.238** 2.697 2.804 
(0.503) (0.841) (1.835) (1.262) (2.321) (4.075) (1.766) (1.789) 
Ratio of children to 
total residents  ≥ 0.33 
1.010 1.329 0.384 0.385 0.203** 0.322* 0.291** 0.329* 
(0.477) (0.697) (0.229) (0.234) (0.144) (0.209) (0.167) (0.190) 
Lowest income tercile 
(< 17,020 VND/day) 
1.625 1.544 2.918* 4.121** 7.687*** 5.371** 3.382** 4.930*** 
(0.727) (0.797) (1.659) (2.452) (5.909) (3.755) (1.847) (2.853) 
Highest income tercile 
(> 22,725 VND/day) 
1.649 1.287 1.680 1.506 1.364 1.961 2.095 1.915 
(0.770) (0.670) (1.019) (0.899) (0.923) (1.288) (1.213) (1.077) 
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Notes: Odds ratios are reported in bold with their standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals 1 if the wife has any say in the decision and 
equals 0 otherwise. Regressions for taking out and repaying small loans are not shown because the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal zero 
could not be rejected for these models (please refer to Table 4.7 for results from ordinal logistic regression models of these decisions).  
a
 Sensitivity refers to the predictions that the dependent variable is 1, conditional on observed values of 1.  
b
 Specificity refers to the predictions that the dependent variable is 0, conditional on observed values of 0.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
(continued from previous page) 
 Family 
budgeting 
Saving Taking out 
medium 
loans 
Repaying 
medium 
loans 
Taking out 
large loans 
Repaying 
large loans 
Taking out 
large 
agricultural 
loans 
Repaying 
large 
agricultural 
loans 
Membership in unions  0.915 0.810 0.506 0.636 0.376* 0.458* 0.581 0.646 
(0.319) (0.303) (0.212) (0.269) (0.189) (0.213) (0.240) (0.258) 
Network-reliance:         
First-degree  
relatives 
1.087 0.926 0.789 0.832 0.627 0.601 0.653 0.671 
(0.241) (0.257) (0.235) (0.244) (0.200) (0.187) (0.175) (0.184) 
Extended family 1.017 1.070 1.160 1.226 1.383** 1.263* 1.305** 1.316** 
(0.106) (0.125) (0.979) (0.159) (0.197) (0.168) (0.148) (0.156) 
Friends 0.925 1.071 0.979 0.993 0.947 1.085 0.937 1.033 
(0.105) (0.136) (0.141) (0.145) (0.149) (0.157) (0.122) (0.136) 
Village head 1.037 0.920 1.022 0.917 1.189 1.116 1.298** 1.069 
(0.101) (0.101) (0.132) (0.112) (0.166) (0.151) (0.155) (0.127) 
Unions 1.106 1.099 1.024 1.018 1.039 1.131 0.976 0.983 
(0.112) (0.127) (0.132) (0.129) (0.164) (0.172) (0.121) (0.123) 
Political connections 1.012 1.034 1.078 1.113 1.377** 1.308** 1.058 1.171* 
(0.052) (0.062) (0.084) (0.090) (0.183) (0.158) (0.077) (0.098) 
         
Likelihood Ratio χ2(19)  46.00*** 32.83** 38.07*** 45.76*** 63.59*** 57.34*** 55.81*** 56.43*** 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.180 0.1599 0.211 0.244 0.366 0.323 0.266 0.269 
Sensitivity
a
   91.72% 98.84% 97.25% 98.89% 97.99% 97.98% 97.27% 96.72% 
Specificity
b
   33.33% 22.50% 25.00% 35.29% 48.28% 43.33% 42.50% 40.00% 
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Table 4.7: Ordinal logistic regression models of wives’ bargaining power in small loan decisions 
 
Taking out small loans Repaying small loans 
Observations 205 205 
Born in district 1.983 2.237* 
(0.858) (0.959) 
Can speak Vietnamese 2.825* 2.526 
(1.706) (1.522) 
Education years 1.011 1.002 
(0.053) (0.052) 
Off-farm employment 0.967 1.034 
(0.324) (0.344) 
Women-controlled income 1.010 1.009 
(0.029) (0.028) 
Risk aversion 1.231** 1.240** 
(0.105) (0.107) 
Marriage length 0.965* 0.963** 
(0.018) (0.018) 
Number of other women in 
house 
0.802 0.805 
(0.181) (0.180) 
Ratio of children to total 
residents = 0 
2.293* 2.415* 
(1.044) (1.099) 
Ratio of children to total 
residents  ≥ 0.33 
1.140 1.105 
(0.495) (0.475) 
Lowest income tercile 
(< 17,020 VND/day) 
0.440** 0.507* 
(0.182) (0.207) 
Highest income tercile 
(> 22,725 VND/day) 
0.638 0.725 
(0.276) (0.310) 
Membership in unions  0.713 0.795 
(0.192) (0.214) 
Network-reliance: 
  First-degree relatives 1.108 1.095 
(0.211) (0.209) 
Extended family 0.887 0.871 
(0.090) (0.088) 
Friends 1.046 1.034 
(0.102) (0.100) 
Village head 1.098 1.105 
(0.084) (0.083) 
Unions 0.821** 0.825** 
(0.069) (0.069) 
Political connections 0.999 0.966 
(0.050) (0.056) 
Likelihood Ratio χ2(19)  40.730*** 40.650*** 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.114 0.113 
Notes: Odds ratios are shown in bold with their standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals 0 if 
she has no say, 1 if she has joint say, and 2 if she has primary (main or sole) say in the decision.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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The first two models in Table 4.6 represent wives’ empowerment in family budget and savings 
decisions. The wife’s ability to speak Vietnamese and her education have positive impacts on her 
odds of being empowered, whereas being born in the district and living in a household with 
higher women-controlled income decrease her odds of being empowered for these decisions. The 
other models represent wives’ empowerment in loan decisions. Sources of wives’ empowerment 
differ depending on the loan type as well as on whether the decision is to take out or repay the 
loan. For example, wives who are more risk averse have higher odds of being empowered for 
small loan decisions (see Table 4.7), but risk preferences have no significant influence on the 
odds of her being empowered for any other financial decision. Sources of empowerment differ if 
the decision is to take out as opposed to repay the same type of loan. For example, the ability to 
speak Vietnamese has a strong and positive impact on wives’ empowerment in taking out large 
loans, though it has no significant impact on her empowerment in repaying such loans. This 
supports the hypothesis that being able to speak the national language is important for obtaining 
large loans. The influence of the child dependency ratio on wives’ empowerment shows that 
wives living in households with a relatively high child dependency ratio have much lower odds 
of being empowered for decisions about larger loans. This indicates that wives may be too 
overburdened by childcare tasks to participate in important financial decisions. 
There are a few unexpected results. First, off-farm employment status has a statistically 
significant impact on wives’ empowerment for decisions about large loans only. Nevertheless, 
the impact is quite large: the odds of a wife being empowered are 2.3 and 2.5 times greater for 
taking out and repaying large loans, respectively, if she works off-farm, given that all other 
variables are held constant. Second, the greater the number of unions that the wife is a member 
of, the lower are her odds of being empowered for taking out and repaying large loans. An 
explanation for this may be that unions may reinforce gender norms. Nevertheless, the result is 
statistically significant at the 10% level only and is not robust since the variable becomes 
insignificant in restricted models. Third, most network-reliance variables are not significant in 
influencing wives’ empowerment. The exception is network-reliance with extended family, 
which has a positive impact on wives’ odds of being empowered for decisions to take out and 
repay the two types of large loans: for each additional item (money for four purposes, a water 
buffalo/cow, or labor) the household can borrow from extended family in times of need, the odds 
of the wife being empowered are 26% to 38% greater, given that all other variables are held 
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constant. This result highlights the importance of family in the study area; however, the network-
reliance variables have the disadvantage of being at the household-level since they were elicited 
from household heads only. Fourth, women-controlled income proxied by the household's annual 
small livestock revenue has a negative impact on wives’ empowerment in all financial decisions 
except for those in small loans. This last unexpected result merits special attention. Although this 
finding may seem counterintuitive based on the theory that the more women control, the greater 
their intra-household decision-making power, some findings in previous studies support this 
result. For example, Kantor (2003) found that women more successful at home-based garment 
production in India are more likely to lose control of their income. This echoes findings by von 
Braun (1988) in which women’s control over rice production in Gambia is almost perfectly 
negatively correlated with yields. In other words, the more successful an enterprise becomes, the 
less women have control over that enterprise. Therefore, as revenues from small livestock 
increase, the responsibility of small livestock may shift to men. Follow-up interviews conducted 
with households with very profitable chicken and pig production support this explanation.  
The results show that education has a positive impact on wives’ odds of being empowered for 
most financial decisions. To test whether the difference in education between spouses is 
important for wives’ empowerment, separate models were examined in which the difference in 
education between the husband and wife replaced the wife's education (results are not shown). 
We find a statistically significant negative impact from a greater educational divide between 
spouses on wives’ empowerment in decisions about family budgeting, saving, and taking out 
medium loans. However, there is no significant effect on the seven other financial decisions. This 
indicates that for all but one loan decision, absolute changes in wives’ education are critical for 
their empowerment whereas relative changes compared to their husbands are not.  
Predicted probabilities help explain how combinations of different circumstances may change 
wives’ probability of being empowered. Table 4.8 shows predicted probabilities of wives’ 
empowerment in decisions about taking out loans by changing her off-farm employment status 
and the household’s child dependency ratio.  All other independent variables are held constant at 
their means. The importance of these circumstances for her probability of being empowered in 
taking out loans is evident. For example, a wife who does not work off-farm and lives in a 
household with a relatively high child dependency ratio has a 75% predicted probability of being 
empowered for taking out large loans, whereas if she were to work-off farm in such a household, 
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her predicted probability of being empowered would increase to 86%, given that all other 
independent variables are held at mean values. On the other hand, her predicted probability of 
being empowered for taking out small loans varies little depending on these circumstances. 
These results provide further evidence of the importance of analyzing sources of wives’ 
empowerment in financial decisions separately since impacts greatly differ by loan type.  
Table 4.8: Predicted probabilities of wives’ empowerment in decisions to take out loans 
 Small 
loans
a
   
Medium 
loans 
Large loans Large 
agricultural 
loans 
Wife does not work off-farm and does 
not live in a household with a high 
child dependency ratio
b
  
0.87 0.87 0.89 0.86 
Wife does not work off-farm and 
lives in a household with a relatively 
high child dependency ratio 
0.88 0.76 0.75 0.71 
Wife works off-farm and does not 
live in a household with a relatively 
high child dependency ratio 
0.87 0.92 0.95 0.89 
Wife works off-farm and lives in a 
household with a relatively high child 
dependency ratio 
0.88 0.84 0.86 0.76 
Notes: All predicted probabilities are significant at the 1% level. Other independent variables are held at mean 
values. Predicted probabilities were obtained using the “margins” command in STATA. 
a
 Predicted probabilities for small loans are from the ordinal logistic regression models and equal sums of predicted 
probabilities for being either the joint or primary decision-maker.   
b
 A high child dependency ratio is defined as being greater or equal to 0.33. This is based on the cutoff point of the 
third tercile of the child dependency ratio in the sample.  
The finding that wives born in Yen Chau have much lower odds of being empowered for 
family budget and savings decisions provides evidence that gendered institutions influence 
empowerment. To test whether ethnicity is influential for wives’ empowerment, separate 
regressions were examined in which the wives’  ability to speak Vietnamese and her birthplace 
were replaced with two dummy variables representing whether she is Black Thai or H’mong 
(results are not shown). Being Black Thai or H’mong as opposed to Kinh (the ethnic majority in 
Vietnam) has a significant and strong negative impact on her odds of being empowered for 
decisions about family budgeting, saving, and taking out and repaying small loans. This provides 
further evidence that gendered institutions may not be as important for credit decisions as they 
are for family budget and savings decisions.  
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Sensitivity and specificity tests report the share of cases correctly predicted by the models for 
both empowered and non-empowered sub-groups, respectively. The sensitivity results indicate 
that the share of cases correctly predicted by the models for the empowered sub-group is high, 
ranging from 92% to 99%, whereas the specificity results indicate that the share of cases 
correctly predicted by the models for the non-empowered sub-group range from 23% to 48%. 
This demonstrates that none of the models are capable of differentiating between empowered and 
non-empowered women at a satisfactory level of precision and that additional sources of 
empowerment other than those included in the analyses must also be relevant. 
4.4.3 INFLUENCING FACTORS OF WIVES’ BARGAINING POWER IN CREDIT DECISIONS USING 
AGGREGATED INDICES 
In this subsection, influencing factors of wives’ bargaining power in credit decisions are 
explored using three aggregated indices (taking out, repaying, and both taking out and repaying 
all four loan types) via OLS models (shown in Table 4.9). Cronbach’s alphas range from 0.7 to 
0.9, indicating that each index has a high level of internal consistency and measures a single 
underlying concept. Robustness checks confirm that the main implications and interpretations of 
statistically significant factors remain robust against the removal of insignificant variables in the 
full model with two exceptions.
29
 Factors significant in increasing wives’ bargaining power in all 
three aggregated indices are her ability to speak Vietnamese, education, and a shorter marriage 
length. There are differences in sources of wives’ bargaining power in taking out and repaying 
loans. Higher women-controlled income has a negative impact on wives’ bargaining power in 
taking out loans, yet it has no impact on her bargaining power in repaying loans. Moreover, 
living in a household without child dependents or which is in the poorest income tercile have 
positive impacts on wives’ bargaining power in repaying loans, but no significant impacts on her 
bargaining power in taking out loans. Therefore, the indices also show the importance of 
examining decisions to take out and to repay loans separately. 
                                                 
29
 Women-controlled income becomes marginally significant in the model of the index for taking out loans and the 
poorest income tercile becomes insignificant in the model of the index to repay loans. 
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Table 4.9: OLS estimation of determinants of wives’ bargaining power from aggregated indices 
 Aggregated index: 
taking out loans 
Aggregated index: 
repaying loans 
Aggregated index: all 
loan decisions 
Observations 183 183 183 
Constant 0.899*** 0.813*** 0.834*** 
(0.304) 0.287 0.272 
Born in district -0.010 0.036 0.013 
(0.077) (0.083) (0.078) 
Can speak Vietnamese 0.295*** 0.291** 0.293*** 
(0.104) (0.112) (0.106) 
Education 0.022** 0.019** 0.021** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Off-farm employment 0.067 0.101 0.084 
(0.058) (0.063) (0.059) 
Women-controlled income -0.007* -0.006 -0.007 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Risk aversion 0.018 0.023 0.021 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Marriage length -0.006* -0.008** -0.007** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of other women in 
house 
-0.060 -0.053 -0.057 
(0.039) (0.042) (0.040) 
Ratio of children to total 
residents = 0 
0.077 0.147* 0.112 
(0.076) (0.082) (0.078) 
Ratio of children to total 
residents  ≥ 0.33 
-0.120 -0.093 -0.107 
(0.077) (0.083) (0.078) 
Lowest income tercile 
(< 17,020 VND/day) 
0.096 0.129* 0.113 
(0.072) (0.077) (0.073) 
Highest income tercile 
(> 22,725 VND/day) 
-0.017 -0.001 -0.009 
(0.073) (0.079) (0.075) 
Membership in unions  -0.038 -0.023 -0.031 
(0.048) (0.052) (0.049) 
Network-reliance:    
First-degree relatives -0.025 -0.024 -0.024 
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) 
Extended family 0.006 0.000 0.003 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Friends 0.015 0.019 0.017 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
Village head 0.009 -0.001 0.004 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Unions -0.018 -0.021 -0.019 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Political connections 0.009 0.009 0.007 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Cronbach's alpha
a
  0.683 0.727 0.869 
F statistic (19,163) 2.460*** 2.590*** 2.570*** 
R
2
  0.223 0.232 0.231 
Adjusted R
2
 0.132 0.142 0.141 
Notes: Coefficients are reported in bold with their standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an 
equally-weighted mean index based on responses of decision-making power in each loan decision: 0 represents no 
say, 1 joint say, and 2 primary say.  
a 
Cronbach's alpha reports the squared correlation between the observed index score and the true score.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level 
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The results demonstrate that several insightful findings of sources of wives’ power in intra-
household financial decisions are lost in the aggregated indices. For example, in the logistic 
regression models exploring sources of wives’ empowerment (in Table 4.7), living in a 
household in the poorest income tercile has a significantly positive impact on wives’ 
empowerment in decisions to take out and repay medium loans, large loans, and large 
agricultural loans, yet this variable is statistically significant in the model of the bargaining 
power index for repaying loans only (in Table 4.9). Moreover, none of the social capital variables 
are significant in any of the bargaining power indices. In general, subtle nuances of sources of 
wives’ empowerment in decisions about taking out and repaying various types of loans are lost in 
the aggregated indices. The results clearly show the benefits of examining women's decision-
making power in each financial decision separately.  
4.4.4 INFLUENCING FACTORS OF HUSBANDS' FINANCIAL DECISION-MAKING POWER  
In this subsection, we examine influencing factors of husbands’ bargaining power based on 
aggregated indices and of their dominance in financial decisions. Table 4.10 shows the results 
based on the aggregated indices. Cronbach’s alphas range from 0.8 to 0.9, indicating a high level 
of internal consistency and that each index measures a single underlying concept. Robustness 
checks confirm that the main implications and interpretations of statistically significant factors 
remain robust against the removal of insignificant variables from the full model, with the 
exception of education which becomes insignificant in each model. In all three aggregated 
indices, the wife’s birthplace within the district, the wife’s inability to speak Vietnamese, and the 
number of women other than the wife living in the household have a positive impact on 
husbands’ bargaining power. On the other hand, more risk aversion, education, and network-
reliance with extended family have negative impacts on his bargaining power. This indicates that 
husbands who are more risk averse may prefer deferring financial decisions to their wives. 
Although it is surprising that husbands who are more educated have less bargaining power, as 
mentioned above, this variable becomes insignificant in each model in robustness checks. 
Comparing results from Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 show the importance of the wife’s ability to 
speak Vietnamese in intra-household decision-making. Moreover, although the wife’s birthplace 
does not have a significant impact on her perceived bargaining power, it has a marginally 
significant impact (P < 0.10) on her husband’s perceived bargaining power, providing evidence 
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that gendered institutions and past experiences of wives may affect intra-household bargaining 
power. Marriage length is not a significant determinant of husbands' bargaining power, whereas 
it is for wives, indicating that as the couple ages, younger household members may take away 
decision-making power from the female household head, but not from the male household head. 
It could also signal that gendered institutions among various age cohorts may affect wives more 
than husbands. 
Influencing factors for husbands being the primary decision-maker are examined via binary 
logistic regression models. Results are shown in Table 4.11. The null hypothesis that all regressor 
coefficients equal zero can be rejected in each model. Robustness checks confirm that the main 
implications and interpretations of statistically significant factors remain robust against the 
removal of insignificant variables, though some variables become insignificant.
30
 The results 
expose added nuances and differences in influencing factors of husbands’ dominance in 
particular financial decisions. Comparing Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 demonstrate that the 
aggregated bargaining power indices obscure factors significant in influencing intra-household 
decision-making power for specific financial decisions. 
                                                 
30
 Variables which become marginally significant or insignificant after the removal of insignificant variables from 
the full models are: the husband’s risk aversion in the family budget model; network-reliance with unions in the 
repaying medium and large agricultural loans models; the wealthiest income tercile in the taking out large loans 
model; and education in the repaying medium loans model. 
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Table 4.10: OLS estimation of determinants of husbands’ bargaining power from indices 
 
Aggregated index: 
taking out loans 
Aggregated index: 
repaying loans 
Aggregated index:  
all decisions 
Observations 183 183 183 
Constant 1.828*** 1.810*** 1.819*** 
 
(0.292) (0.303) (0.291) 
Wife born in district 0.153* 0.156* 0.154* 
 (0.087) (0.091) (0.087) 
Wife cannot speak Vietnamese 0.314*** 0.360*** 0.337*** 
(0.114) (0.118) (0.113) 
Education -0.026** -0.024** -0.025** 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Off-farm employment 0.002 0.012 0.007 
(0.068) (0.071) (0.068) 
Risk aversion -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.062*** 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Marriage length -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Number of other women in house 0.107** 0.081* 0.094** 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.045) 
Ratio of children to total residents 
= 0 
0.006 -0.045 -0.020 
(0.088) (0.091) (0.088) 
Ratio of children to total residents  
≥ 0.33 
-0.063 -0.139 -0.101 
(0.089) (0.092) (0.088) 
Lowest income tercile 
(< 17,020 VND/day) 
-0.094 -0.106 -0.100 
(0.088) (0.091) (0.087) 
Highest income tercile 
(> 22,725 VND/day) 
0.072 0.035 0.053 
(0.081) (0.084) (0.081) 
Membership in unions  0.046 0.064 0.055 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) 
Network-reliance: 
  
 
First-degree relatives 0.038 0.052 0.045 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.040) 
Extended family -0.069*** -0.074*** -0.072*** 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Friends 0.011 0.012 0.012 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Village head 0.012 0.018 0.015 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Unions -0.012 -0.019 -0.015 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Political connections 0.005 0.006 0.006 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Cronbach's alpha
a
  0.808 0.837 0.918 
F statistic (18,164) 2.59*** 2.81*** 2.80*** 
R
2
  0.222 0.236 0.235 
Adjusted R
2
 0.136 0.152 0.151 
Notes: Coefficients are shown in bold with their standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is an 
equally-weighted mean index based on responses of decision-making power in each loan decision: 0 represents no 
say, 1 joint say, and 2 primary say.  
a 
Cronbach's alpha reports the squared correlation between the observed index score and the true score.  
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.   
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Influencing factors of husbands’ dominance in financial decisions mainly confirm results in 
Table 4.10: the wife’s inability to speak Vietnamese, the wife’s birthplace, the husband’s 
education, the number of women other than the wife living in the household, and network-
reliance with extended family are significant in influencing the odds that the husband is the 
primary decision-maker in most financial decisions. Given the finding that the wife’s birthplace 
and ability to speak Kinh influence the husband's dominance in almost every financial decision, 
we ran separate regressions (results not shown) in which these variables were replaced with the 
husband’s ethnicity to examine whether gendered institutions influence his dominance in 
decision-making. We find that the husband’s ethnicity is not significant in influencing his odds of 
being the primary decision-maker in any financial decision, indicating that gendered institutions 
may be less important for husbands’ perceptions of their own decision-making power than they 
are for wives’ perceptions of their own decision-making power.  
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Table 4.11: Binary logistic regression models of husbands’ dominance in financial decisions 
 Family 
budgeting 
Saving Taking 
out small 
loans 
Repaying 
small 
loans 
Taking 
out 
medium 
loans 
Repaying 
medium 
loans 
Taking 
out large 
loans 
Repaying 
large 
loans 
Taking 
out large 
agricultur
al loans 
Repaying 
large 
agricultur
al loans 
Constant 2.181 0.316 0.777 0.777 2.539 2.923 1.948 1.241 7.497 3.700 
 (2.926) (0.462) (1.258) (1.258) (3.601) (4.164) (2.857) (1.747) (10.941) (5.297) 
Wife was born in 
the district 
2.432* 3.018** 3.196** 3.196** 2.410* 2.370* 1.343 1.470 1.495 1.509 
(1.190) (1.503) (1.625) (1.625) (1.134) (1.105) (0.644) (0.669) (0.719) (0.707) 
Wife cannot speak 
Vietnamese 
4.791** 2.600 4.322* 4.322* 2.844* 3.532** 2.109 2.831* 3.433** 4.255** 
(3.326) (1.624) (3.368) (3.368) (1.668) (2.121) (1.215) (1.611) (1.979) (2.455) 
Education 0.905* 0.898** 0.981 0.981 0.946 0.944 0.865** 0.906* 0.883** 0.898* 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.063) (0.063) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) 
Off-farm 
employment 
1.038 1.607 1.828 1.828 0.938 1.013 0.978 1.239 0.877 0.809 
(0.338) (0.557) (0.804) (0.804) (0.320) (0.345) (0.352) (0.419) (0.305) (0.280) 
Risk aversion 0.858* 0.855* 0.929 0.929 0.825** 0.832** 0.736*** 0.781*** 0.771*** 0.760*** 
(0.072) (0.073) (0.098) (0.098) (0.074) (0.074) (0.069) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) 
Marriage length 0.974 1.008 0.982 0.982 0.978 0.973 0.991 0.991** 0.964** 0.987 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Number of other 
women in house 
1.364 2.336*** 1.304 1.304 1.976*** 1.927*** 2.004*** 1.606 1.861*** 1.412 
(0.282) (0.557) (0.383) (0.383) (0.464) (0.454) (0.457) (0.343) (0.426) (0.316) 
Ratio of children to 
total residents is 0 
0.916 1.346 2.871* 2.871* 0.729 0.683 0.593 0.542 0.924 0.444* 
(0.361) (0.562) (1.669) (1.669) (0.305) (0.286) (0.267) (0.227) (0.394) (0.190) 
Ratio of children to 
total residents  ≥ 
0.33 
1.096 2.383** 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.706 1.648* 1.010 1.002 0.719 
(0.467) (1.038) (0.505) (0.505) (0.439) (0.322) (0.749) (0.439) (0.451) (0.321) 
Lowest income 
tercile (< 17,020 
VND/day) 
0.569 0.827 0.720 0.720 0.936 0.766) 0.704 0.854 0.392** 0.427* 
(0.227) (0.347) (0.355) (0.355) (0.392) (0.323 (0.311) (0.352) (0.176) (0.187) 
Highest income 
tercile (> 22,725 
VND/day) 
1.291 1.712 1.308 1.308 1.682 1.540) 2.100 1.724 1.787 1.419 
(0.484) (0.681) (0.664) (0.664) (0.678) (0.619 (0.875) (0.676) (0.717) (0.564) 
Membership in 
unions  
1.294 0.960 1.014 1.014 0.923 0.987) 1.205 1.255 1.074 1.191 
(0.249) (0.191) (0.265) (0.265) (0.192) (0.205) (0.261) (0.255) (0.235) (0.258) 
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Notes: Odds ratios are reported in bold with their standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable equals 1 if the husband is the primary decision-maker 
(main or sole say) and equals 0 otherwise (joint or no say).  
a
 Sensitivity refers to the predictions that the dependent variable is 1, conditional on observed values of 1.  
b
 Specificity refers to the predictions that the dependent variable is 0, conditional on observed values of 0.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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 Family 
budgeting 
Saving Taking 
out small 
loans 
Repaying 
small 
loans 
Taking 
out 
medium 
loans 
Repaying 
medium 
loans 
Taking 
out large 
loans 
Repaying 
large 
loans 
Taking 
out large 
agricultur
al loans 
Repaying 
large 
agricultur
al loans 
Network-reliance:           
First-degree 
relatives 
1.146 1.086 1.413 1.413 1.195 1.209 1.234 1.201 1.110 1.259 
(0.230) (0.239) (0.337) (0.337) (0.241) (0.245) (0.268) (0.249) (0.228) (0.258) 
Extended family 0.891 0.945 0.627*** 0.627*** 0.751*** 0.732*** 0.782** 0.805** 0.813** 0.798** 
(0.083) (0.091) (0.093) (0.093) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.077) (0.076) 
Friends 0.942 0.945 1.176 1.176 0.993 1.013 1.002 1.046 0.973 0.991 
(0.089) (0.092) (0.140) (0.140) (0.096) (0.099) (0.102) (0.101) (0.095) (0.096) 
Village head 1.044 1.060 1.076 1.076 1.075 1.089 1.048 1.069 1.069 1.092 
(0.069) (0.074) (0.101) (0.101) (0.078) (0.081) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074) 
Unions 0.906 0.933 0.945 0.945 0.822** 0.828** 0.899 0.874 0.878 0.817** 
(0.075) (0.083) (0.099) (0.099) (0.073) (0.074) (0.082) (0.076) (0.080) (0.075) 
Political connections 0.974 1.006 1.130 1.130 1.053 1.074 1.037 1.035 1.019 1.038 
(0.044) (0.046) (0.091) (0.091) (0.050) (0.053) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
           
Observations 217 212 205 205 214 214 228 228 223 223 
Likelihood Ratio 
χ2(18)  
26.66* 36.43*** 36.18*** 36.18*** 43.64*** 46.58*** 41.01*** 35.54*** 34.73** 38.24*** 
McFadden’s Pseudo 
R
2
 
0.089 0.127 0.168 0.168 0.148 0.157 0.144 0.118 0.121 0.130 
Sensitivity
a
  61.39% 43.68% 95.63% 95.63% 59.60% 63.81% 33.33% 36.90% 35.06% 34.94% 
Specificity
b
 66.38% 82.40% 17.78% 17.78% 75.65% 69.72% 88.46% 85.42% 86.30% 83.57% 
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4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study has identified influencing factors of wives’ empowerment and husbands’ dominance 
in ten financial decisions – family budgeting, saving, and taking out and repaying four types of 
loans – as well as influencing factors of their bargaining power in loan decisions based on 
aggregated indices. In general, being able to speak Vietnamese, completing more education, 
living in a relatively poor household, and living in a household with more network-reliance with 
extended family increases wives' odds of being empowered in most financial decisions, whereas 
being married longer, living in a household with higher women-controlled income (proxied by 
small livestock revenue), and living in a household with a relatively high child dependency ratio 
decreases wives' odds of being empowered. We also find evidence that gendered institutions 
(proxied by birthplace and ethnicity) influence wives’ decision-making power in family 
budgeting and saving, whereas they do not for most loan decisions. Positive impacts on 
husbands’ dominance in intra-household decision-making include being married to a wife who 
was born in the district, being married to a wife who cannot speak Vietnamese, and living in a 
household with more women, whereas negative impacts include his being more risk averse and 
living in a household with greater network-reliance with extended family. Although the 
regressions analyzing sources of wives’ and husbands’ bargaining power in loan decisions based 
on aggregated indices find similar influencing factors, they demonstrate disadvantages of relying 
on aggregated indices, particularly the loss in nuanced findings and the inherent assumptions that 
sole and main decision-making have more value than joint decision-making.  
Before offering recommendations for further research and policy, we address some 
shortcomings of this analysis. First, the data does not indicate which aspects of decision-making 
about taking out or repaying loans husbands and wives are involved with. For example, when 
taking out loans there are several aspects which should be considered, such as the use of the loan, 
whether there are enough funds or assets to cover the loan in case of default, and the feasibility 
of the proposed investment. Second, respondents may not have answered truthfully about their 
decision-making roles and instead may have: answered what they thought to be culturally 
acceptable (Jejeebhoy, 2003), provided answers which do not conflict with their own personal 
beliefs on decision-making authority (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Festinger, 1957), or 
devalued their autonomy to conform to social norms (Espinal and Grasmuck, 1997; Jejeebhoy, 
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2003). Third, data availability limited the inclusion of other factors which may influence intra-
household decision-making power, such as past experiences, the household’s division of labor, 
assets held traditionally by women, assets brought into marriage, physical attractiveness, and the 
perceived need of the spouse (Allendorf, 2007; Blumberg and Coleman, 1989). Fourth, except 
for membership in unions, the other social capital proxies were measured at the household-level. 
Finally, as Kabeer (1999, p. 447) writes, “Statistical perspectives on decision-making, however, 
should be remembered for what they are: simple windows on complex realities.” 
Future research on women’s intra-household decision-making power should explore more 
institutional-level factors, such as opinions about and experiences with gendered institutions. 
Data on childcare, household responsibilities, and workloads would further enrich analyses. It 
should be emphasized that rather than relying on an aggregated index to explore influencing 
factors of intra-household decision-making power as many studies have done, each decision 
should be analyzed separately. This allows for identifying influencing factors important for 
specific decisions as well as for more specific policy recommendations to be made. Moreover, 
important findings may be lost altogether in an aggregated index.  
The results can be used to provide policy recommendations which may increase wives’ 
empowerment in intra-household financial decisions. First, ensuring that women can speak 
Vietnamese may have the greatest impact on wives’ empowerment. In nearly every financial 
decision examined, the ability to speak Vietnamese has a strong and positive impact on the wife's 
odds of being empowered. Second, requiring the completion of more education may also 
increase wives’ empowerment since education has a strong impact on wives’ empowerment in 
nearly every financial decision. Education policies need not be gender specific: for most 
financial decisions, absolute changes in wives’ educational level influenced their empowerment, 
whereas relative changes compared to their husband did not. 
Because influencing factors of various financial decisions were examined separately, we are 
able to recommend policies which may improve wives’ empowerment for specific decisions. 
Here, we do so for four financial decisions: taking out and repaying large loans and large 
agricultural loans. The results found that off-farm employment increase the odds of women being 
empowered for most decisions related to larger loans. Therefore, women’s employment 
opportunities should be expanded. However, we remain cautious in our promotion of off-farm 
employment opportunities: It may be more favorable for wives’ empowerment to promote at-
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home employment opportunities, such as small-scale enterprises located in their home or a 
neighbor’s home (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). This is because changes in intra-household decision-
making processes may not result from changes in women’s employment opportunities (Goetz 
and Gupta, 1996): gendered institutions may also influence empowerment. For example, unless 
gender norms change so that household and childcare tasks are shared among other household 
members or society, off-farm employment may overburden women through higher workloads 
given (Ackerly, 1995; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Montgomery et al., 1996), especially given the 
finding that child dependency ratios impact on the odds of wives’ being empowered for larger 
loan decisions. We also recommend to lengthen the school day and require that lunch breaks are 
taken at school since these changes may have both short-term and long-term impacts on women’s 
empowerment. The short-term impact is that school may serve as a childcare function and 
therefore longer school hours and lunch taken at school may allow women more time to 
participate in financial decision-making processes. The long-term impact is that longer school 
days may assist the next generation of women since wives completing more education were 
found to have higher odds of being empowered in nearly every financial decision examined in 
this paper. These recommendations are targeted to the study area; however, they may be 
applicable to other areas with similar characteristics.  
Our other policy recommendations are more specific to the financial sector. Although very few 
women borrow from formal institutions and less than 8% are primary decision-makers for large 
loans and large agricultural loans, we caution against targeting women for credit programs since 
the evidence is mixed in terms of whether women  participating in financial programs targeting 
women increases their empowerment and well-being (Ashraf et al., 2010; Garikipati, 2008; 
Kabeer, 2001). Instead, policies and information about financial services should be directed 
toward both husbands and wives since the majority of decisions about large loans are made 
jointly. Moreover, programs which include husbands and wives together may be seen as a less 
drastic change in existing decision-making regimes compared to programs which target women 
only. Based on the finding that wives living in households with relatively high child dependency 
ratios have lower odds of being empowered for decisions about larger loans, improving the 
accessibility of formal credit and reducing the time needed to conduct financial transactions may 
improve their decision-making power. For example, conducting bank transactions via cellular 
phones or mobile bank vehicles would require significantly less time. In Yen Chau, every one or 
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two months a mobile bank vehicle from the VBSP visits the commune center, which means that 
people still have to travel far to reach these services. To allow bank services to be more 
accessible, mobile bank vehicles should visit villages if road conditions allow, or at least park 
alongside the national highway near side roads to remote villages. In addition, inefficiencies and 
bureaucratic red tape at the VBARD, the only bank with an office in the district, should be 
reduced; making deposits and withdrawing money, for example, from the VBARD is an 
extremely slow process and forms are rejected for trivial mistakes. 
There is no simple or quick fix to improving wives’ empowerment in intra-household 
decisions. Policies may require years to achieve goals such as those aiming to improve education 
and language skills. Moreover, group effects and gendered institutions may prevent women from 
having more clout in intra-household financial decisions because women may follow existing 
norms and behaviors of other women, which may even have multiplier effects (Fletschner and 
Carter, 2008; Mabsout and Staveren, 2010). Because sources of empowerment from the 
individual-, household-, and institutional-level may be reinforced by one another, a multi-level 
approach is critical to improving wives’ empowerment in financial decisions.  
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Risk preferences and women’s empowerment influence how decisions are made and have 
tangible outcomes, yet there exists no consensus on their determinants or measurement. Risk is 
central to many aspects of economic life including decisions about insurance, consumption, 
income, savings, and portfolio choice (Barry and Robison, 1975; Pratt, 1964; Sandmo, 1969, 
1970, 1971). The poor and non-poor alike face complex risks such as credit availability, weather, 
the general economy, and contractual arrangements (Barry and Robison, 2001). High levels of 
risk aversion are cited as a major cause of poverty traps since risk averse individuals pursue low-
risk, low-return livelihood strategies (Dercon, 1996; Lybbert and McPeak, 2012; Morduch, 1994; 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). Women's empowerment is also important for a variety of 
outcomes including child nutrition, food security, and education (Allendorf, 2007; Doss, 19966; 
Hashemi et al., 1996; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Quisimbing and Maluccio, 2000; B. Sen and 
Hulme, 2004; Smith and Haddad, 2000; Thomas, 1990). Moreover, women's empowerment has 
intrinsic value (Kabeer, 1999; G. Sen and Batliwala, 2000; The World Bank, 2011) and is 
regarded as vital for achieving poverty reduction and human rights (Malhotra and Schuler, 2005). 
In Chapter 1 we demonstrated that both risk aversion and low empowerment of women are 
intricately linked within poverty traps.  
This thesis aims to close knowledge gaps on the determinants and measurements of risk 
preferences and women's empowerment. Improved methods to elicit risk preferences and intra-
household decision-making power as well as better understanding of their determinants can 
allow development policy to better match smallholders’ risk preferences and to increase women’s 
empowerment. In the remainder of this final chapter of the thesis, we provide a summary of the 
main results and our contributions to the existing literature, discuss methodological and data 
limitations, and offer recommendations for future research and policy. 
5.1 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN RESULTS 
In Chapter 2 we compared five widely applied methods to elicit risk preferences (a non-
hypothetical lottery game called the multiple price list (MPL) technique, financial risk tolerance 
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question, self-assessment scale, and hypothetical income and inheritance gambles) and four 
locally-adapted methods (yield and price gambles of the main cash crop, maize, and the main 
food crop, rice) and examined influencing factors of risk preferences based on each of the 
elicitation methods. This is the first study to elicit risk preferences in a developing country from 
such a wide range of techniques as well as to examine whether various facets of social capital 
influence risk preferences. There is no consensus on how socio-economic characteristics 
influence risk preferences since some studies have found that risk preferences differ significantly 
based on gender (e.g., Gilliam et al., 2010), education (e.g., Harrison et al., 2007), age (e.g., 
Tanaka et al., 2010), number of dependents (e.g., Hallahan et al., 2004), shocks (e.g., Guiso et 
al., 2011) and/or income (e.g., Cohen and Einav, 2007), while others have found no significant 
relationship (cf. Harrison et al. (2007) for gender; Anderson and Mellor (2009) for education; 
Holt and Laury (2002) for age; Picazo-Tadeo and Wall (2011) for number of dependents; 
Chiappori and Paiella (2011) for shocks; and Tanaka et al. (2010) for income). Our results 
showed that respondents are, on average, very risk averse. Moreover, correlations between most 
elicitation methods were statistically highly significant, although most were weak. Thus, risk 
preference measures related to different decision domains should be compared with caution. We 
found that significant determinants of risk aversion across most elicitation methods are female 
gender, older age, lower education, higher network-reliance with first-degree relatives, lower 
network-reliance with extended family, fewer connections to local authorities, agreement with 
norms of sharing gains with others, and lack of agreement with norms of helping others who take 
a risk and fail. Therefore, we found evidence that people's risk preferences are embedded in 
social institutions and that strong familial attachments may discourage individuals from taking 
risks. A major contribution to the literature is the analysis of how different facets of social capital 
affect risk preferences and the comparison of influencing factors across nine elicitation 
techniques.  
In Chapter 3 we examined the stability of risk preferences elicited from the same respondents 
seven to eight months apart, first in the lean season and then in the maize harvest season, using 
three widely applied elicitation methods (a lottery game, financial risk tolerance question, and 
self-assessment scale) and four locally-adapted methods (yield and price gambles of maize and 
rice). This is the first study to elicit risk preferences over time in a developing country as well as 
the first to examine whether various facets of social capital affect risk preference changes over 
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time.
31
 The literature offers no consensus on whether risk preferences remain stable over time 
and what determinants affect its instability since only a handful of studies exist which have 
analyzed risk preference stability over time and findings vary (Andersen et al., 2008; 
Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008; Chiappori and Paiella, 2011; Doss et al., 2008; Guiso et al., 
2011; Harrison et al., 2005; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Sahm, 2008; Vlaev et al., 2009). 
Using a conceptual framework, we hypothesized that both time-variant and time-invariant 
variables, including several proxies of social capital and other socio-economic characteristics, 
may cause risk preferences to change from the lean season to the harvest season given the 
different living conditions in these seasons, such as the availability of food and cash. To better 
understand how shocks affect risk preferences, we examined both the time component – i.e., how 
soon the shock had occurred before risk preferences were elicited – and the specific 
characteristic – i.e., if the shock were a drought, livestock death, another covariate shock, or 
idiosyncratic – of shocks. The results indicated that for all but one assessment method – the 
financial risk tolerance question – risk preferences were not stable across seasons. Respondents 
became less risk averse in the harvest season according to the lottery game and self-assessment 
scale, yet became more risk averse according to the rice and maize gambles. Correlations 
between risk preferences across seasons in the lottery game, financial risk tolerance question, 
and self-assessment scale were weak, while those in the maize and rice gambles were stronger. 
Characteristics which remained stable across the seasons, such as gender, education and some 
social capital proxies, as well as characteristics which varied, such as idiosyncratic and covariate 
shock impacts, were significant in determining changes in risk preferences, although 
determinants varied by elicitation method. Contrary to expectations, impacts from more recent 
shocks did not have a greater influence on risk preference changes. Furthermore, livestock death 
impacts had no significant effect on risk preference changes, although losses from other 
covariate shocks (excluding drought) and idiosyncratic shocks did. Although the relative impact 
of shocks on risk preference changes is small relative to the estimated losses incurred, if a 
household were to experience several severe shocks, this may lead to significant increases in risk 
aversion over time which may impact livelihood strategies. Factors determining risk preference 
changes across seasons based on the two self-assessment methods (the financial risk tolerance 
                                                 
31
 Doss et al. (2008) measure self-identified rankings of risk perceptions over time in East Africa.   
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question and self-assessment scale) tended to have the opposite effect compared to the methods 
involving gambles and were often contrary to expectations. Thus, this chapter provided further 
evidence of the importance of the decision domain and elicitation method when analyzing risk 
preferences.  
Chapter 4 identified influencing factors of wives' and husbands' intra-household decision-
making power in saving, family budgeting, and taking out and repaying four different loans. 
Based on theories and previous research, we hypothesized that individual-, household-, and 
institutional-level factors may be influential for intra-household financial decision-making. 
Although several studies have explored the impact of exposure to credit or savings programs on 
women's empowerment (Ashraf et al., 2010; Hashemi et al., 1996; Holvoet, 2005; Swain and 
Wallentin, 2007), none have examined influencing factors of women’s empowerment in intra-
household decision-making processes for taking out and repaying loans of different sizes. Other 
studies, for example, have examined influencing factors of women’s empowerment in decisions 
about credit in general, household expenditures, and/or mobility, often combining various 
decision domains together (Allendorf, 2007; Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Garikipati, 2008; 
Kantor, 2003; Pitt et al., 2006; Rahman and Rao, 2004; Yusof and Duasa, 2010). We found that 
sources of decision-making power vary by financial decision and demonstrated that important 
findings are lost altogether in aggregated indices composed of several decisions. Being able to 
speak Vietnamese, completing more education, living in a relatively poor household, and having 
more network-reliance with extended family increased wives' decision-making power in most 
financial decisions, whereas being married longer, living in a household with a relatively high 
child dependency ratio, and living in a household with greater women-controlled income 
(proxied by small livestock revenue) decreased wives' odds of being empowered. Although this 
latter result may seem counterintuitive, previous studies and follow-up interviews suggest that 
the more successful the woman's domain becomes, the greater the chance men take it over. 
Advantages of asking about specific loans rather than loans in general were evident: We found 
stark and important differences between decision-making power and its sources in small loans 
versus larger loans. 
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5.2 DATA LIMITATIONS  
There are some methodological and data limitations of this thesis. The main limitation is that 
risk aversion and decision-making power may not be known even to respondents themselves and 
may be subject to emotions and moods at a particular state of time (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011; 
Leith and Baumeister, 1996; Lerner and Keltner, 2011; Slovic et al., 2004). Moreover, particular 
events may be remembered by some respondents more than others and may also be reinforced by 
others' experiences (Takarangi and Strange, 2010). For example, when a respondent was asked 
about their willingness to take risks for rice prices, they may have more vividly remembered 
when they had been negatively impacted by higher rice prices than when they had benefited from 
lower rice prices. Furthermore, negative memories may be more vivid if others had commented 
on the event. In regards to eliciting decision-making power, respondents may, for example, have 
remembered events in which they had greater roles in decision-making processes and may have 
tended to forget events in which they had smaller roles. Thus, memory, emotions, and others' 
experiences may have influenced responses in this study. Nevertheless, because we were unable 
to observe actual decision-making processes about risks and intra-household decision-making 
processes, we must rely on other methods.  
There exist limitations to some explanatory variables of risk preferences and decision-making 
power examined in this study. For example, in Chapters 2 and 3 we included shock impacts as an 
explanatory variable of risk preferences, yet respondents may not have been able to accurately 
estimate losses from shocks. Moreover, the time in which the shock occurred may not be the best 
indicator of when the impact of the shocks was actually felt. In Chapter 4, data limitations 
prevented measuring the relative share of wives' and husbands' income in household income 
because of lack of data on individual income earners in the household. Instead, we relied on a 
proxy of women-controlled income (small livestock revenues in 2011) based on qualitative 
evidence that women tend to be responsible for small livestock. In addition, we were unable to 
compute a share of small livestock revenues in total household income for 2011 because we 
lacked good quality income data for that year. Thus, for future research we recommend 
collecting data on the division of labor and on who controls different sources of income.  
Although a number of determinants of risk preferences, changes in risk preferences over time, 
and intra-household decision-making power were significant in several regression analyses 
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across the various elicitation methods, there are unanswered questions on remaining 
determinants. The effect of most past experiences is particularly neglected in this study. In 
Chapter 2, we briefly explored the influence of parental risk aversion on respondents' risk 
preferences years later, yet the measure was rudimentary since it relied on respondent's own 
assessment of their parents' risk preferences. Risk preferences may be influenced by experiences 
from people other than parents, such as other family members and neighbors. It is a challenging 
task to examine how past experiences affect risk preferences through quantitative survey 
methods. If the impact of past experiences on risk preferences is to be researched, we 
recommend a qualitative research approach, such as in-depth interviews on experiences with 
risks and investments. Similar problems hold true for examining the influence of experiences on 
intra-household decision-making power. For example, does a woman who grew up in a 
household where her mother had a low-level of decision-making power counter or imitate her 
mother's role? Again, qualitative research could help uncover influences of the past.  
Despite these above data limitations, this thesis represents an important contribution to the 
literature given its analysis of a wide range of risk preference elicitation techniques as well as its 
identification of determinants of risk preferences and decision-making power.  Limitations to the 
elicitation methods and recommendations for future research are discussed below.  
5.3 LIMITATIONS TO THE ELICITATION METHODS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Because this research is the first to elicit risk preferences and analyze their determinants from 
such a wide range of techniques, as well as the first to examine how various proxies of social 
capital affect risk preferences and intra-household decision-making power, we are able to 
recommend more suitable and informative methods for measuring risk preferences and intra-
household decision-making power as well as for identifying influencing factors of risk 
preferences and decision-making power. 
This thesis revealed that social capital has varying effects on risk preferences and intra-
household decision-making power depending on its proxy. For example, different types of norms 
and network-reliance with varying social networks had unique effects on risk preferences and 
decision-making power. Thus, we recommend using several proxies of social capital rather than 
only one. Moreover, the most widely applied proxy of social capital – the number of 
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organizations a respondent is a member of – may not be applicable in particular areas. For 
example, this proxy is not very suitable in Vietnam given the highly bureaucratic nature and 
strong governmental ties in organizations (Gray, 1999; Kerkvliet et al., 2003).    
Although the MPL involving non-hypothetical lottery gambles is considered the gold standard 
to elicit risk preferences, is incentive compatible, and lacks framing effects, it has many 
disadvantages. For example, it measures windfall gains which are not applicable to most 
smallholder farmers, it is expensive since training costs are higher and payouts are non-
hypothetical, it is time-intensive to manage logistically, it involves high time inputs to explain to 
respondents, it requires numeracy, and it is more difficult for respondents to comprehend than the 
other methods since it involves varying probabilities. In addition, luck and superstitions may 
influence choices (Knight, 1921) and it is not possible to detect the seriousness of responses. 
Some respondents appeared to answer the questions carefully, while others did not and viewed 
the gambles as being pre-determined based on luck or "just for fun" since they involved tossing a 
ten-sided die which some found entertaining. Distinguishing serious responses from non-serious 
ones is a difficult task and may be impossible using quantitative survey methods. For these 
reasons, we do not recommend the MPL for eliciting risk preferences, particularly in a 
developing country. Nevertheless, this method may be suitable in a developed country among 
educated respondents, yet the payouts should be sufficiently high to be significant for 
respondents which may have implications for the research budget.  
We also elicited risk preferences using two methods which rely on respondents to assess their 
own risk preferences – the financial risk tolerance question and self-assessment scale. A major 
disadvantage of these two methods is that they do not elicit a CRRA which can be compared 
across contexts. Moreover, in Chapter 3 we found that determinants of changes in risk 
preferences across seasons based on these two self-assessment methods tended to have the 
opposite effect compared to the other elicitation methods and that the effects were often contrary 
to expectations and theoretical foundations. Some explanations for this anomaly are: responses 
may have reflected how respondents would like their risk preferences to be or how they would 
like others to view their risk preferences to be rather than what they actually are; and responses 
may be a reflection of confidence in how past situations were handled rather than a reflection of 
how future situations may be handled. These findings question the validity of these two 
assessment techniques. In addition, the financial risk tolerance question is not satisfactory 
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because of the dual thrust of response categories, the unfamiliar nature of financial investments 
for many, and the problematic conversion of responses into numerical categories of risk aversion 
(Hanna and Lindamood, 2004). The self-assessment scale may be a good alternative to the MPL 
and financial risk tolerance question since it has behavioral validity with responses to the MPL, 
is easier to administer and comprehend, is less expensive, and can be adapted to different 
scenarios (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2012) to assess preferences for different types of risks such as for 
income, food security, and investment decisions. Nevertheless, changes are necessary if the self-
assessment scale is to assess risk preferences more accurately. The easily identifiable middle 
category, 5, on the scale from 0 to 10 should be removed and the time component (i.e., if the 
measurement is based on recent past, current, or near future situations) should be more explicit. 
Hypothetical gambles were also applied. The inheritance gambles were not applicable to 
respondents since very few have expectations of receiving a substantial inheritance. Although, 
the hypothetical income gambles have several disadvantages, such as framing effects, difficulty 
among some respondents in understanding the scenarios, and requiring more time to explain than 
the self-assessment scale, the income gambles involve potential losses which are familiar to 
most. The income gambles should be adapted to better reflect smallholders’ lives, such as by 
posing questions about a decision to reallocate land to a new cash crop with possible gains and 
losses. We also tested four locally-adapted hypothetical gambles involving prices and yields of 
the main cash crop (maize) and food crop (rice). In our opinion, the maize and rice gambles 
present the greatest potential for assessing risk preferences of smallholders since they elicit a 
CRRA which is comparable across studies and contexts, were found to be relatively easy for 
respondents to comprehend, and involve decisions which are more applicable and familiar. In 
addition, the method could be adapted to other regions of the world based on local cash and food 
crops. Improvements in these gambles, however, are necessary: We recommend altering the 
gambles to create more refined CRRA intervals by including additional choices which are closer 
in value, such as differences of 5% or 10%, rather than 15%.  
Given the varying degrees and influencing factors of risk aversion found using different 
elicitation methods, we recommend that future research also elicit risk preferences via several 
methods rather than rely on one method only. Respondent fatigue, however, should be considered 
as well as the order in which risk preferences are assessed. If the MPL technique is applied, we 
recommend that respondents first select their responses to the MPL and then answer questions 
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from the other elicitation techniques before payouts from the MPL are determined: Determining 
payouts from the MPL before the other elicitation techniques are answered may bias responses in 
the other methods. 
To measure intra-household decision-making power, we recommend that future research avoid 
relying on an index composed of several decisions. Instead, each decision should be individually 
analyzed. If possible, the husband and wife should be interviewed separately about their 
decision-making power within the household. This would allow for more robust findings and 
provide a more in-depth analysis of intra-household dynamics. Moreover, we recommend that 
questions about intra-household decision-making power should state that the question refers to 
the past few cases in which that decision was made. This may garner more accurate responses by 
allowing respondents to reflect on the past few cases only, rather than eliciting more generalized 
answers. We also emphasize that researchers should inquire about decisions meaningful to 
women's status in the household – having decision-making power over shampoo purchases is 
much different from that over credit decisions. In addition, qualitative research on wives' and 
husbands' roles in intra-household financial decision-making can improve quantitative research 
as well as provide important insights on its own.  
In summary, we are wary of accepting lottery gambles as the gold standard and suggest that 
given the importance of measuring risk aversion, more research eliciting risk preferences using 
different measures needs to be conducted similar to past work on finding appropriate methods to 
elicit household income through Living Standards Measurement Studies in which there were 
many tests of different versions of the questionnaire. The quest for better methods should be 
continued.  
5.4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of this thesis can be used to target safety nets, encourage investments, and improve 
women's clout in financial decision-making. These recommendations may be able to help 
households and individuals avoid poverty traps or escape them, as well as help both poor and 
non-poor households improve their livelihoods, achieve tangible outcomes like improved child 
nutrition and education, and make better investment and consumption decisions.  
There are several policy recommendations stemming from the result in Chapter 2 and 3 that 
most respondents are very risk averse. Given that the current livelihood strategy – maize 
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production on steep slopes which highly degrades the soil – is perceived by farmers in Yen Chau 
to be a low-risk income earning activity, respondents should be supported to adopt new 
production systems which do not entail as much environmental degradation, yet which may be 
perceived as risky. Support for adopting new production systems could be in the form of credit, 
subsidized inputs, and local field trails. Opportunities for smallholders to participate in the 
hands-on operations of local field trials may help them overcome risk aversion to new production 
systems and technologies, increasing the likelihood of adoption (Feder et al., 1985; Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 1995 in Ravallion, 2002). The results also found that specific socio-economic 
characteristics determine increases in risk aversion. Furthermore, based on the finding in Chapter 
3 that shocks can cause individuals to become even more risk averse, such policies may reduce 
the increasing effect of shocks on risk aversion by helping households mitigate the influence of 
shocks. Policy options to help the poor escape poverty should improve opportunities and help 
prevent the non-poor from falling into poverty traps from external shocks by guaranteeing a 
subsistence level of consumption and helping households rely less on low-risk, low-return 
livelihood strategies (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003). These policy options include ex-post 
consumption credit and other credit (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989, 1990; 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Townsend, 1995; Zeller et al., 1997; Zeller and Sharma, 
2000;  Zimmerman and Carter, 2003), agricultural or weather insurance (Barrett et al., 2006; 
Barnett et al., 2008; Lybbert et al., 2004; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993), improved health 
insurance and health care, effective cash or food transfer programs such as safety nets (Barrett 
and Swallow, 2006; Chronic Poverty Research Center, 2009; Dasgupta, 1997; Naschold, 2012), 
irrigation and agricultural research to reduce yield risk (Barrett and Swallow, 2006; Barrett et al., 
2006; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003), and infrastructure investments to help better link areas to 
markets and reduce price fluctuations from local shocks (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003; 
Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). Improvements in education, employment, and family planning 
would also help households escape and remain out of poverty traps (Woolard and Klasen, 2005) 
as well as have other beneficial outcomes such as improved livelihoods and reduced childcare 
requirements.  
Developing additional arenas to expand social capital may also help households. We found that 
more reliance on family has an increasing effect on risk aversion, while that with extended 
family, friends, and the village head has a decreasing effect on risk aversion. Social capital has 
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the potential to help households cope with shocks (Adato et al., 2006), yet a barrier to the further 
development of social capital in Vietnam is a government regulation requiring that registered 
associations have a bank account with a balance between $6,000 and $10,000 (Uhrig, 1995 in 
Gray, 1999). The result of this regulation is that small organizations, particularly those at the 
village-level, are unable to be recognized. We believe that this inhibits the formation of social 
capital in Vietnam, given that already existing organizations are largely bureaucratic and strongly 
connected to the government (Gray, 1999; Kerkvliet et al., 2003). If this regulation were lifted, 
smallholders could reduce their risk by forming organizations which could improve their 
livelihoods, such as rotating savings and credit organizations, microfinance institutes, and 
producer organizations to procure inputs at lower rates (Barrett and Swallow, 2006). 
The findings in Chapter 4 can be applied to provide policy recommendations to increase wives' 
intra-household decision-making power for specific financial decisions. These include ensuring 
fluency in Vietnamese, increasing education, supporting at-home employment opportunities, 
lengthening the school day, and requiring that children eat lunch at school. Recommendations 
specific to the formal financial sector are to target financial services to both husbands and wives, 
offer mobile banking, and reduce red tape for conducting financial transactions. These 
recommendations may also yield tangible outcomes important for child nutrition and education 
based on previous research (Allendorf, 2007; Quisimbing and Maluccio, 2000; B. Sen and 
Hulme, 2004; Thomas, 1990). Because sources of empowerment from the individual-, 
household-, and institutional-levels may be mutually reinforcing, a multi-level approach is 
critical.  
To conclude, comparing a variety of methods to elicit risk preferences and intra-household 
decision-making power and examining their influencing factors has shown the importance of 
using a variety of techniques and allowed us to provide specific research recommendations to 
better identify risk preferences and decision-making power as well as to provide policy 
recommendations relevant to development: the status quo for measuring risk preferences and 
decision-making power should be re-examined and support should encourage the adoption of 
new production systems, help households better cope with shocks, and increase women's clout in 
financial decisions, thereby opening the door to new livelihood strategies.  
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6 APPENDICES 
In the appendices, we include sections from the questionnaire applicable to this thesis.   
6.1 POVERTY PERCEPTIONS 
Perception of characteristics of poverty 
 What do you think are the main 
characteristics of a poor household? 
Please give up to 5 characteristics 
and rank them by importance, starting 
with the most important one. (Code 1) 
What do you think are the main 
characteristics of a well-off 
household? Please give up to 5 
characteristics and rank them by 
importance, starting with the most 
important one. (Code 2) 
Most important    
2
nd
 most 
important  
  
3
rd
 most 
important  
  
4
th
 most 
important  
  
5
th
 most 
important  
  
 
 
Perception of causes of (chronic) poverty 
 What do you think are the most 
important causes for a household to be 
poor?  
Please give up to 5 causes and rank 
them by importance, starting with the 
most important one. (Code 3) 
What do you think are the most 
important causes for a household to 
be well-off?  
Please give up to 5 causes and rank 
them by importance, starting with the 
most important one. (Code 4) 
Most important    
2
nd
 most 
important  
  
3
rd
 most 
important  
  
4
th
 most 
important  
  
5
th
 most 
important  
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Perception of causes of poverty dynamics 
 What do you think are the most 
important causes that could make a 
non-poor household fall into 
poverty?  
Please give up to 5 causes and rank 
them by importance, starting with the 
most important one. (Code 5) 
What do you think are the most 
important causes that could make a 
poor household escape poverty 
(become better off)?  
Please give up to 5 causes and rank 
them by importance, starting with the 
most important one. (Code 6) 
Most important    
2
nd
 most 
important  
  
3
rd
 most 
important  
  
4
th
 most 
important  
  
5
th
 most 
important  
  
 
 184  
Code 1: Characteristics of poor households Code 3: Causes of poverty Code 5: Causes of falling into poverty 
1=Shortage of land 1=Shortage of land 1=Drought 
2=No irrigable land 2=No irrigable land 2=Flooding/landslide 
3=Poor quality of land (low fertility, steep slopes) 3=Poor quality of land (low fertility, steep slopes) 3=Declining soil fertility 
4=No large livestock (cattle, buffalo) 4=Poor roads/poor access to markets 4=Output price decrease 
5=Temporary food shortages 5=Poor access to credit 5=Input price increase 
6=Poor housing condition 6=Poor access to agricultural extension 6=Death/illness of a working household member 
7=Poor access to credit 7=Lack of family labor 7=Expenses for ceremonies (funeral, wedding) 
8=Often indebted 8=Low level of education 8=Alcoholism 
9=Large share of dependent household members 9=Lack of farming experience 9=Bad habits (e.g. gambling, wasteful life style) 
10=Low level of education 10=Poor social network 10=Taking a risk that fails 
11=No/poor knowledge of national language 11=Being member of ethnic minority 11=Other (specify): 
12=No voice in local decision-making 12=Poor health  
13=Other (specify): 13=Laziness  
 14=Alcoholism  
 15=Bad habits (e.g. gambling)  
 16=Generally adverse climatic conditions   
 17=Not willing to take a risk  
 18=Other (specify)  
Code 2: Characteristics of wealthy households Code 4: Causes of wealth Code 6: Causes of escaping poverty 
1=Abundance of land 1=Generally favourable climatic conditions 1=Support by local social network 
2=Availability of irrigable land 2=Abundance of land 2=Support by remote social network or remittances 
3=Good quality of land (fertile soils, relatively flat) 3=Availability of irrigable land 3=Government support 
4=Some large livestock (cattle, buffalo) 4=Good quality of land (fertile soils, relatively flat) 4=NGO support 
5=No food shortages 5=Good roads/good access to markets 5=Windfall monetary gains (e.g. inheritance) 
6=Sound housing condition 6=Easy access to credit 6=Being hard-working 
7=Easy access to credit 7=Easy access to agricultural extension 7=Being thrifty 
8=No debts 8=Abundance of family labor  
9=Small share of dependent household members 9=Relatively high level of education 10=Taking a risk that pays off 
10=Relatively high level of education 10=Sound farming experience 11=Other (specify): 
11=Knowledge of the national language 11=Good social network  
12=Influence in local decision-making 12=Being Kinh  
13=Other (specify): 13=Strong health  
 14=Being hard-working  
 15=Being thrifty  
 16=Generally good climatic conditions   
 17=Willing to take a risk  
 18=Other (specify)  
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6.2  SHOCKS 
Interviewer: Explain to the respondent first that a shock is an event that led to a serious reduction in your asset holdings, and/or caused 
your household income to fall substantially, and/or led to a significant reduction in consumption. 
 
Shocks since January 1
st
, 2012 (or since last interview date in case of second survey round in 2011 conducted in Nov./Dec., 2011).  
4.1.1 
Which 
shocks 
have 
affected 
your 
househol
d since 
the 
beginning 
of last 
year, i.e., 
since 
January 
01, 2010? 
 
 
 
 
(Code 1) 
4.1.2 
When did 
the shock 
occur? 
 
 
Note: for 
home 
consumed 
crops take 
harvest 
time, for 
cash 
crops take 
time when 
most 
produce is 
sold 
(month 
/year) 
4.1.3 
 How 
wide-
sprea
d was 
the 
shock
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Code 
2) 
4.1.4 
Can you 
estimate the 
amount of 
loss to your 
household 
without 
considering 
methods 
taken to 
reduce the 
shock? 
 
Note: For 
lost/destroye
d items take 
replacement 
value.  
  (‘000 VND) 
4.1.5. What did you do to deal 
with the consequences of the 
shock? 
 
Note: If 91, 92, or 93 >> 2.1.6.  
If not 91, 92, or 93 >>2.1.7. 
4.1.6.  
Was the off-
farm 
employmen
t you 
increased 
agricultural, 
non-
agricultural 
or both? 
 
 
4.1.7. 
What was 
the net 
value of 
all coping 
activities
? 
 
4.1.8 
Did the 
shock lead to 
a reduction 
of your 
household’s 
level of 
regular 
consumption
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1 = yes,  
2 = no) 
 
Note: If yes 
>> 2.1.8. 
4.1.9 
Did the 
shock lead to 
a reduction 
of your 
household’s 
level of food 
consumption
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1 = yes, 
 2 = no) 
4.1.10 
How long 
did it take 
your 
household to 
economicall
y recover 
from the 
shock? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Code 4) 
4.1.5.1 
Most 
importan
t coping 
activity 
 
 
 
(Code 3) 
4.1.5.2 
2
nd
 most 
importan
t coping 
activity 
 
 
 
(Code 3) 
4.1.5.3 
3
rd
 most 
importan
t coping 
activity 
 
 
 
(Code 3) 
1 = 
agricultural 
2 = non-
agricultural 
3 = both 
(‘000 
VND) 
1         /           
2...            
 
EVENT 
ID 
Which other major events have positively or 
negatively affected your households’ asset base 
and/or income since January 1
st
, 2010?  (Code 5) 
When did the 
event occur? 
(month/yr) 
What was the value of the asset/amount 
of money received by the household from 
this event? (‘000 VND) 
What was the amount paid 
by the household for this 
event?  (‘000 VND) 
1  /   
2...     
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Code 1: Type of shock  
A) Natural shocks 
 
E) Criminal shocks 
20: Destruction or theft of tools or inputs 
21: Theft of valuables (e.g. jewellery, motorbike) 
22: Theft/destruction of crops 
23: Theft of animals 
 
F) Idiosyncratic shocks 
24: Illness of working HH member 
25: Death of working HH member 
26: Illness of dependent HH member 
27: Death of dependent HH member 
28: Loss of job 
29: Divorce 
30: Payment of fine/legal dispute  
31: Other___________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
Code 2: How widespread 
1: Affected only my HH 
2: Affected some HH in the village 
3: Affected all HH in the village 
4: Affected many HH in the district 
 
Code 3: Coping activity 
1: Did nothing 
2: Used own monetary savings 
31: Sold livestock to someone within village 
32: Sold livestock to someone outside village 
41: Sold household assets to someone within village 
42: Sold household assets to someone outside village 
51: Sold farm equipment to someone within village 
52: Sold farm equipment to someone outside village 
61: Borrowed in cash or in-kind from friends/relatives 
within village at low or at zero interest rate 
62: Borrowed in cash or in-kind from friends/relatives 
outside village at low or at zero interest rate 
 
 
 
 
 
71: Borrowed in cash or in-kind from informal sources 
(such as moneylender, shopkeeper, trader, landlord) 
within village at high interest rate 
72: Borrowed in cash or in-kind from informal sources 
(such as moneylender, shopkeeper, trader, landlord) 
outside village at high interest rate 
8.    Borrowed from bank located/based outside village 
91: Increased off-farm employment within village  
92: Increased off-farm employment outside village 
(without temporary migration) 
93: Increased off-farm employment (with temporary 
migration of  one HH member) 
94: Increased off-farm employment (with temporary 
migration of several HH members) 
10: Received government aid 
11: Received remittances/gifts from people within village 
15: Received remittances/gifts from people outside 
village 
12: Change in agricultural practice (e.g. input use, change 
in 
pursued activities, changes in marketing strategy) 
(specify): 
_________________________________________ 
13: Postponed the purchase of an asset 
14: Other 
(specify)_________________________________ 
 
Code 4: Time to recover 
1: Less than 1 year 
2: Approximately 1 year 
3: Not yet recovered 
4: Not applicable, no recovery time  
 
Code 5: Major event 
1: Wedding 
4: Inheritance 
2: Received major funds/assets (specify): 
_____________________________________ 
3: Other (specify) ______________________________ 
1: Drought 
2: Flood 
3: Landslide 
4: Fire outbreak 
 
 
B) Agricultural production shocks 
5: Yield loss due to pests/diseases 
6: Crop loss during storage 
7: Animal death 
 
C) Market shocks 
Agricultural (unprocessed goods): 
8: Substantial increase in input prices 
9: Substantial decline in output prices 
10: Inability to sell agricultural 
products 
11: Lack in working capital (credit) 
 
Non-agricultural (includes processed 
goods and resale of agricultural 
goods):  
12: Decrease in demand 
13: Decrease in sales price 
14: Increase of production costs 
15: Lack in working capital (credit) 
16: Total business failure 
 
D) Political shock 
17: Land redistributed by government 
18: Forced migration/resettlement 
19: Forced financial 
contributions/taxation 
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6.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL: MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS 
We want to ask now questions about the associations in which you or members of your 
household participate and has membership, including communist party, mass organisation or 
any other kind of organisation. 
 
(Ask the question for each member over 15 who is present in the HH for at least one month.If 
a member has membership in several organizations, then enter the HH ID several times in 
the first column and fill a line for each organization he participates in) 
 
  3.1.1. 
ID of HH member 
older than 15 an a 
member of HH for at 
least 1 month in past 12 
months 
   
 (use ID from family 
roster) 
3.1.2. 
What type of 
organization does 
this HH member 
participate in? 
 3.1.3. 
Does this HH member 
have a position in the 
organization? How 
active is the member in 
this organization? 
 3.1.4.                                  
During the past 12 months, did 
your hh make contributions or pay 
fees to this organization, excluding 
small food contributions? 
 
11 = Yes, in cash 
12 = Yes, in kind (labour...) 
13 = Yes, in cash and kind 
2 = No 
(code 1) (code 2) 
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Code 1 type of organization 
Mass organisation 
1 = Farmer Union  
2 = Women Union  
3 = Youth Union 
4 = Veteran Union  
5 = Fatherland Front  
6 = Eldery Union  
 
NGO providing services 
7 = NGO providing extension service 
8 = NGO providing microfinance services 
9 = Other NGO (family planning, health 
care, school education, and services for any 
other social sector) 
 
Financial organization 
10 = VBSP Credit group 
11 = Other formal Credit group 
12 = Other informal credit/finance group 
 
 
 
  
 
Agriculture/trade organization 
14 = Extension club 
15 = Cooperative  
16 = Labour / worker union  
17 = Professional association  
18 = Trade union  
  
 
Political organization 
20 = Communist Party 
33 = People’s Council  
21 = People’s committee 
22=  Village board  
23 = Ethnic committee  
 
Other groups/organizations 
13 = Environmental group 
24 = Religious group  
25 = Cultural association 
26 = Parent group  
27 = School committee 
28 = Health committee 
29 = Sport group 
31 = Forest protection service 
32 = Community security group 
30 = Other (specify)_______ 
  
Code 2 degree of participation 
1 = Any leader (leader, vice-leader) 
2 = Very active (other responsibility than leader) 
3 = Active (participate in all/almost all meetings) 
4 = Give help from time to time (participate in some meetings) 
= Not active (do not attend any meetings) 
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6.4 SOCIAL CAPITAL: CONNECTIONS TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES  
 Type of organisation and level 
 
Note: If respondent does not know 
which organization or level, do NOT 
add a “1” to that category. Just write 
an extra note below to explain the 
number and relation.  
3.2.1.How many people do 
you or any member of your 
household know personally 
who are members of  
[organisation]? 
 
By know personally, this is a 
two-way relationship in which 
people talk to each other and 
know at least basic 
information about one 
another. 
If 0 >> next organization 
3.2.2. 
How 
many are 
relatives 
of the 
household 
head or 
the 
spouse? 
3.2.3. 
How many are 
close friends of 
a household 
member? 
 
A close friend is 
someone who 
you or a HH 
member knows 
very well and 
could ask favors 
from 
1 Communist party at commune level    
2 People’s committee at commune level    
3 Women Union at commune level    
4 Fatherlands front union at commune 
level 
   
5 Communist party at district level    
6 People’s committee at district level    
7 Women Union at district level    
8 Fatherlands front union at district level    
9 Communist party at province level    
10 People’s committee at province level    
11 Women Union at province level    
12 Fatherlands front union at province 
level 
   
6.5 SOCIAL CAPITAL: NETWORK RELIANCE 
 If you or another HH member 
asked, would it be easy or not easy 
to [problem] from [person from your 
network]? 
 
1= easy 
2= not easy 
3.3.1.  
First 
degree 
relatives 
of HH 
head or 
spouse 
3.3.2. 
Other 
relatives of 
HH head or 
spouse 
3.3.3. 
Friends/ 
Neighbour, 
excluding 
village 
head 
3.3.4. 
Village 
head 
3.3.5. 
Unions 
1 
Borrow money for education      
2 
Borrow money for health expenses      
3 Borrow money for any positive 
event, such as a wedding 
     
4 Borrow money for any negative 
event, such as a funeral 
     
5 
Borrow a water buffaloe / cow      
6 
Ask for labour      
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6.6 SOCIAL CAPITAL: SOCIAL NORMS 
For the next few questions, I will ask you if you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly 
disagree with a statement. 
  
1= Strongly agree                
2 = Agree                               
3= Neither agree nor disagree (neutral) 
4= Disagree                         
5 = Strongly disagree 
If a household takes a risk and gains, this household is expected to share its gain with 
others in the village.  
 
If a household takes a risk and loses, others in the village are expected to help this 
household.  
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6.7 LOTTERY GAME 
We will show you different options for an actual payout. You will be making choices between 
two options. Here is an example of a choice between two options: 
 
Option A  Option B 
70%
  
chance of receiving of 40,000 VND, 
30% chance of receiving of 30,000 VND 
 70%
 
chance of receiving of 60,000 VND, 
30% chance of receiving of 5,000 VND 
    
    Option A                 Option B 
    
            
 
After you have chosen between Option A and Option B, we will roll a dice to determine which 
payout you will receive. For example, if you chose Option A, if the dice is rolled and it shows a 
1,2,3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 then you would receive 40,000 VND and if the dice is rolled and it shows a 8, 
9 or 10 then you would receive 30,000 VND.  
 
The first monetary amounts listed and darker parts of the circle under Option A and 
Option B, correspond to lower digits on the dice and the last monetary amounts listed 
under Option A and Option B correspond to higher digits on the dice. 
 
For example, if you choose Option B and the dice is rolled and it shows a 8, 9 or 10, then you 
would receive 5,000 VND. If the dice is rolled and it shows a 1 through 7, then you would 
receive 60,000 VND.  
 
Do you understand the choice between Option A and Option B? 
 
We will show you ten decisions similar to the one above, but only one of these 10 decisions will 
be played for real money after you have made all 10 decisions.  
 
40,000 
VND 
30,000 
VND 
60,000 
VND 
5,000 
VND 
1,2,3
,4,5,6,7 
1,2,3
,4,5,6,7 
8,9
,10 
8,9,
10 
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For example, if the dice is rolled and it shows a 7, then decision number 7 will be played for real 
money. No pair of choices is any more likely to be used than any other and you will not know in 
advance which one will be selected, so please think about each question carefully.  
 
After the diced is rolled to determine which choice pair will be played, we will refer to the 
questionnaire to see whether you had previously chosen Option A or Option B. Then, we will roll 
the dice again to determine the prize.  
 
There is no chance that you will lose any money by participating in this game.  
 
Do you understand how the decisions and payouts are selected randomly by rolling a dice? 
 
Now we will begin the questionnaire before one of these 10 questions is randomly selected for an 
actual payout. A field assistant will come to select which of the 10 questions will be chosen and 
to give the actual payout.  
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Option A  Option B 
10% chance of receiving 41,000 VND, 90% 
chance of receiving of 33,000 VND 
 10%
 
chance of receiving of 79,000 VND, 
90% chance of receiving of 2,000 VND 
 
 
         Option A                       Option B  
           
 
 
 
Note: In the survey conducted in November and December, 2012, prices were adjusted for 
inflation to: 35,000 VND vs. 44,000 VND in Option A and to 2,000 VND vs. 85,000 VND in 
Option B.  
 
41,000
VND 
33,000 
VND 
79,000
VND 
2,000 
VND 
1 
2,3,4,5,6,
7,8,9,10 
1 
2,3,4,5,6,
7,8,9,10 
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Option A  Option B 
20% chance of receiving 41,000 VND, 
80% chance of receiving 33,000 VND 
 20% chance of receiving 79,000 VND, 
80% chance of receiving 2,000 VND 
 
 
          Option A                      Option B  
  
         
41,000 
VND 
33,000 
VND 
79,000 
VND 
2,000 
VND 
1,2 
3,4,5,6,7,8,
9,10 
1,2 
3,4,5,6,7,8,
9,10 
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Option A  Option B 
30% chance of receiving 41,000 VND, 
70% chance of receiving 33,000 VND 
 30%
 
chance of receiving 79,000 VND, 
70% chance of receiving 2,000 VND 
 
 
       Option A                      Option B  
           
 
41,000 
VND 
33,000 
VND 
79,000 
VND 
2,000 
VND 
1,2,3 
4,5,6,7,
8,9,10 
1,2,3 
4,5,6,7
,8,9,10 
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Option A  Option B 
40%
 
chance of receiving 41,000 VND, 60% 
chance of receiving 33,000 VND 
 40%
 
chance of receiving 79,000 VND, 60% 
chance of receiving 2,000 VND 
 
 
      Option A                      Option B  
 
         
 
41,000 
VND 
33,000 
VND 
79,000 
VND 
2,000 
VND 
1,2,3,
4 
5,6,7,8,9,10 
1,2,3,
4 
5,6,7,8,9,10 
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Option A  Option B 
50% chance of receiving 41,000 VND, 50% 
chance of receiving 33,000 VND 
 50% chance of receiving 79,000 VND, 50% 
chance of receiving 2,000 VND 
 
 
       Option A                      Option B  
           
41,000  
VND 
33,000 
VND 
79,000  
VND 
2,000 
VND 
1,2,3,
4,5 
6,7,8,9,
10 
1,2,3,
4,5 
6,7,8,9,
10 
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Option A  Option B 
60% chance of receiving 41,000 VND, 40% 
chance of receiving 33,000 VND 
 60% chance of receiving 79,000 VND, 40% 
chance of receiving 2,000 VND 
 
 
       Option A                      Option B  
           
 
41,000 
VND 
33,000 
VND 
79,000 
VND 
2,000 
VND 
1,2,3,
4,5,6 
7,8,9,
10 
1,2,3,
4,5,6 
7,8,9,
10 
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Option A  Option B 
70% chance of receiving 41,000 VND, 30% 
chance of receiving 33,000 VND 
 70% chance of receiving 79,000 VND, 30% 
chance of receiving 2,000 VND 
 
 
       Option A                      Option B  
           
 
41,000 
VND 
33,000 
VND 
79,000 
VND 
2,000 
VND 
1,2,3,4,
5,6,7 
1,2,3,4,
5,6,7 
8,9,10 8,9,10 
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Option A  Option B 
80% chance of receiving 41,000 VND, 20% 
chance of receiving 33,000 VND 
 80% chance of receiving 79,000 VND, 20% 
chance of receiving 2,000 VND 
 
       Option A                   Option B  
           
 
41,000 
VND 
33,000 
VND 
79,000 
VND 
2,000 
VND 
1,2,3,4,
5,6,7,8 
9,10 
1,2,3,4,
5,6,7,8 
9,10 
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Option A  Option B 
90% chance of receiving 41,000 VND, 10% 
chance of receiving 33,000 VND 
 90% chance of receiving 79,000 VND, 10% 
chance of receiving 2,000 VND 
 
       Option A                   Option B  
 
           
 
 
41,000 
VND 
33,000 
VND 
79,000 
VND 
2,000 
VND 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7
,8, 9 
10 
1,2,3,4,5,6,
7,8, 9 
10 
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Option A  Option B 
100% chance of receiving 41,000 VND, 0% 
chance of receiving 33,000 VND 
 100% chance of receiving 79,000 VND, 0% 
chance of receiving 2,000 VND 
 
 
       Option A                      Option B  
          
 
41,000 
VND 
79,000
VND 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,
8,9, 10 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,
8,9, 10 
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Answer sheet for recording lottery game: 
 
 
1. Payout Option 
 
1= Option A 
2 = Option B 
1.1  
1.2  
1.3  
1.4  
1.5  
1.6  
1.7  
1.8  
1.9  
1.10  
Ask respondent to look over their responses again in case they want to make any changes. 
1.11  If HH chose Option A for 1.10 mark “1” here and re-ask 1.1 to 1.10 over again!!  
1.12 If respondents insists on choosing Option A in 1.10, put a one in the box and, ask 
his/her reasoning and write in detail here why: 
 
 
 
1.13 If the respondent chooses Option B for all cases, ask his/her reason and write in 
detail here why: 
 
 
 
1.14 If the respondent switches between Option A and B, ask his/her reason and write in 
detail here why: 
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Receipt sheet for lottery game  
 
First roll of dice:                             
 
                                                 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10) 
 
(This first roll of the dice determines which option will be played for real money.) 
 
Household’s previous choice of Option A or B for selected option: 
(Refer to answer given previously in the questionnaire)                                
          1= Option A 
          2= Option B 
Second roll of dice:  
   (to determine payout)                    (1 to 10) 
 
 
Amount received from payout option (Determined by a second roll of the dice. Refer to game 
selected in the questionnaire (2.1-2.10) for which number on the dice corresponds to which 
payout) 
_________________ VND 
 
 
Signature of the interviewer: _________________ 
 
 
 
Signature of the respondent: ____________________ 
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6.8 FINANCIAL RISK TOLERANCE QUESTION 
Which of the following statements describes closest the amount of financial risk that you are willing to take when you save or make 
investments: 
1. Take substantial financial risk expecting to earn substantial returns 
2. Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns 
3. Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns 
4. Not willing to take any financial risks 
 
6.9 SELF ASSESSMENT SCALE 
6.8.1 How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking 
risks? Please rank yourself from a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 as fully avoiding risks and 10 as fully prepared to take risks. You 
can choose ANY value between 0 and 10.     Interview: Show scale, kb = do not know.  
 
6.8.2 When you young were still dependent on your parents, would you say that your father was avoiding taking risks or are 
you fully prepared to take risks?    Interview: Show scale 77 = not applicable, kb = do not know 
 
6.8.3 When you young were still dependent on your parents, would you say that your mother was avoiding taking risks or 
are you fully prepared to take risks ?    Interview: Show scale 77 = not applicable, kb = do not know 
 
  0               1               2                 3                 4                  5                   6               7                8                  9              10 
  
           
 
Fully avoiding taking risks                                Fully prepared to take risks
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6.10 INCOME SERIES 
Interviewer: show participants the graph while explaining the question.  
Suppose you are the only income earner in your household. You are told that you must change your income earning activity and have 
two possibilities. The first income earning activity would guarantee you an annual income for life that is equal to your current total 
family income. The second is possibly a better paying income earning activity, but the income is less certain: there is a 50% chance 
that the second income earning activity would double your total lifetime income and a 50% chance that it would cut it by one-third. 
Which income earning activity would you take? 
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Suppose the chances were 50% that the second income earning activity would double your lifetime income and a 50% chance that it 
would cut it in half. Would you take the first income earning activity or the second income earning activity?    
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Suppose the chances were 50% that the second income earning activity would double your lifetime income and 50% that it would cut 
it by 75%. Would you take the first income earning activity or the second income earning activity? 
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Suppose the chances were 50% that the second income earning activity would double your lifetime income and 50% that it would cut 
it by 20%. Would you take the first income earning activity or the second income earning activity? 
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Suppose the chances were 50% that the second income earning activity would double your lifetime income and 50% that it would cut 
it by 10%. Would you take the first income earning activity or the second income earning activity? 
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6.11 INHERITANCE SERIES 
Suppose a relative who owned a gas station passed away and you inherited the gas station which is worth 336 million VND. You have 
to decide whether to sell the gas station and receive 336 million VND or to sell the gas station in one month and have a 50% chance of 
doubling your money to 672 million VND and a 50% chance of losing one-third of it, leaving you with 224 million VND. Would you 
sell the gas station now or wait a month? 
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Suppose that waiting a month would result in a 50% chance that the money would be doubled to 672 million VND and a 50% chance 
that it would be reduced by half, to 168 million VND. Would you sell the gas station now or wait a month? 
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Suppose now that waiting a month would result in a 50% chance that the money would be doubled to 672 million VND and a 50% 
chance that it would be reduced by 75%, to 84 million VND. Would you sell the gas station now or wait a month? 
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Suppose that waiting a month would result in a 50% chance that the money would be doubled to 672 million VND and a 50% chance 
that it would be reduced by 20%, to 269 million VND. Would you sell the gas station now or wait a month? 
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Suppose that waiting a month would result in a 50% chance that the money would be doubled to 672 million VND and a 50% chance 
that it would be reduced by 10%, to 302 million VND. Would you sell the gas station now or wait a month? 
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6.12 MAIZE PRICE SERIES 
Which of the following dry seed maize selling prices would you prefer, assuming that yields stay 
constant? 
1 3,900 VND/kg, every year  
2 3,300 VND/kg with 50% probability and 5,050 VND/kg with 50% probability, every year 
3 2,700 VND/kg with 50% probability and 6,250 VND/kg with 50% probability, every year 
4 2,150 VND/kg with 50% probability and 7,400 VND/kg with 50% probability, every year 
 
                     1                                              2                     
                           
                              3                                                                  4                       
                      
Notes: These are based on median prices in 2009 (adjusted for inflation). In the survey conducted 
in November and December, 2011, these were adjusted for median prices in Yen Chau in 2010 
(adjusted for inflation) and were: Option 1: 5,000 VND; Option 2; 4,250 VND vs. 6,500 VND; 
Option 3: 3,500 VND vs. 7,000 VND; Option 4: 2,750 VND vs. 8,500 VND.  
3,900 
VND
/kg 
5,050 
VND/
kg 
3,300
VND/
kg 
6,250 
VND/
kg 
2,700
VND/
kg 
7,400 
VND/
kg 
2,150
VND/
kg 
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6.13 MAIZE YIELD SERIES:  
Which of the following dry seed maize yields would you prefer, assuming that prices stay 
constant? 
  
1  6.8 tons/ha every year 
2  5.8 tons/ha with 50% probability and 8.8 tons/ha with 50% probability, every year 
3  4.8 tons/ha with 50% probability and 10.9 tons/ha with 50% probability, every year 
4   3.7 tons/ha with 50% probability and 12.9 tons/ha with 50% probability, every year 
    
        1                                         2                     
               
 
                              3                                                    4                       
           
Notes: These are based on median yields in 2009. In the survey conducted in November and 
December, 2011, these were adjusted for median yields in Yen Chau in 2010 and were: Option 
1:6.0 tons; Option 2: 5.1 vs. 7.8 tons; Option 3: 4.2 vs. 9.6 tons; Option 4: 3.3 vs. 11.4 tons.  
6.8 
tons/
ha 
8.8 
tons/
ha 
5.8 
tons/
ha 
10.9 
tons/
ha 
4.8 
tons/
ha 
12.9 
tons/
ha 
3.7 
tons/
ha 
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6.14 RICE PRICE SERIES:  
Which of the following unhusked rice prices would you prefer in the rainy (summer) season, 
assuming that yields stay constant?  
 
1. 6,550 VND/kg, every year  
2.  5,550 VND/kg with 50% probability and 8,500 VND/kg with 50% probability, every year  
3.  4,600 VND/kg with 50% probability and 10,500 VND/kg with 50% probability, every year 
4 . 3,600 VND/kg with 50% probability and 12,450 VND/kg with 50% probability, every year  
 
               1                                                      2                     
               
                               3                                                      4                       
            
Notes: These are based on median prices in 2009 (adjusted for inflation). In the survey conducted 
in November and December, 2011, these were adjusted for median prices in Yen Chau in 2010 
(adjusted for inflation) and were: Option 1: 9,000 VND; Option 2; 7,700 VND vs. 11,700 VND; 
Option 3: 6,300 VND vs. 14,000 VND; Option 4: 5,000 VND vs. 17,000 VND.  
6,550 
VND
/kg 
8,500 
VND/
kg 
5,550 
VND/
kg 
10,500 
VND/
kg 
4,600 
VND/
kg 
12,450
VND/
kg 
3,600 
VND/
kg 
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6.15 RICE YIELD SERIES:  
Which of the following rice yields would you prefer in the rainy (summer) season, assuming that 
prices stay constant?    
 
1  5 tons/ha every year 
2  4.25 tons/ha with 50% probability and 6.5 tons/ha with 50% probability, every year 
3  3.5 tons/ha with 50% probability and 8 tons/ha with 50% probability, every year 
4  2.75 tons/ha with 50% probability and 9.5 tons/ha with 50% probability, every year  
    
                   1                                          2                     
               
                              3                                                           4                       
              
Notes: These are based on median yields in 2009. In the survey conducted in November and 
December, 2011, these were adjusted for median yields in Yen Chau in 2010 and were:  
Option 1:4.8 tons; Option 2: 4.1 vs. 6.2 tons; Option 3: 3.4 vs. 7.7 tons; Option 4: 2.6 vs. 9.1 
tons.  
5.0 
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ha 
6.5 
tons/
ha 
4.25 
tons/
ha 
8.0 
tons/
ha 
3.5 
tons/
ha 
9.5 
tons/
ha 
2.75 
tons/
ha 
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6.16  PICTURE RANKING OF RISKS 
For these three questions, show the respondent the pictures (mixed) on a flat surface and have 
them order them. Then, write down the order. If respondent cannot rank, write the code in the 
“do not know” row. If 2+ answers are “tied”, then write the codes separated by a “/”.  
 
Please rank the following crops in terms of their riskiness for 
your household’s income from low risk to high risk:  expansion 
of: 
rice, maize, mango, pig production, cattle trading, cattle 
production for meat, fish ponds, chicken production.                                    
       
code 2 
 
 
Do not know: 
 
Please rank the following in terms of their riskiness from low risk 
to high risk:  
taking out an agricultural loan from a bank for all inputs for 
maize, taking out an agricultural loan from an informal source for 
all inputs for maize, applying more fertilizers, applying more 
inputs excluding fertilizers, using high-yielding varieties                       
                           
code 3 
 
Do not know: 
 
Code 2: 
1 =  rice 
2 = maize 
3 = mango 
41 = Ban pig 
42 = exotic pig 
5= cattle trading 
6 = cattle production for meat 
7 = fish ponds 
8 = chicken production 
 
Code 3: 
1 = taking out an agricultural loan from a formal 
source for all inputs for maize (such as VBSP, 
VBARD) 
2 = taking out an agricultural loan from an 
informal source for all inputs for maize 
3 = applying more fertilizers  
4 = applying more inputs, excluding fertilizers 
5 = using high-yield varieties 
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6.17 DECISION-MAKING POWER 
 
Explain each category of 
decision making (sole, 
main and joint) and give 
an example for each.  
Sole decision 
maker: no need 
to discuss/have 
agreement with 
others 
Main or dominant 
decision maker:  others 
may be involved but the 
decision-making process 
is dominated by you 
Joint decision maker: you are 
involved in the decision and you nor 
others have a dominant position in 
decisions.  
Decision making within 
HHs 
1.2.1  
Are you the only 
person who 
makes decisions 
for (source)? 
 
1 =Yes >> next 
source 
2 = No 
3 = Not 
applicable/none 
of source>> next 
source 
1.2.2 Are you the main 
decision maker, for 
[source]?    
1 = Yes >> next source 
2 = No 
1.2.3 
Do you make 
decisions jointly 
about [source] with 
others?  
 
1 = Yes 
2 = No >> next 
source 
1.2.4 
With whom do 
you make joint 
decisions with 
in your HH for 
[source]? 
 
1 = male 
head/spouse 
2 = female 
head/spouse 
3 = son 
4 = daughter 
5 = other 
(specify) 
____________ 
 
1 
Keeping track of  
family finances 
    
2 Savings     
3 
Taking out a cash or 
in-kind loan greater 
or equal to 2 million 
VND, excl. in-kind 
input loans 
    
4 Repaying [above]     
5 
Taking out an in-kind 
input loan greater or 
equal to 2 million 
VND 
    
6 Repaying [above]     
7 
Taking out a cash/in-
kind loan over 
200,000 & up to 2 
million VND 
    
8 Repaying [above]      
9 
Taking out a cash/in-
kind loan between 
10,000 and 200,000 
VND 
    
10 Repaying [above]     
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6.18 MAP OF YEN CHAU 
 
Source: Taken from Saint-Macary, C. 2011. Microeconomic impacts of institutional transformation in Vietnam's 
Northern Uplands: Empirical studies on social capital, land and credit institutions. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of 
Hohenheim. Stuttgart, Germany.   
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